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ABSTRACT 
 
The Basins-At-Risk theory formulates relations between institutional capacity in a basin 
and the level of water conflict in that basin, suggesting that higher levels of institutional 
capacity will lead to reduced levels of water conflict in a given system. I test the 
substance of this theory using comparative, simulation-based analysis of water resources 
systems in the USA and Spain. I determine whether, given two artificial societies 
experiencing water conflict, expanding institutional capacity would indeed lead to 
reduced conflict levels. I develop and apply two agent-based models of society and 
hydrology: one for Albacete, Spain, and the other for the Snake River, eastern Idaho, 
USA. Each model incorporates essential elements of the regional society: real world 
actors are translated into proactive deliberative agents using a BDI framework; the 
hydrology/geology is represented either through use of pre-existing models, or basic 
hydrologic simulation; economic, societal and other dynamics are represented through 
additional databases and agent rule bases. I apply the models experimentally to explore 
the societal effects of adding an additional institution to the existing water resources 
management institutions: ground water banking, a new set of rules for agents to interact 
with their hydrologic system. I run both models over historical and projected time 
periods, testing out different scenarios of variation in internal and external agent 
environment to explore the detailed dynamics of each system. Results and analysis 
suggest that institutional capacity and water conflict dynamics are strongly related, but 
that the direction of influence can vary. I identify critical elements of the design of 
ground water banking institutions, when considering their potential success in mitigating 
conflict. I also investigate the possibilities of engineering a universally portable socio-
hydrologic agent, and discover that while the concepts of the chosen cognitive 
architecture may be portable, it is effectively impossible to guarantee a fully portable 
technical implementation. 
 
Thesis Advisor: David H. Marks 
Title: Professor of Civil and Environmental Engineering and Engineering Systems 
Division 
 
Thesis Reader: Michael Flaxman 
Title: Assistant Professor of Urban Studies and Planning
 
 5 
Table Of Contents 
ABSTRACT 3 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 5 
1.0 ... INTRODUCTION 7 
1.1 ... Institutional analysis and water conflict 7 
1.2 ... The influence of institutions on domestic conflict 7 
1.3 ... Institutions and water conflict in the western US 8 
1.4 ... Institutions and water conflict in eastern Spain 9 
1.5 ... Justification for focus area selection 10 
2.0 ... PROBLEM STATEMENT 14 
2.1 ... Study purpose and general approach 15 
2.2 ... Research Questions 16 
2.3 ... Major Hypothesis 16 
2.4 ... Sub-Hypothesis 18 
2.5 ... Construct definition 18 
2.6 ... Modeling precedent and theoretical base 22 
2.7 ... Sources of empirical data 23 
2.8 ... GWBSIM empirical data 23 
2.9 ... AlbAgent empirical data sources 29 
3.0 ... CHARACTERIZING ARTIFICIAL SOCIO-HYDROLOGIC SYSTEMS 31 
3.1.0 ... GWBSIM specification 31 
3.1.1 ... Environment 31 
3.1.2 ... Agents 35 
3.2 ... AlbAgent specification 50 
3.2.1 ... Environment 50 
3.2.4 ... AlbAgent agents 56 
4.0 ... Design Of Experiments: GWBSIM and AlbAgent 70 
 6 
4.1 ... Methodological Limitations 76 
5.0 ... RESULTS 79 
5.1 ... Final experimental specifications 79 
5.1.1 ... GWBSIM 79 
5.1.2 ... AlbAgent 79 
5.2 ... Presentation and analysis of results 79 
5.2.1 ... GWBSIM 79 
5.2.2 ... AlbAgent 106 
5.3 ... DISCUSSION 137 
5.3.1 ... A note on achieving steady state 137 
5.3.2 ... GWBSIM discussion 138 
5.3.3 ... AlbAgent Discussion 146 
5.4 ... Comparative Analysis, GWBSIM and AlbAgent 153 
5.5 ... Discussing results from the perspective of the Sub Hypothesis 158 
6.0 ... CONCLUSIONS 165 
6.1 ... Research Question 1 165 
6.1.1 … Conclusions on existence of a theoretical relation 165 
6.1.2 … Conclusions on the nature of the confirmed theoretical relation 166 
6.1.3 … Additional conclusions on the limitations of a banking system 169 
6.1.4 … Conclusions on contributions to the Basins-At-Risk theory 169 
6.2 ... Research Question 2 172 
7.0 ... Suggestions for Further Work 175 
7.1 ... Agent-based modeling of socio-hydrologic systems 175 
7.2 ... Institutional capacity and water conflict 175 
7.3 ... Ground water banking 176 
APPENDIX 177 
Part A 177 
Semi-structured interviewing guide – eastern Idaho,  January/February 2007 177 
Part B 180 
Generic hydrologic agent: proposed framework for adaptation to and implementation in specific 
simulation contexts 180 
Note on diagrams 180 
REFERENCES 186 
 7 
1.0 ... Introduction 
1.1 ... Institutional analysis and water conflict 
 
A recent prominent theme in water resources management research (e.g. Wolf 1997, 
Wolf 1998, Beach et al 2000, Carius et al 2006) has been the statistical and qualitative 
study of international water systems for the purposes of determining those conditions that 
lead to conflict and those that avoided or mitigated conflict. One of the findings suggests 
that fostering and maintaining appropriate institutional capacity is critically important to 
reducing the likelihood of conflict. As Carius et al (2006) suggest, “the key variable is not 
absolute water scarcity, but the resilience of the institutions that manage water and its 
associated tensions” (Carius et al 2006: 1). Miller et al (1997) suggest that water 
allocation institutions have a critical role to play in mitigating conflict over water 
allocation due to climate change. This finding is not restricted to academia. The 
Development Assistance Committee of the OECD recently released a report suggesting 
that “the development of shared data, information systems, water management 
institutions, and legal frameworks helps to sustain efforts to reduce the risk of conflict” 
(OECD 2005). 
 
1.2 ... The influence of institutions on domestic conflict  
 
The focus on international water conflict in the research community is perhaps 
understandable: international conflicts seem more serious from the perspective of 
potential armed escalation, even though several studies have pointed out that water wars 
are extremely rare and international water conflict seems more a driver for cooperation 
than antagonism: “water is a trigger for conflict, but a reason to make peace” (Ohlsson 
1997:13). The domestic context of links between institutional capacity and conflict has 
seen far less attention outside of research focusing on the developing world (e.g. Hamdy 
et al 2002). Work has mainly focused on the details of implementing or evaluating water 
trading institutions (Easter et al 1999), tracking institutional change in response to 
climatic and economic forcers (Miller et al 1996; Livingston 1994), or exploring the role 
of institutions in integrated water resources management (Solanes and Gonzalez-Villareal 
1999): in other words, how to design better institutions, and how institutions are changing 
in response to social, economic and environmental shifts. Very little work has been done 
explicitly exploring the effect of different forms and degrees of institutional capacity, and 
changes to institutional capacity, on water conflict. It is unclear why this is so. Domestic 
conflicts may represent much more complex and nuanced cases than international 
settings, or may simply be less high profile and so less attractive for researchers (or for 
funders). However, water conflict in the developed world appears to be more intractable 
at a domestic scale, far less an occasion for cooperation than in international settings 
(Ohlsson 1997). This may be due to their lower profile (high profile international disputes 
tend to attract resources for their resolution), or because the complexity of the interaction 
between management entities can be much more complex for local and regional water 
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resources. In any case, institutions on a domestic scale are likely to be as important as 
their international counterparts: many countries have evolved complex vertically and 
horizontally distributed institutional structures for water resources management that are 
implicated in every aspect of the management and use of water, from bore-hole to tap and 
back again. The relations between these institutions and the water conflicts their host 
systems often experience form the general focus area of this thesis. 
 This paper seeks to direct more attention to the relations between institutional 
capacity and domestic conflict, using a comparative, simulation-based analysis of regions 
in the USA and Spain. The USA and Spain are chosen on the basis of several important 
characteristics: the existence of a number of serious domestic (inter- and intrastate) water 
conflicts that threaten the social, economic and environmental fabric of entire regions, 
providing a number of options for case selection; the relative abundance of information 
on the evolution of these conflicts and associated institutions, making for more easier 
calibration, verification and validation of conflict models; and the sophistication of pre-
existing tools for tracking and modeling the physical basis of such conflicts, allowing the 
conjunctive analysis of social, economic and environmental systems related to conflict. 
Of course, the settings are not identical in these respects: data on land and water use is 
better organized and more accessible in the US compared with Spain; Spain has a very 
different political and institutional structure for managing water and water conflicts 
compared with the US. This is why a comparative analytical approach is adopted: by 
comparing simulations of these different settings, the dynamics of each system can be put 
in context, and some useful side lessons obtained as to the viability and universality of 
using agent-based approaches to simulate water conflict settings. 
 
1.3 ... Institutions and water conflict in the western US 
 
In the United States, real or potential water conflict is most acute in the western states, 
where it represents a serious challenge to regional social, economic and environmental 
health. Fundamental ecohydrological realities – low precipitation and low river density – 
have contributed to setting up western American society and economy for conflict. But 
most of the problem is sourced in social, economic and institutional trends: growing 
cities, a huge industrialized irrigated agricultural base, and a historical record of local, 
state and federal institutions adopting a development-against-all-odds approach to meet 
profligate demand absolutely disconnected from hydrological and climatological realities 
(Reisner 1987). One response to such realities is new construction of water resource 
infrastructure: augmenting dam or canal capacity, tapping new underground storage, or 
altering the flows of water around storage and distribution systems. But even changes to 
physical infrastructure may require institutional intervention, such as changes to dam 
operation policy or the structure of allocation agreements. Furthermore, any changes to 
physical infrastructure immediately come up against a variety of major local, regional and 
national institutions. From state water law and local groundwater users associations, to 
interstate compacts and state water resources management agencies, to national Acts of 
Congress and major federal bureaucracies, institutions of one form or another are likely 
to present barriers or bridges to change in western American water resources 
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management. As Livingston (1994) suggests, “Institutional arrangements set the ground 
rules for resource use. At best, institutions facilitate achievement of economic and social 
goals. At worst, they establish impediments to efficient resource use” (Livingston 1994: 
1), as well as possibly causing environmental damage, social conflict and promoting 
unsustainable water resources management.  
   
1.4 ... Institutions and water conflict in eastern Spain 
 
Conflict over water in Spain is nothing new, and nor are water institutions. The country 
has severe disparities in the distribution of water by volume: the northern basins of Spain 
receive 18 times more water than the arid southeastern basins (Garrido 2001). When 
paired with the economic and demographic realities of growth in the southern 
Mediterranean climates of the country, conflicts appear inevitable. This is particularly 
true when we consider that, like the US, Spain devotes over 80% of its water to 
agricultural irrigation (ibid). Consequently, the bulk of the institutional capacity in the 
country is organized around the task of obtaining water for and distributing water to the 
agricultural community. 
 Like the western US, Spain has an abundance of water institutions, although some 
of them are far older than their western US counterparts: water courts were operating in 
Spain from the late middle ages (Maas and Anderson 1978). Johansson et al (2002) 
suggest that in Spain as much as elsewhere, “the laws and rules that define water 
distribution will naturally affect the performance of the system” (Johansson et al 2002, 
187). Swyngedouw (1999) argues that “throughout this [20th] century, water politics, 
economics, culture and engineering have infused and embodied the myriad tensions and 
conflicts that drove and still drive Spanish society” (Swyngedouw 1999, 1). More 
recently, the National Water Plan (NWP) of 1993, which proposed an ambitious set of 
new storage and distribution infrastructure projects, generated significant political 
conflict between the various autonomous regions of Spain and the central government 
(Sauri and del Moral 2001). Water institutions in Spain appear to be shifting away from 
the classic approach of the ‘hydraulic age’: building their way out of trouble with dams, 
pipelines and other storage and diversion infrastructure. After the problematic reception 
of the NWP, the Spanish federal government engineered a radical shift in policy, now 
“recognizing economic costs and environmental concerns” (Bukowski 2007, 2). Recent 
work by Gomez-Limon and Martinez (2005) suggests that the importance of water 
markets (as an economic institution to supplement existing institutions) has been 
underestimated in Spain; they recommend the implementation of irrigation water markets 
in the Duero Basin of northern Spain as a way to “increase economic efficiency and 
agricultural labor demand, particularly during droughts” (Gomez-Limon and Martinez 
2004, 1). Albiac et al (2003) make a detailed study of a more traditional approach to 
water scarcity, physical transfer of water from one region to another. In this case, the 
water transfer is taking place between the Ebro basin and several south-eastern regions of 
Spain. These authors take an institutional perspective, exploring the economic costs of 
the water transfer, and suggesting that the physical solution falls short of being truly 
sustainable. They recommend instead that the transfer be accompanied by demand 
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management - an institutional solution - to mitigate its lack of economic sustainability 
(Albiac et al 2003).  
 Despite the increasing realization in Spanish water management agencies as well 
as academia of the conceptual and practical linkages between socioeconomic institutions 
and the availability of water for human use, the Spanish national press continues to be 
replete with stories of political conflict between farmers in different regions, between 
farmers and cities, between cities, between regions, and between regions and the national 
government (Llamas 1988; Swyngedou 1999). Garrido (2001) suggests that the root of 
the conflict is the “growth in water demand and maturity of the Spanish water economy” 
(Garrido 2001, 237). While Garrido appears to be suggesting that practical realities of 
social and economic growth are responsible for conflict, this thesis will argue (adopting 
the approach pioneered by the Basins At Risk (BAR) project at Oregon State University; 
OSU 2003) that it is institutional capacity which is fundamentally to blame for conflicted 
water use and management. It is, in any case, abundantly clear in Spain that institutions 
as well as infrastructure and climate play a critical role in the existence and severity of 
conflict: national and regional plans compete for legislative and fiscal attention; federal 
agencies compete with regional, local and now supranational agencies (the EU Water 
Framework Directive) for jurisdiction and control. In some ways, the climatic and 
hydrologic setting is on the simple side of the equation; the number and diversity of 
competing institutions and philosophies regarding water management in Spain adds huge 
complexity and uncertainty to the picture. As Cots et al (2007) suggest, “current 
European water assessment and management systems are increasingly under pressure to 
develop new practices capable to meet growing societal demands for sustainable 
development as well as mounting biophysical pressures such as climate change” (Cots et 
al 2007, 2). Note that the problem is largely conceptualized as a societal problem 
requiring changes in practice, in other words, modifications to existing institutions: 
“Moving towards a more flexible and adaptive paradigm capable to deal with uncertainty, 
multiple perspectives... will require a shift in the design of institutions” (ibid, 3). It is a 
short conceptual leap from there to the idea that not only is existing institutional 
complexity linked to problematic water management, but that a lack of capacity for 
institutional change may have similarly dire implications for conflict. 
 These brief introductions to both Spanish and US settings are intended to 
highlight the importance of institutions to water management and conflict. As such, they 
ground a core proposition of the thesis: if we are to efficiently and effectively engineer 
new institutions or alter existing ones, we need to understand the influence of different 
forms and degrees of institutional capacity on the generation and/or resolution of conflict 
in the domestic setting. Achieving this understanding could be approached from a number 
of angles; this thesis proposes the use of systems modeling to obtain simulation-based 
evidence of a qualitative and theoretical relationship between particular forms and 
degrees of institutional capacity, and the generation or resolution of water conflict.   
 
1.5 ... Justification for focus area selection 
 
The choice for the first focus area, the state of Idaho in the western US, is mainly due to 
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the fact that the state is broadly representative of the emerging social, economic and 
environmental character of a new American West: increasing and increasingly urban 
populations (IDCL 2005), a rapidly growing economy (Thredgold 2006; IDCL 2006) and 
an agricultural sector (dependent largely on irrigation) seeing a trend towards fewer, 
larger and more industrialized farms (IRP 2006). Most major rivers in the state are over-
appropriated, and conflicts of varying severity are emerging throughout the state. As for 
many states in the West, these appear to stem from fundamental collisions in use at the 
nexus of multiple interests and value systems: preservation of endangered species under 
the auspices of the ESA, growing urban demand, Native American assertion of senior 
water rights, and traditional agricultural hegemony over water rights and usage: “demand 
for water by existing agricultural and urban users outstrips available supplies in many 
cases…so demand for water for public purposes or for increased urban supplies 
necessarily conflicts with existing patterns of water use” (Weinberg 1997: 5). As climate 
change looms, two significant shifts in Idaho’s hydroclimatological character suggest 
serious potential future conflict within the state: increased summer temperatures and 
reduced summer rainfall, increased winter runoff but reduced winter snow-pack (Hamlet 
and Lettenmaier 1999). Potential increases summer temperatures and reductions in 
summer rainfall would lead to reductions in natural flows at the most critical time for 
agricultural users; the potential reduction in winter snow-pack would lead to less spring 
and early summer runoff, further decrementing natural flows and groundwater recharge. 
Meanwhile, increased winter runoff would lead to elevated natural flows at entirely the 
wrong time of year for the agricultural growing season. Options to adapt to and mitigate 
the effects of these climatic shifts include changes to the physical infrastructure of water 
abstraction, storage and distribution, and/or changes to the institutional structure by 
which water is managed in the state. Coupled with the potential for a narrowing in the 
hydrological capacity of the system, new uses and users are coming online that threaten 
to complicate and further stress the system: Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations 
(CAFOs), dairies, municipalities, aquaculture, power, traditional irrigated agriculture, in-
stream flow allocation for environmental use, and recreational users are coming into legal 
and political conflict over the management of the system. Some conflicts are emerging, 
ironically, through the efforts of some users to become more efficient. As the canal 
companies line their canals and convert to sprinkler operations, less water infiltrates the 
aquifer, with concomitant effects on the aquifer phreatic surface. This may be causing 
reductions in spring flows downstream upon which other users depend. Layered on top of 
these biophysical, demographic and economic realities is an archaic system of water 
rights based on the doctrine of prior appropriation. This doctrine dates back to a period 
prior to the emergence of powerful centrifugal pumps after WWII, and so is ill-equipped 
to handle ground water pumping at an institutional level, and certainly not in a 
conjunctive manner with surface water resources. Consequently, the current water rights 
system in Idaho is under full review by the state department of water resources. This 
implies significant institutional uncertainty that is arguably contributing to the genesis 
and prolongation of conflicts. This institutional uncertainty is compounded by an ongoing 
lawsuit at the state supreme court, brought by a consortium of surface water users against 
ground water users in the basin. Clearly, the current legal, political, social, economic and 
hydrologic complexities of water conflict in Idaho provide an ideal point of departure for 
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an effort focused on exploring the generation and/or resolution of conflict due to changes 
in institutional capacity. 
 Time and resource limitations of this project mean a focus on a sub regional 
conflict emerging in eastern Idaho over surface and groundwater use around the Eastern 
Snake Plain Aquifer (ESPA) and the Snake River. In addition to the complex and lengthy 
process of water rights adjudication (IDWR 2006) being conducted by Idaho Department 
of Water Resources (IDWR), the Idaho Water Resource Board (IWRB) is currently 
working with private consultants, state and federal agencies to develop a range of options 
for better management of a scarce resource and resolve outstanding legal challenges. 
Options being considered include groundwater banking (Schmidt 2006), new water 
transfer regulations and expansion to surface storage: a range of physical and institutional 
enhancements to the existing system. The ESPA social-biophysical system is at a critical 
juncture for resource management: conflict is already emerging, and forecasted climatic, 
population and economic changes that may enhance the conflict makes for some urgency 
in the search for solutions. 
 This specific focus area was selected on the basis of several additional factors: 
first, there is currently an active conversation among stakeholders in Idaho over potential 
institutional alternatives – groundwater banking being prominent among them. 
Consequently, detailed information on potential groundwater banking implementation 
options in Idaho already exists (e.g. USBR/IWRRI 1999; Contor and Johnson 2005) as 
well as ongoing research by IWRRI and USBR into the substance of alternative options 
(USBR/IWRRI 2006). This provides a rich, readily available source of data for 
developing, parameterizing and having expert review of simulation scenarios. Second, 
any simulation of a water resources system would be deficient if it did not actually 
incorporate some hydrological modeling. A sophisticated, robust groundwater modeling 
tool already exists, the IDWR/UI Eastern Snake Plain Aquifer Model (ESPAM: Cosgrove 
et al 1999). This is a 2D finite difference model based on the respected MODFLOW code 
from the USGS, and simulates the flow of surface and subsurface groundwater in the 
ESPA area. The beta version of the model, the results of which this paper is written on, 
did not link directly with this model (although this is a planned development in coming 
months). However, its simple hydrological module draws on the principles of the 
ESPAM and uses the same time series calibration data, so does have some hydrologic 
functionality. Thirdly, the conflict of interests and values in the ESPA area bears strong 
similarities to other settings in the Western US. Analytical conclusions from modeling 
this system may consequently hold significant external validity. 
 The second focus area in eastern Spain was initially chosen, rather prosaically, 
because of some of the author’s work on a separate project related to the Albacete 
municipality in Castilla-La Mancha. The striking similarities, and yet stark differences, 
between the eastern Spanish and western American contexts suggested some fruitful 
comparative work could be undertaken. On closer inspection, it became even clearer that 
the setting in Albacete provided some rich material for simulation and analysis. The 
Albacete municipality and provincial region is an exceptionally arid area, receiving less 
than 8 inches of precipitation a year. Climate change threatens to diminish this even 
further as the century unfolds. The existing surface water resources - the Jucar River and 
associated tributaries - are heavily over abstracted, to the point of zero surface flow 
 13 
through much of the region. Extensive agricultural development, which began in the 
region around the city of Albacete in the late 1950s (Angelo, pers. comm. 2007), has 
largely tapped into the Eastern Oriental aquifer and caused extensive and severe 
drawdown (Lopez Sanz 1999). The ground water system remains around 30% over-
abstracted each year (i.e. pumping is at least 130% of recharge to the aquifer in any given 
year; Angelo, pers. comm. 2007), and the water table has dropped to the point where 
pumping costs and water quality concerns are serious considerations both for farmers and 
the local urban communities. As Carmona and Varela-Ortega (2007) point out, the region 
has suffered from historical policies encouraging ground water use for agricultural 
irrigation irrespective of its fundamental hydrologic sustainability - first the Franco 
government, and then the European Union (Carmona and Varela-Ortega 2007; Varela et 
al 1998). ,  
 Spain differs considerably from the western United States in its institutional 
setting. While Western US water law was originally based on Spanish legal precedent, 
subsequent institutional modifications have caused some divergence.  California and 
many of the wetter states in the West, for example, evolved a complex part-riparian, part-
appropriative system (Kanazawa 1998). But even among the drier states such as 
Colorado, the prior appropriations system that had spread across the region and originates 
in Spanish water law underwent considerable modification. This is above and beyond the 
fact that the prior appropriations doctrine emerged more as a practical response to the 
demands of mining with limited water in the 1800s, rather than as a simple facsimile of 
the colonial, Hispanic institutions (ibid). With the emergence of the EU Water 
Framework Directive (WFD) as a new and powerful force shaping European water 
resources management Chave 2001), Spain pulls well away from the Western US model 
which has nothing like the level of federal attention to local detail that the WFD implies. 
As Chave suggests, the WFD is “probably the most significant legislative instrument in 
the water field to be introduced on an international basis for many years” (Chave 2001, 
1). Among the key philosophical principles of the policy are elements that are generally 
inimical to the common conception of Western US water law and policy: the 
precautionary principle, an explicitly selected high level of protection, deliberate steps to 
take preventative action, forcing the polluter pays principle on industry, and integrating 
WRM into other environmental policies (ibid). Like all parties to the EU, Spain has being 
going through steps outlined in the WFD text: classification of hydrological systems into 
River Basin Districts, development of reference condition data, assessment of ecological 
status, and so on, with the ultimate objective being to achieve “good status” for all 
European waters including those in the Spanish peninsula (Borja et al, 2004). What this 
means for an irrigator, the central ‘agent’ in the water systems of both the Western US 
and Spain, is unclear. Recent work by Bazzani et al (2005) suggests that the directive in 
some regions “may be summed up in a minor reduction of water use associated with a 
sharp decrease of farm income and a significant reduction of employment” (Bazzani et al 
2005, 1). The same authors, however, point out that the effects of such a large and 
complex institution on such a large and complex system as European water resources  are 
likely to be specific to locale.  
 What is clear is that Spanish institutions are different from Western US 
institutions, particular with regard to governmental interference in the day to day business 
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of providing and making use of water supplies by agriculture. That is not to say that the 
two systems do not have anything in common: both settings are heavily dominated in 
terms of water use by their agricultural systems; subsidies are a powerful driver to 
agricultural production; and the water systems in both regions are near exhaustively 
engineered. However, the subtle differences in the reach and power of the institutions in 
each setting makes a comparison worthwhile, as well as the potential differences in the 
way that individuals will interface with those institutions. In some ways, the Spanish 
setting is more fertile for a study of this sort: in the Western US, an agent-based approach 
will rely more heavily on capturing individual decision making and the interactions 
between individuals and certain institutions that would be atypical for a European setting. 
In Spain, the agent model needs to incorporate a more powerful and more interfering 
federal bureaucracy, and has to take much more care in the design of the institution and 
its relation to the individual. Nevertheless, the important dimension to be explored here is 
the tension between individual and institutional action as a dynamic affecting how ground 
water banking and conflict are interrelated.   
 In this thesis, then, comparison between the regions is not treated as an 
opportunity to exhaustively detail and test the institutional differences and somehow 
correlate them to a systemic conflict response to ground water banking. The level of 
detail that can be incorporated into and simulated with an agent-based model restrict the 
extent to which complex and nuanced conclusions can be drawn about institutional 
influences on conflict specific to setting. In this thesis I am concerned, first and foremost, 
with generalizable theory on linkages between institutional capacity and conflict, 
generated through socio-hydrological simulation. However, I am also interested in both 
the theory and practicality of modeling individuals and institutions in different settings: 
does the Spanish setting - both in character of individuals and influence of institutions - 
differ so much from the US setting that the fundamental cognitive models of agents have 
to change? If so, how? These are some of the questions that will be explored in parallel to 
the main thrust of the thesis.  
   
2.0 ... Problem statement 
 
With this thesis I hope to contribute to addressing the following problems: 
 
• The problem of sustainability in water resources management: whether we can 
hope to mitigate adverse environmental consequences, or otherwise enhance the 
sustainability of agriculturally-dominated water systems through the judicious use 
of institutions rather than infrastructure; 
• The problem of the ‘universal socio-hydrologic agent’: can agent-based modeling 
across international and cultural boundaries be accomplished with the same 
fundamental cognitive tools and internal conceptual models? 
 
I am structuring the investigation around one major hypothesis and associated research 
question, and one sub hypothesis and sub question. These are laid out and discussed 
below. 
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2.1 ... Study purpose and general approach  
 
In this thesis, I propose to use agent-based computational simulation to explore the 
societal and environmental response to different institutional scenarios in Spain and the 
western US, for the purposes of: generating generalized understanding of the links 
between institutional capacity and water conflict; contributing meaningfully to the search 
for solutions that balance social, economic and environmental needs in the two regions 
while mitigating or avoiding conflict; and contributing to theory associated with the 
concept of a universal socio-hydrologic agent.  
 My general approach has as its foundation the construction of two agent-based 
models, one for each system. Each model represents, with some key and major 
abstractions and simplifications, a number of individual and institutional actors within 
each water resources system, including their interrelations and decision-making 
characteristics. The Idaho model incorporates a water simulation module based on a pre-
existing hydrologic tool from the University of Idaho. The Albacete model incorporates a 
simpler, more illustrative ‘bathtub’ model of the Eastern Oriental aquifer constructed 
specially for this application. Both hydrologic simulations are intended to allow a 
comparative analysis between the social and environmental implications of two broadly 
defined simulation scenarios: the implementation of a new institution, groundwater 
banking, as an accounting system to handle deliberate recharge and discharge to and from 
the aquifer (defined as institutional change in this setting: Contor and Johnson 2005); and 
a business-as-usual future where no institutional changes are implemented. Both 
scenarios imply that no new infrastructure is added to the system; in both cases, existing 
wells are used for the purposes of interacting with the aquifer as a ‘water bank’. 
 An exceptionally important point to note here is that neither simulation tool is 
intended to be predictive. There are fundamental reasons why this is so: primarily, the 
quality of data being used to generate the structure and content of each model is 
significantly below par for the purposes of policy-relevant predictive modeling. While 
this constrains the utility of each model in a real decision-making environment, it does 
not constrain some careful and conservative interpretation of the implications of each 
simulated scenario for their real world counterparts. It is my intention that each model be 
treated as an exploratory and illustrative exercise, marshaling mixed social and 
hydrological concepts and data to explore general trends in system behavior. The second 
point is that I have personal reservations as to the utility of attempting to predict social 
behavior through the medium of agent-based modeling. I share the view advanced by 
Tesfatsion (2002) and others that agent-based modeling in a socioeconomic context is 
best suited to developing theory rather than predicting real world outcomes (although I 
am not averse to using theory to make carefully bracketed predictions as to the general 
qualitative nature of those outcomes). In addressing agent-based computational 
economics, Tesfatsion suggests one of the benefits to the approach of using simulated 
(see also Epstein and Axtell’s work in this regard: Epstein and Axtell, 1997) synthetic 
societies, is the ability to “demonstrate constructively [i.e. generatively] how global 
regularities might arise from the bottom up, through the repeated local interactions of 
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autonomous agents” (Tesfatsion, 2002). In the present instance, I advocate the use of 
agent-based models to enhance existing theories on the linkages between institutional 
capacity and water conflict, not to predict whether or not a particular institution will lead 
to a certain degree of a certain kind of conflict if it were ever implemented in a real world 
system. There still exists a great gulf between our representation of human cognition 
inside computational simulations, and the real nature of that cognition; this is particularly 
true of the reasonably simple models I create and run for this thesis. My cognitive models 
borrow from older work of Artificial Intelligence and Cognitive Neuroscience 
researchers, but in no way represents the latest or the best way to represent agent 
cognition as proxy for human cognition. Consequently, given the continuing paucity of 
data and significant conceptual deficiencies, I am most definitely not applying agent-
based modeling to anything but explanatory theory building. However, to reiterate, this 
will not and I believe should not stop me from drawing some general, carefully 
circumscribed implications for real world systems. 
 
2.2 ... Research Questions  
 
1. Major Question: theories exist which suggest that higher institutional capacity 
correlates with reduced conflict frequency and severity; can agent-based socio-
hydrological models of two institutionally rich, conflicted water resources 
management settings contribute to this theory, and if so, what kind of theoretical 
relations do they suggest? 
 
2. Sub Question: what do the significant institutional differences between the western 
US and eastern Spain mean for an attempt to build a more generic agent 
architecture (cognition and action mechanisms) that could be used to simulate 
socio-hydrologic systems across political, geographic and cultural borders? 
2.3 ... Major Hypothesis 
 
“Any change to institutional capacity will have an effect on the dynamics of water 
conflict in an artificial social-hydrological system”  
 
 With this hypothesis I am advancing theories of system change for each of the 
Spanish and US settings. The hypothesis draws on the concepts of episodic and 
continuous change (Weick and Quinn 1999). According to these authors, systems prone 
to episodic change are those that: are focused on efficiency in resource distribution and 
production, and short-term rather than long-term adaptability; are highly institutionalized 
with powerful norms. Systems prone to continuous change are those oriented towards 
continued translation of learning and experience into new practices.  
 The ESPA area has only a few key water-related institutions, all of which are 
well-entrenched, is socioeconomically and politically focused on optimal distribution of a 
scarce and over-allocated resource, and has a social system knitted together by the shared 
norms of practicing a century of large-scale irrigated agriculture. The introduction of a 
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new institution or the alteration of an existing one is consequently rare and deliberate, 
accomplished through drastic top-down change. The creation of Water District 120 in 
2002, for example, was only accomplished through the intervention of the Director of the 
Idaho Department of Water Resources (IDWR) under statutory authority (IDWR 2002). I 
thus characterize the ESPA as a social-hydrological system that is institutionally frozen 
and consequently prone to episodic change.  
 Institutions are even more powerful and well-entrenched in Albacete, but the 
system is far more receptive to major institutional change: the requirements of the WFD 
are actively creating a new set of institutions that have serious local and regional 
implications. Prior to the WFD, most WRM institutions regionally and nationally were 
based on a utilitarian paradigm: hydraulic exploitation for maximal economic benefit to 
citizens, at minimal personal cost (Sauri and del Moral, 2001). The major inter-basin 
water transfers were designed, so Sauri and del Moral suggest, to achieve “water for 
everybody at no cost” (ibid, 1). The WFD adjusts WRM priorities to include strong 
environmental considerations, so this is a time of considerable institutional flux in the 
region. With or without the WFD, however, government in general retains a strong level 
of control over the direction of water management and use. Whatever may or may not be 
happening at higher institutional levels, the agricultural system in the region has long 
been focused on exploiting the resource for shorter term gain (Maass and Anderson, 
1978). This suggests an interesting conflict between a macroscale shift in institutional 
emphasis, but a strong local interest in economic gain through exploitation of a scarce 
resource. I thus characterize Albacete as a system embodying dual levels of change: a 
socio-hydrological system that has a dynamic, continually evolving institutional 
framework at a macroscale, and an institutionally frozen environment at a more local 
scale. However, the only very recent emergence of irrigated agriculture (the last half-
century) in Albacete compared with nearby regions such as Alicante (ibid) may suggest a 
more flexible institutional framework, or the dominance of individual choice rather than 
institutional imperatives.  
 Despite the differences between ESPA and Albacete, both systems are tightly 
coupled to external or internal perturbation: in ESPA, this is partly because of a severe 
over-allocation of resources but more likely due to an extremely limited range of legal 
and political institutions available for handling emerging conflict. There is a significant 
amount of water above and below ground the ESPA region, in other words, but serious 
legal and political limitations on the possible solutions to conflict. In Albacete, the tight 
coupling appears to be due more to the severe over-allocation of water. The aquifer is 
heavily over-abstracted, and when the aridity of the region is considered along with an 
infrastructural status quo that delivers most of the region’s water to the older irrigation 
districts on the coast, we see a tight coupling between the system behavior and any 
change to its hydrologic conditions. The system is therefore indirectly coupled to 
institutional change, since any institutional modification that somehow changes the 
availability of water (whether through direct volumetric change or otherwise an access 
change) is likely to cause a shift in the rest of the system.  
 In tightly coupled systems, any significant perturbation, whether institutional or 
environmental will result in an immediate shift in some element of system behavior. I am 
assuming for both regions that political conflict is the pressure valve that indicates a 
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malfunctioning water resources management framework: a party or parties is being 
harmed in some way by some wider system process or specific actor behavior, and so 
responds by complaining or initiating a legal proceeding. Consequently, I hypothesize the 
link between conflict dynamics and the introduction of a new institution (a major system 
perturbation) in both regions.  
 
2.4 ... Sub-Hypothesis 
 
“Institutional and environmental differences between modeling settings do not 
necessarily mean that a fundamentally new socio-hydrologic agent must be built for 
each” 
 
Achieving a more generic foundation to the simulation of socio-hydrologic systems is not 
something that has attracted much practical interest in the agent-based modeling 
community. Yet it is a concept that is frequently called for in the wider field of social 
simulation (Mentges 1999, Schmid 2000). This disparity is probably not for want of 
trying, since developing a single generic agent implies settling upon a single structural 
model for representing human cognition and behavior inside an ABM (Amblard 2001), 
something which neither cognitive neuroscience nor agent-based modeling have settled 
upon. Given the conceptual and practical challenges to achieving that level of granularity 
in a ‘generic’ agent, I am not hypothesizing that a single, generic structure for a socio-
hydrologic agent can be constructed if it advances a single interpretation of human 
cognition and behavior. However, I do believe the following: that both the broad 
definition and basic structure of a socio-hydrologic agent can be engineered so as to be 
portable from one WRM setting to another. This is because the broad intent of modeling 
a socio-hydrologic agent varies very little between modeling projects and model settings: 
the agent must interact with society, economy and hydrology/environment in competition 
for the water resources available to the system. This lack of variation should mean we can 
improve upon our concept of an agent in the socio-hydrologic simulation setting and 
advance some propositions for what a socio-hydrologic agent looks like regardless of the 
real world scenario being modeled. To address this hypothesis, I will attempt a broad 
definitional and structural comparison between the agents within two models constructed.  
Note that I am not intending to prove that a generic agent is universally possible, simply 
that switching real world setting should not necessarily mean the agent structure must 
also fundamentally change. My core intent is to build theory in socio-hydrologic 
simulation by offering some ‘socio-hydrologic agent constructs’ based on real 
comparisons between two models built for diverse settings.  
 
2.5 ... Construct definition 
 
Conflict as Aubert (1963) observed, “is ambiguous. It is applied to neural processes, to 
internal psychic states and to individual choice of action” (Aubert 1963: 26). Conflict is a 
general state of antagonism, a “tension between two actors irrespective of how it has 
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originated and how it is terminated” (ibid). In multi-agent systems literature, agents are 
either cooperating or conflicting (Zlotkin and Rosenschein 1991), but more sophisticated 
agents that are representative of human actors need to experience and practice degrees of 
conflict – some conflict is productive, but there is usually a threshold over which conflict 
becomes damaging (Beratan and Karl 2005). However, for the operationalization of 
conflict in the context of an agent-based modeling effort that faces real constraints on 
available time and resources, I define conflict more simply: as one instance of an agent or 
group of agents taking a ‘court action’ against another agent or group of agents. Conflict 
dynamics are essentially a function of both severity and frequency of conflict: a small 
number of very severe conflicts has the same weight as a larger number of very minor 
conflicts, for example. The level of conflict is neither significantly constructive or 
destructive (although it does take agent resources to raise and maintain a ‘court action’) 
to individual agents up to a certain threshold at which conflict becomes so frequent and 
so severe that the model grinds to a halt. In the Idaho model, a court action consists of 
registering a complaint to the State Management Entity (SME: more on agent typologies 
below) about depletion of an allocated water right, and is recorded by the SME as a 
collection of three data points: the plaintiff, the defendant and the amount of water lost 
claimed as injury. The SME will, depending on the amount and source of such suits, from 
time to time issue curtailment orders to the defendants. This is not designed to represent 
any serious attempt to fix the problem, but to simulate the effect of periodic disturbance 
of the institutions of water management by a higher level institutional entity. In 
AlbAgent, conflict is represented by three grades of severity: informal complaints, where 
a Farmer agent registers a minor gripe with the government (CHJ: see more on agent 
typologies below); formal complaints, where a Farmer agent registers a more serious 
issue; and a protest, which is roughly the equivalent severity of an Idahoan court action - 
but termed a ‘protest’ because the Spanish legal environment regarding water is 
considerably less litigious than the western United States. For both models, conflict 
frequency is operationalized as the number of court actions/protests and complaints 
occurring within each time step, and conflict severity as the number of agents making 
court actions/protests and complaints within each time step. This is intuitively sensible, 
since one agent may be particularly enthusiastic in letting the government agent know of 
its disgruntled state (and may be uniquely able to support the costs of such action), in 
which case a high frequency may be posted. But since only one agent is registering all 
this conflict, the severity is not significant. However, where the entire population of 
irrigator agents is involved posting conflicts in one time step, something is clearly wrong. 
 
 Institutional capacity in an agent framework is defined as a composite measure of 
the presence (is it present in the system), capacity (what is the range of its functions, and 
what supporting resources does it have) and quality (the longevity, efficiency and 
effectiveness) of an agent institution. The definition of institution is based on Searle 
(2005): “an institution is any collectively accepted system of rules (procedures, practices) 
that enable us to create institutional facts [a fact that does not exist without its associated 
institution]” (Searle 2005: 21). An institutional enhancement would be a modification to 
an existing institutional structure, or the creation of a new one with the intention of 
contributing to less conflictual water resources management. Three forms of social 
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institution are operationalized in this model: a basic system of flexible and inflexible 
rules governing agent behavior at the macro-level (i.e. a legal and economic framework); 
an abstract organizational structure with intentionality and an influence on agent behavior 
and system outcomes (i.e. for the Idaho model we have the SME, a state agency 
concerned with and mandated to oversee water management in the region; for the 
Albacete model, we have the CHJ, a regional agency concerned with managing water in 
the Rio Del Jucar basin); and the ground water banking institution itself, which overlays 
new rules of operation and interaction for both individual agents, their social institutional 
rules, and the state/regional water management agency. 
 
The definition of artificial social-hydrological society is drawn from Epstein and Axtell 
(1996): in an artificial social-hydrological society, “fundamental social structures and 
group behaviors emerge [but are also specified] from the interaction of individuals 
operating in artificial environments [in this case, based on hydrological and agricultural 
data and sub-models] under rules that place only bounded demands on each agent’s 
information and computational capacity” (Epstein and Axtell 1996: 4).  
 
Ground water banking is variously defined elsewhere as “the storage of excess wet year 
supplies in subsurface aquifers” (Purkey et al 1998), or “a means of reallocating or 
transferring the use of water through some kind of centralized management entity” 
(Cartron et al 2002), but these are not exhaustive – the term takes on meaning specific to 
the context in which it is being considered. The ground water banking project at the 
University of Idaho (USBR/IWRRI 2006) and other feasibility studies (e.g. 
USBR/IWRRI 1999) suggest some potential scenarios for the shape and function of a 
groundwater banking system, addressing issues of getting the water into the ground and 
out of it again and then distributed to users, all in a socially and economically efficient 
and non-conflictive manner. Getting water into the ground might be achieved via the 
installation of large injection wells for aggressive aquifer recharge of wintertime runoff, 
the diversion of surplus flows during high flow periods onto ponding sites where water 
would infiltrate into aquifer storage, or utilizing existing ground water pumping 
infrastructure (the most likely interim solution). Water would flow out again through 
existing abstraction wells, and through natural groundwater-to-surface hydrogeologic 
connections. Note that the concept for Spain would likely differ, since the pumping 
infrastructure is more limited in sophistication and scale. It is possible that deposits into 
the bank (or aquifer) would be conducted through the use of virtual water, in the sense 
that foregoing the right to pump water would be considered a deposit. Leasing water from 
the bank/aquifer would be accomplished in the same way in Albacete as in Idaho - direct 
pumping, most likely through pre-existing wells. The management of this new flux would 
most likely be achieved by an accounting system of groundwater debits and credits, 
tracking the source and destination of parcels of water in the storage zone and providing 
for the trading of water credits according to the requirements of the users, managers and 
the environment. The groundwater banking concept is operationalized as an entire 
scenario – a specification of a managing institution (coordinating the banking system and 
adjudicating disputes) and associated institutional arrangements (rules of engagement 
with the system that agents have to follow to participate in the bank). 
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 The ground water bank concept is operationalized in both models using a set of 
rules that apply universally to agents participating in the banking system, and provide 
options as well as limitations for them to inject, withdraw and trade ground water as a 
commodity. 
 
Socio-hydrologic agent is a concept without common currency in either hydrology or 
agent-based modeling (or any other water-related fields, to my knowledge). The concept 
of ‘socio-hydrologic systems’ is more frequently heard and so forms the foundation of 
my definition. A socio-hydrologic system, or a socio-hydrologic approach to viewing a 
system, is used here in a sense defined by Mohorjy (1989): integrating “the hydrologic 
and socio-economic aspects of water resources planning” (Mohorjy 1989: 1). In other 
words, a socio-hydrologic system is one where social, economic and hydrologic 
subsystems are causally linked. In Albacete, economic and sociopolitical choices have 
had strong effects on the state of the regional aquifer, and the evolving state of the aquifer 
and other dimensions of the aquatic environment (such as water quality) continue to have 
strong influence on the regional economy and society. In the western US, the entire 
agricultural system and associated community fabric have evolved around a complex 
system for allocating water; the natural and not so natural cycles of the river system are 
tightly interwoven with the fortunes of the social and economic system. This is not to 
advance that the social-hydrologic coupling is the only relation of consequence in either 
setting. Both are complex settings where several dependencies on multiple levels exist.  
 Given my definition and assumption of coupled systems in both settings, I 
propose the concept of a socio-hydrologic “agent” as a proxy for some individual residing 
within and interacting intimately with a socio-hydrologic system. To be a socio-
hydrologic agent, the entity must have a dual relationship with both water and 
society/economy. The irrigation farmer is the pre-eminent example in both settings: in the 
American West, irrigation farmers still sit at the center of the hydraulic society that a 
century of Federal subsidy has built (Worster 1992). In Albacete, the irrigation farmer is 
the principal reason why the aquifer is heavily depleted and the current supply and 
quality crisis is unfolding (Martin de Santa Olalla Manas et al 1999). The farmer in both 
settings sits at the nexus of economy and environment: in Spain, the EU subsidy drives 
overproduction at the same time as the WFD drives conservation and habitat restoration; 
in the American West, Federal subsidies shift production to water intensive crops in areas 
that without irrigation would be desert, even while profits sink as wetter farmland 
production forces prices down. For the purposes of simulation, then, a socio-hydrologic 
agent is an entity affected both by hydrology in the raw (precipitation, floods, pollution, 
etc) and hydrology translated into social and economic dynamics (water policies, 
changing prices, etc). However, this is not the limit of the definition: to be an agent, the 
entity must have some outward effect on the world. A socio-hydrologic agent in 
particular must effect change in the social and hydrological systems associated with water 
for its particular setting. The focus of my thesis simulations is on the farmer as a socio-
hydrologic agent, affected by and effecting change in the social, economic and 
hydrologic systems within which the agent is embedded. Less numerous in the models 
are agents representing government, power companies, canal companies and fish farms. 
All of these are still socio-hydrologic agents, since their actions directly affect the 
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hydrologic system and associated institutions (or they may in fact represent one of those 
institutions), and they are themselves affected by hydrologic and socio-hydrologic 
change. 
2.6 ... Modeling precedent and theoretical base 
 
Considerable effort has been devoted in the agent-based modeling (ABM) research 
community towards articulating typologies for ABM applications. For this work I take as 
a theoretical base the work of Boero and Squazzoni (2005), who argued that “empirical 
knowledge needs to be embedded into modeling practices through specific strategies and 
methods” (ibid: 1.7) and suggested a taxonomy of ABMs in which “case-based models” 
form one key class: models with an “empirical space-time circumscribed target domain” 
(ibid: 3.4). Case-based models are theoretically thick, have micro-specifications for 
individuals and interactions, and serve to “investigate empirical macro properties” (ibid: 
3.5). Finally, they suggest that “the goal of the model maker is to find a micro-macro 
generative mechanism that can allow explaining the specificity of the case, and 
sometimes to build upon it realistic scenarios for policy making” (ibid). This forms the 
central theoretical basis of my approach: appreciating the complexity of a particular 
setting (Ragin 1987) while seeking to generate local theoretical explanations that can be 
extended to other settings and to a higher body of theory. This project is exploring the 
emergence of conflict in “highly complex, non-linear, path-dependent and self-
organizing” (Macy and Willer 2002: 144) socio-hydrologic systems. The methodological 
approach is characterized (after David et al 2004) as Socio-Scientific (using a “theoretic 
framework of social and/or environmental sciences to model social and environmental 
phenomena”; David et al 2004: 3.11) and as Socio-Concrete (modeling and simulating 
“concrete social systems based on direct observation and statistical data, in order to 
understand social and institutional processes and phenomena” (ibid: 3.19). 
 Water or other natural resource focused agent-based models are prolific in the 
ABM world: Becu et al (2003) modeled small catchment water management in northern 
Thailand (the CATCHSCAPE model). In this model, the major hydrological features of 
the catchment were simulated, as were farmers’ individual decisions, with exposition of 
impacts on local water management, economy and landscape evolution. Espinasse and 
Franchesquin (2005) simulated hydrological management of the Camargue ecosystem in 
southern France, representing human activities (e.g. fishing, agriculture and nature 
exploration) as agents and coupling these activities with a hydrological model. Feuillette 
et al (2003) used a multi-agent model to test hypotheses on the importance of non-
economic interactions between farmers over water in Tunisia: they modeled the water 
table and user interactions to explore the results of different management interventions. 
Castella et al (2005) explored the use of intensive collaborative work with stakeholders to 
build an agent-based model of agro-ecological land-use changes in northern Vietnam. 
These are a small sampling of an emerging and increasingly robust body of research 
using agent-based simulation to explore social dynamics associated with natural 
resources. This work falls somewhere between the highly participatory approach of 
Companion Modeling using the CORMAS platform (e.g. Barreteau et al 2001), and 
laboratory-based approaches using the RePast or Swarm platforms exploring socio-
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biological or micro-sociological theory (Minar et al 1996): agents are specified to a 
higher degree of detail than in Swarm-type models, but stakeholders will not be engaged 
to the extent that the CORMAS approach suggests. This project emphasizes validation of 
outcomes using stakeholder surveying (David et al 2004), where this has been possible. 
 Despite the broad precedent of using agent-based models to explore natural 
resources management questions, there is little precedent for exploring conflicted water 
resources systems through agent-based simulation modeling, and conducting loose 
comparative analyses of the results of simulations for different settings. The research I 
outline and conduct in this thesis is novel in that respect. 
 
2.7 ... Sources of empirical data 
 
In this discussion and onwards in the rest of the thesis, the two models are referred to by 
their development names: GWBSIM (Ground Water Banking Simulation - Idaho) and 
AlbAgent (Albacete Agent Model).  
 The difference in the provenance of the two models is nowhere clearer than in the 
sources of empirical data on which model is at least partly based. GWBSIM is partly 
parameterized through a series of interviews with approximately 25 stakeholders from the 
region, and partially validated with a workshop during August 2007. AlbAgent is based 
entirely on secondary data sources: statistical information from the Spanish national 
statistics agency, and geospatial information from local and regional contacts. Informal 
validation opportunities were had in October and December 2007, but otherwise there has 
been no serious stakeholder-oriented validation for AlbAgent. This exposes a more 
fundamental difference in the two models, which can be measured in complexity. 
GWBSIM was a year in the making, whereas AlbAgent was less than half a year in 
production, and the result is differences in the functional complexity of each model. 
However, despite being less complex, AlbAgent replicates the basic and essential 
structures of GWBSIM; the agent cognitive models are very similar, the algorithmic set 
up of the ground water bank is nearly identical in concept, and the mechanisms for 
representing and tracking conflict in the system are the same. The implications of model 
differences for analytical comparison are discussed in later sections, and for the moment I 
will restrict myself to discussing what empirical data was gathered, as well as where and 
how it was used in each model.  
 
2.8 ... GWBSIM empirical data 
 
Primary data for structuring the cognition of the agents comes a series of interviews I 
conducted in January 2007 with around 25 key stakeholders up and down the Eastern 
Snake Plain. I structured these interviews to elicit responses from stakeholders that could 
be used to flesh out the BDI (Belief-Desire-Intention) cognitive framework used to 
develop the agents. Data for parameterizing the hydrology and economy came from the 
IDWR (time series hydrologic data), the University of Idaho Agricultural Economics 
Research Service (AERS; for crop pricing and production costs over the period 1980-
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2000) and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA; for historical 
precipitation and temperature data). I conducted additional validation work in August 
2007 with a group of stakeholders derived mostly from the USBR’s Snake Plain 
Groundwater Banking Project advisory committee. A basic interviewing guide was used 
to help structure questioning, and this is included in the Appendix. However, discussion 
tended to vary significantly from the script. A brief discussion follows below of how the 
data gathered in these interviews was used to help develop the cognitive structures of the 
model. 23 interviews were conducted with a range of stakeholders from around the 
region: while specific individuals cannot be named, ‘types’ of stakeholder we spoke with 
included: 
 
 Surface water irrigators 
 Ground water irrigators 
 Canal company staff 
 Federal, state and local water management staff 
 Aquaculture representatives (spring users) 
 Regional academics 
 
The interviewing questions were designed to seek as much information as possible within 
the following categories: 
 
1. Beliefs – knowledge about the natural and social worlds; a belief would be 
“groundwater and surface water are poorly connected in this location due to an 
intervening clay layer” or “John is a member of the committee and is on good 
terms with all the members”. 
2. Needs – fundamental, immediate and survival-oriented drivers of desire and 
intention; a need would be “I need to pay off a loan before the end of the term in 
order to stay solvent”.  
3. Interests – secondary, longer-term drivers of desire and intention, arising from 
combinations of fundamental needs, and other non-survival-oriented drivers; an 
interest would be “improve financial security to enable the purchase of new 
farming equipment and reduce dependency on loans”.  
4. Positions – socioeconomic and sociopolitical position of an actor relative to other 
actors within a context; positions would be “I am the head of this irrigation 
district” or “I have participated in this committee for several years and consider 
myself a committee member”. 
5. Desires – explicit assignments of goodness to different states of the world based 
on implicit complementary combinations of needs, interests and positions; a 
desire would be “[Implicit]: given my position within the community, my 
immediate need to ensure the survival of my farm and my long term interest in 
building my ownership of water rights, [Explicit]: I think changing the status quo 
in local water resources management is an excellent idea”. 
6. Intentions – explicit committed plans arising from implicit reasoning about 
desires in the contexts of beliefs; an intention would be “[Explicit]: I intend to buy 
this water right, [implicit]: since it meets my needs and interests, and I know that 
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a poor groundwater-surface water connection exists in this area so I am not losing 
water to the aquifer”.  
7. Moral sentiments – significant personal emotions towards another individual, 
group of individuals or formal organization, which affect intentions, interests and 
desires; an emotion would be “I don’t get on with X because he did not support 
me in the last committee meeting”. 
8. Social norms – the actor’s own perception of tangible or intangible social 
pressures acting on his own decision-making, influencing the selection of 
intentions; social norms would be “transparent handling of water transfers is 
important to the community” or “we usually work together to resolve our 
differences – it’s characteristic of how we do things here”. 
 
The semi-structured nature of the interviewing meant that is was not possible to explore 
all these themes systematically or code them accordingly, but the results of the 
conversations were parsed into the model as much as possible along these lines. The 
following is a set of excerpts from one transcript, with comments detailing the use of the 
information in the model’s structure. Note that due to a confidentiality agreement, the 
identity of the interviewee cannot be disclosed. ‘SH’ denotes ‘stakeholder’, and ‘I’ 
denotes ‘interviewer’. 
 
General overview: 
 
I: What do you all see as the critical issues in the ES at the present time? 
 
SH: The biggest problems… To me itʼs the conjunctive management issues. 
Also, the interface between our legal mandate and where weʼd like to go.  
 
The interpretation in the model is in the general assumption of institutional and legal 
inflexibility. The larger organizations with a role to play in the Snake (such as the CCs 
and the SME) are restricted in their ability to interpret the law. They perform their 
functions and do not attempt to improve based on past experience on to adapt to changing 
conditions. Thus one of the core ‘interests’ of this agent’s mission is interpreted as being 
to maintain the status quo and the agent’s mission, while imparting that agent with a 
certain amount of stress related to its inability to respond to change given the restrictive 
legal framework. This could represent a ‘social norm’ widely prevalent in the regional 
society and influencing how stakeholders will handle risk. 
 
Knowledge of other agents: 
 
I: Whatʼs your understanding of the average userʼs understanding of the 
complexities in the system? 
 
SH: Thereʼs a general lack of understanding. Within the water user community, 
there are probably folks that know thereʼs an issue out there, but not much details 
of what the issue is. Thereʼs perhaps a minority of less than 10% who are up on 
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all aspects and facets of the issue. Most people have a very surface 
understanding of the aquifer, a very elementary understanding of the issues. I 
donʼt think things run very deep, they donʼt have the knowledge or the detail of 
the complexity there.  
 
The interpretation in the model is in the level of trust agents have in the ground water 
model. The model makes the assumption, based on this interview result and others, that 
most agents have a very poor understanding of how the aquifer works and how the 
Eastern Snake Plain Aquifer Model simulates the behavior of the aquifer. With a poor 
understanding is likely to come a lack of trust and increased suspicion, and these 
variables are modified accordingly. 
 
Selection of agent typologies: 
 
I: You mentioned urban growth. Is that a pretty steady trend? Are you thinking 
strategically in terms of long term urban growth or do you see that as an 
uncertainty? 
 
SH: All of southern Idaho is growing at a pretty aggressive rate, and I would 
foresee that continuing. Around Twin Falls, Idaho Falls, Pocatello. Itʼs not 
something that plays a big role at this point, but particularly in relation to any 
banking concept there may be some future issues. 
 
… 
 
I: From this stakeholder list, please pick out the stakeholders who you work most 
closely with, or find your decisions influenced by the most. 
 
SH: … You donʼt have on here the recreation public. The eastern Snakeʼs 
reservoir system has flat water recreation boaters, fishermen; in some of the 
lower reservoirs there are kayakers, fishermen. Thatʼs a big public with an 
important role, especially in the Palisades, Jackson area. 
 
The first excerpt has been interpreted several ways in the model: other accounts also 
supported the impression that M&I users were increasingly important in electoral and 
economic terms, but were not significant influences at the present time on water use and 
management. Both in interviewing and in the validation workshop in August, the 
presence of M&I users as agents in the model appeared to be a possible future option, but 
not a make-or-break necessity. Consequently, M&I users are left out of the final model at 
this time.   
 The second excerpt is an example of interviewing data not used in the final model 
structure, but also pending future implementation: recreational users are growing in 
numbers and political significant in the eastern Snake, and along with environmental 
needs may represent a major consideration in future and a possible driver of participation 
in the ground water bank. However, time and memory limitations meant that a 
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recreational user agent was not implemented in the final model structure. 
 
Perception of powerful agents within the system: 
 
I: Form the perspective of other stakeholders, who is the most influential or 
powerful? 
 
SH: First, the surface water users. Second, itʼs the ground water users. Then the 
aquaculture folks are right in there. Theyʼre the big drivers, the ones who have 
hired the expensive lawyers, the ones who have taken issues to the courts. The 
dairy industry next. After that it probably comes down to those with the biggest 
space-holding in the reservoirs to the least. But then thereʼs also the Committee 
of Nine, which was created 85 years ago to be an advisor to the Water Master in 
the upper Snake. 
 
This short answer holds a wealth of information relevant to the social hierarchies in the 
system: while surface water users and ground water users were repeatedly among the top 
few stakeholders considered the most significant and influential, the aquaculture industry 
(Spring Users in the model) were frequently seen as the most combative and the most 
able to bring their issue to the attention of the region and state based on their greater level 
of wealth. This general sentiment was used as a justification to set up the SU agents to be 
more predisposed to launch a court action and/or complain – not that this was guaranteed, 
just more likely – than other agents.  
 
Level of conflict in the system: 
 
I: As far as other stakeholders are concerned, have there been any decisions 
made by stakeholders that youʼve observed to be particularly contentious? 
 
SH: The calls, principally.  
 
I: From the list, which stakeholders tend to interact with the most conflict? 
 
SH: The IWUA represents the surface water users and is pretty conflictive. The 
newer organizations, the ground water users, theyʼre getting front and centre 
these days. Idaho Power certainly causes problems from time to time. In general, 
thereʼs always friction between water uses - large and small, upstream to 
downstream. The aquaculture folks have got quite a bit more involved in the last 
decade, I would say.  
 
I: Conversely, are there any stakeholders particularly open to collaboration? 
 
SH: The Nez Perce forced folks to collaborate for quite a few years. There were 
many attempts to collaborate between the surface water and ground water folks. 
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For whatever reasons, they failed. The mood right now is people are resolved in 
themselves that the next steps will be taken in the court system. 
 
The reference to ‘calls’ is to the court actions made by downstream surface water users 
against upstream ground and surface water users for allegedly depriving those 
downstream users of their legal water rights. This kind of information is enormously 
useful for setting up the outward-looking belief systems of individual agents – which 
agents are seen by other agents as being particularly conflictive or hostile – as well as 
setting up different agent typologies with different inherent predispositions to conflict. In 
general, the agents do not differ significantly in their ‘genetic’ tendency to conflict, but 
certain key facilitating variables – wealth, starting income and water stress – do differ and 
so agents do naturally vary in their predisposition to launch court actions and complain.  
 ‘Nez Perce’ refers to an agreement over water use and management in the Snake 
between the Native American tribes and other water users. The comment on the lack of 
collaboration and the tendency to rely on the court system to resolve problems was 
corroborated by several other stakeholders. It is the principal reason why a negotiation 
option was not included in each agent’s conflict resolution options. The default is to 
complain or go to court, and this was an assumption drawn directly from these kinds of 
comments. The reality is that there are multiple steps between complaints and full-blown 
court actions, including mediated settlements and negotiated mitigation plans, but to 
reflect the apparent mood in the system towards conflict, the agents were set up without 
the general ability to negotiate or collaborate in any significant way. Considerations of 
time limitations were also a factor in this decision. 
 
Model trust: 
 
I: Does the lack of trust in the model in certain key areas represent an obstacle? 
 
SH: When you talk about shutting off certain wells thatʼs where issues will come 
up. People will question specific curtailments based on the model. The trout 
industry has put advertisements in the paper to convince the public that the 
perfect model is achievable.  
 
I: Is that in a drive to get a better model made? 
 
SH: They put an ad in the Sunday newspaper a few weeks ago saying that if we 
would just find fund a few hundred thousand dollars, and only a few months time 
would take us to generate a much better model. I donʼt that view is credible. 
Theyʼre suggesting they can get a level of improvement thatʼs only really likely 
with a massive investment and the drilling of so many wells that the aquifer would 
no longer be what it is now. 
  
This last excerpt is to support the implementation of the ‘model trust’ variable. It was 
clear from this interview and others that the ground water model (which is what is being 
referred to in this excerpt) was a political instrument as well as a technical one: some 
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stakeholders were committed to getting the perfect model, and in so doing perhaps delay 
the process to their advantage. Others appeared more committed to making do with the 
existing technology and confronting the reality that the ultimate decision will not be a 
technical but a political one. So some sort of specific ‘belief’ variable relevant to the 
ground water model with which the ground water bank would be run seemed appropriate: 
all agents with the option of participating have a certain degree of trust in the model 
(which can vary over time, as discussed earlier), and other emotions that contribute to the 
agent’s willingness to participate in the model.  
 
2.9 ... AlbAgent empirical data sources 
 
The form and quantity of empirical data used in AlbAgent differs greatly from GWBSIM. 
Whereas GWBSIM incorporated detailed interviewing data into the socio-cognitive 
structures and parameterizations, AlbAgent takes a different, leaner approach, building on 
the experience gained in constructing GWBSIM. This could be accomplished by making 
some key assumptions that reduced the requirement for gathering detailed cognitive 
information from stakeholders represented in the model. These assumptions are listed and 
justified below. 
 
• General cognitive variables were very similar to those used in GWBSIM: for 
example, AlbAgent’s representation of agents expressing frustration with the 
system was similar to GWBSIM: complaints with varying degrees of formality, and 
formal protests to the government. The slight difference from GWBSIM is that 
legal action is not explicitly represented. This was viewed necessary to reflect the 
less litigious nature of water resources management in Spain versus the U.S. 
Additionally, the GWBSIM structure for representing agent stress was also used in 
AlbAgent. 
• The general cognitive structures for weeding out actionable plans from a stock of 
options were assumed to be broadly similar in Spain as the US: for example, 
GWBSIM agents only take a particular action after it has been evaluated on a 
number of counts, such as time relevance, cognitive benefits (does the proposed 
action change a cognitive variable in some beneficial way), resource benefits (does 
the proposed action change a personal resource in some beneficial way) and role 
conformism (does the proposed action conform to the typical action in that situation 
for the particular agent typology). AlbAgent agents follow the same process, 
although the exact nature of the implementation is different. The similarity was 
justified on the grounds that farmers in that environment of Spain may differ 
culturally from the western U.S., but probably have very similar patterns of 
practical reasoning since they grow some of the same crops in similar 
environments. 
 
By assuming broadly similar cognitive variables and cognitive structures, a great deal of 
empirical data requirement could be dispensed with (and, in any case, was not physically 
possible). The remaining parameterization requirements for AlbAgent can be broken 
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down into: 
 
• Hydrologic: aquifer budget; ground water levels 
• Economic: costs of production; produce prices 
• Agricultural: crop mix and distribution among farmers; locations of farm wells 
• Demographic: farmer population 
 
Hydrologic data was assembled from direct and indirect consultation with regional 
experts, and from historical datasets stored on the Confederacion Hidrologica del Jucar’s 
website ([Confederacion Hidrologica del Jucar (CHJ), 2006, #18794]). Economic data 
was derived from the website of the Instituto Nacional de Estadistica for Spain ([Institutio 
Nacional de Estadistica (INE), 2007, #16788]), and from a diverse range of other sources 
describing the Spanish agricultural economy. Agricultural data was drawn from the 
CORINE CLM 2000 dataset as part of a regional geodatabase put together by an MIT 
team in the fall of 2007. This same geodatabase was also used to generate the base map 
grid. Finally, demographic data was gathered from INE.  
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3.0 ... Characterizing Artificial Socio-Hydrologic Systems 
 
In constructing the models, I broke down the real world systems for Idaho and Albacete 
into environment and actors. The environment is the hydrologic and climatic system. The 
actors are the stakeholders in the system. Beyond this crude distinction, a complete 
characterization of either region would have resulted in a large number of actors and 
some very complex hydrology and climatology. For modeling purposes, both systems 
were reduced to a smaller number of biophysical, social and economic dimensions. I was 
more constrained with data for AlbAgent, and so was committed to further reductions in 
complexity in that model. In the following section I describe, for each model, the 
essential social and hydrologic components in its socio-hydrologic system. 
 
3.1.0 ... GWBSIM specification 
 
The main actors of interest are agricultural irrigators of various descriptions, non-
agricultural irrigators, and a principal state-level management entity. The main 
environmental processes of interest are surface and ground water flows in response to 
climatic and anthropogenic forcers. In the model, both biophysical and social components 
are simulated by agents, but non-social and non-individual agents are purely reactive and 
non-cognitive (i.e. the Aquifer agent is purely reactive because it is non-social, and the 
System Management Entity (SME) is purely reactive because it is non-individual and 
representative of an institution).   
 Clearly, this is a considerable abstraction of the real system, but for the most part 
these abstractions and concomitant assumptions are based on the analysis of empirical 
data derived from recent interviewing conducted with a variety of stakeholders up and 
down the Snake, and from extensive and ongoing discussions with hydrologists, 
economists and policy experts at the Idaho Water Resources Research Institute (IWRRI). 
 
3.1.1 ... Environment 
 
The model’s environmental simulation encapsulates two main resource components: 
surface river flow and ground water flow. Ground water is simulated based on the 
ESPAM 1.1 model, developed by IWRRI hydrologists to capture subsurface flow 
dynamics across the entire eastern Snake plain. ESPAM 1.1 is a single-layer aquifer 
model, with sufficient representation of surface geography (the river reaches are 
represented clearly as separate river cells) that a single layer in GWBSIM was also seen 
as sufficiently representative. Each cell is implemented as an instance of the Aquifer 
agent typology. An Aquifer agent is purely reactive and has no cognitive capacity. The 
principal functional responsibilities of an Aquifer agent are processing time series of 
reach effects for the ground water banking scenario, providing the spatial representation 
for the user interface/model output display, and yielding other general environmental 
information (such as local soil moisture levels) when queried by local agents. The 
instantiation of the Aquifer class as agents allows the creation of a grid cell graphic that 
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can be more easily queried and manipulated at runtime. To obtain the benefit of coupling 
with ESPAM without actually doing any coupling, aquifer response functions were used. 
IWRRI has run 100-year simulations using 1000 acre-foot stresses (i.e. withdrawals of 
1000 acre-feet over an initial trimester stress period, and then simulating the response of 
surface water reaches) to develop tables of response functions for each cell. A response 
function describes the likely drawdown volume on any one of the 11 surface river reaches 
in the model, given a certain pumping quantity over a certain period of time. In practice, 
this allows the agent model to simulate river response to pumping from the aquifer 
without implementing a coupling between ESPAM and the agent model. Each Aquifer 
agent has an associated table of response functions for each reach and each of three 
annual periods for the simulation runtime of 20 years. 
 Implementation of the river simulation within the agent model was more 
problematic. Initial planning suggested that coupling with MODSIM (a network flow 
approach to simulating river flow and allocation of water to irrigation entities, developed 
by Colorado State University and the US Bureau of Reclamation) was the most credible 
and realistic option. Time constraints and initial technical problems that slowed 
development mean that for the present analysis, the coupling was not possible. In its 
place, an interim solution was developed using a cellular automata approach loosely 
based on the work of Nicholas and Thomas (2002). The basin is divided up into 11 river 
reaches, each one defined by a Reach cell. Each Reach cell is treated as a discrete entity 
that receives ‘parcels’ of water from its eastern/northern neighbor and passes on modified 
parcels to its western/southern neighbor. A parcel is defined as a discrete quantity of 
water, in acre-feet, with an acre-feet per second flow rate defined for each cell according 
to a time series of data for the period 1980-2000. The parcel contributes to the absolute 
quantity of water in each cell, which is used for irrigation allocations and other functions 
within the simulation. At specified intervals, a parcel with a volume corresponding to the 
cell’s flow rate is transferred to the neighboring and downstream cell; at the same time, 
the cell receives another parcel from upstream. The River cell agent (also described later), 
is a non-reactive, non-active agent that is instantiated as an agent in the model purely for 
the purposes of animating the river. 
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Figure 1: class diagram for the Aquifer agent 
 
 Climate is not simulated directly, but implicitly assumed given that the time series 
data for storage and flow are based on a combination of real climatic and other 
environmental processes. A ‘drought’, therefore, is indirectly simulated by a reduction in 
flow and storage that year, and vice versa for periods of normal or above-average rainfall. 
 For simplicity, a static GIS provides the backdrop for the agents. By ‘static’, 
unchanging is implied, not a lack of communication between the GIS and the agents. The 
location of the agents on the GIS grid provides for many environmental variables 
necessary for agent decision making, although the results of agents decisions are not 
reflected in any change in the map except for their color (bankrupt agents and agents 
trading ground water credits change color according to their state). The GIS is based on 
the same model grid used in the official ESPAM 1.1 model. The grid cells are grouped 
into eleven contiguous reaches. Details for the spatial grid are provided in Figure 2 (after 
Cosgrove et al 2006). 
 
Grid origin: outside corner of model cell (1,1), Idaho Transverse Mercator (IDTM) 
coordinates x = 378,416.2 , y = 233,007.2 m / lat = 43.118806, long = -115.49619 
Grid cells: 11,451 active model cells, 1 mile x 1 mile square (5,280 ft x 5,280 ft). 
Figure 2: georeferencing and spatial details of ESPAM grid 
 
 
 34 
 
Figure 3: the Eastern Snake Plain Aquifer model grid. Each square grid cell is of 5 km edge 
length. The smaller blue squares are river squares. The missing section of river in the lower 
portion of the model corresponds to a reach not hydrologically connected to the aquifer in the 
main ESPA model. 
 
 
Figure 4: the ESPAM grid translated into the model. Note that GWI agents are distributed all 
over the grid, SWI agents mostly in the eastern half of the grid close to the river, and spring users 
in the western most portion of the grid. Dark blue cells are river or lake cells, light blue cells are 
springs (in the western portion of the grid). 
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3.1.2 ... Agents 
 
This section discusses the model's agents on two levels: first, at the conceptual level, each 
agent typology is described in terms of general characteristics - desires, actions, spatial 
location and so on. Second, at the technical level, I describe how the actual cognitive 
structure of the agent is realized.  
 
Conceptual design of agents 
3.1.2.1 Surface Water Irrigator agent (SWI):  
 
The SWI is interested in planting, irrigating, harvesting and selling its crops in order to 
maintain an income and pay off debts incurred in conducting an agricultural business. 
The SWI can choose from between five crops (potatoes, wheat, barley, sugarbeets and 
alfalfa hay). The SWI obtains its water from the natural and storage flow of the river via 
the Canal Company agent - note that all SWIs belong to one of 46 canal company agents, 
which distribute water among the SWIs according to the inflow at the canal’s headgate 
and the shares that each SWI holds in the canal. Depending on the weighting and 
combination of a number of factors (including the agent's perception of water availability 
in the past, its own predisposition to generating conflict, and its current state of income 
and debt) the agent may seek to file a conflict ‘suit’ (termed a court action in the model) 
to the System Management Entity (SME) agent. This is the model proxy for a single 
conflict. Issuing a court action incurs a cost for the agent, and so the agents are more 
likely to cooperate to issue 'class' court actions rather than issue one on an individual 
basis. The SWIs have a maximum population of 1518 in any one simulation run, with an 
average of 700 acres owned by any one SWI (minimum and maximum acreages set at 
300 and 30000, with the distribution of owned acres accomplished using a Weibull 
distribution). In the +GWB scenario, the SWI agent is permitted to deposit water in the 
ground water bank via managed recharge (ponding of water in areas of land with high 
infiltration rates). The SWI is initialized with a range of emotional states, including 
‘happiness’, ‘initiative’ and ‘risk aversion’. These states are modified by fuzzy logic 
algorithms known in the model as ‘emotional engines’, as well as by simple feedback 
loops in response to positive or negative internal or external conditions. 
 
3.1.2.2 ... Ground Water Irrigator agent (GWI):  
 
The GWI is also interested in choosing, planting, harvesting and selling crops each year 
in order to maintain an income, pay off debts incurred in conducting an agricultural 
business, and minimize the electricity cost of pumping. The GWI obtains its water 
exclusively from ground water wells. The GWI agent is not subject to the same 
reductions in flow as the SWI, but can experience partial or full curtailment of an 
individual allocation by order of the System Management Entity (under a mitigation 
plan). The number of GWIs is set at a maximum of 2863 in any one simulation run, with 
land ownership allocated using the same distribution as SWIs. In the +GWB scenario, the 
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agent can both deposit and withdraw water from the ground water bank using its pumping 
infrastructure. GWIs have the same emotional engines as SWIs, although with different 
fuzzy logic rules, and different feedback loops. 
3.1.2.3 ... Spring User agent (SU):  
 
In the real system, spring users are non-agricultural users (e.g. trout farms) who rely on a 
water supply with a very strong direct connection to ground water flow – springs in the 
downstream (south-western and western) portion of the aquifer. To simplify their 
representation, these users are designed as industrial plants with a certain production rate 
and various water quality, quantity and economic conditions affecting production. The 
agent’s principal interest is in maintaining and/or increasing production. Consequently, 
SUs adopt behaviors to access sufficient water to meet their pre-specified needs (derived 
from a normal distribution around the average non-agricultural user's water consumption 
in the ESPA for the past 20 years). SUs are distributed mainly in the lower reach of the 
river/aquifer system, up to a maximum population of 80. 
3.1.2.4 ... Power Company agent (PC): 
 
The Power Company owns several run-of-the-river dams where river levels and flow 
rates are correlated with electricity generation and the agent’s income. The equation used 
to calculate power generation is shown in Figure 5 below (after NRAES 1978). The PC is 
thus interested mainly in maintaining flow in the river. The agent is relatively simple 
from a cognitive perspective, and does not have the same emotional engines and 
cognitive sophistication of the irrigator agents. The PC is significantly wealthier than all 
other agents, but cannot participate in the ground water bank. The PC does have the 
ability to complain and to launch court actions. A distinguishing characteristic of the PC 
is its ability to launch court actions at a much lower cooperation threshold than other 
agents, due to its greater capital reserves and more substantial political capital. 
 
  
 KW = 0.0846 x E x Q x H 
 
 where: 
 KW = power output in kilowatts 
 E = efficiency of hydroelectric plant (derived from publicly available data on 
 Snake River dams) 
 Q = water flow, cubic feet per second 
 H = head, feet (derived from Snake River dam data, Idaho Power) 
 
 
Figure 5: equation used to calculate power generation from each PC dam. 
3.1.2.5 ... System Management Entity agent (SME):  
 
The SME is an amalgamation of the real world functions of state and federal water 
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resources management agencies. The responsibilities of this agent include the allocation 
of water among the SWIs and GWIs according to water right priority date and quantity, 
the recording of disputes arising between water users, and the management of the ground 
water banking system under the GWB scenario. The SME is also able to issue mitigation 
plans that require GWI agents to mitigate the effects of their pumping on river levels. 
There is only one SME, and the agent is non-spatially explicit. 
3.1.3 ... Technical discussion of agent typologies 
 
The core of the GWBSIM generic agent cognitive architecture (applied to all cognitively-
active agents) is as follows: two parallel and constantly running cycles of reasoning and 
action (see Figure 6) process agent beliefs, desires and intentions. The coupled work of 
these two cycles allows the agent to reason and take action multiple times per model step.  
 
 
 
Figure 6: Cognitive architecture of GWBSIM agents. BDI+M = Belief-Desire-Intention+Memory 
 
The left-hand loop in Figure 6 shows how, in each time step, each agent checks the state 
of its internal, local and regional environments. This stage is referred to as ‘condition 
checking’. A large number of condition checking methods run in each time step, since 
this stage must encompass all the possibilities for action open to the agent. If the 
conditions are right for taking a certain action (e.g. for planting: soil moisture is high 
enough, there is enough water forecasted for delivery to the agent’s fields, and the time of 
year is right for the chosen crop), the agent moves the proposed action to an action queue, 
part of the right-hand loop shown in Figure 6. In this loop, the action queue is checked at 
least once per time step, and more if necessary. As each proposed action comes to the 
head of the queue, more complex conditions are checked. In the case of planting, this 
would now include checking the state of the agent’s capital reserve or credit (for seed 
purchase), the state of the agent’s machinery, cost and availability of 
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pesticide/herbicide/fungicide/fertilizer. Figure 7 displays conceptually how simple 
condition-action rules lead to plan selection and action implementation. 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Conceptual representation of cognitive architecture, for plant() method 
 
These reasoning and acting loops require cognitive raw materials, the data inputs which 
the agent uses to come to a decision on choosing an action and then taking that action. 
These ‘raw materials’ are implemented using the Belief-Desire-Intention, or BDI, model 
(Rao and Georgeff 1999). The BDI model attempts to resolve complex human cognition 
into a more computationally tractable structure without losing the essence of the human 
cognitive process. Georgeff et al (1998) suggest that this architectural model has a sound 
philosophical model of human reasoning; has seen a variety of implementations and 
practical applications providing for an accumulation of research experience; and provides 
for an “elegant abstract logical semantics” (Georgeff et al 1999, 1). On these grounds, 
they advance the BDI model as an efficient and effective way to implement human-like 
reasoning capabilities.  
 Within the BDI model, Beliefs describe the agent’s existing internal set of 
knowledge about the current state of the world. Desires describe the agent’s desired state 
of the world, i.e. how the agent would like the various dimensions of its external and 
internal environment to become in the short, medium and long term. Intentions describe 
the plans for action with which the agent will carry out the range of actions open to it. 
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Simplistically, an agent’s intentions are designed to alter its external and internal 
environment so that its beliefs conform more closely with its desires. In practice, the 
relationship is more complicated, since desires are relevant on different timescales and 
priorities, and are not always intended as a realizable goal. Sometimes they function more 
as a motivation to act in a certain direction. 
 
3.1.4 ... Agent Emotions 
 
In addition to beliefs and desires, all cognitively-active agents possess an array of 
emotions (class: EmotionObject). Each EmotionObject is a primitive variable with a 
range 0.0 to 10.0, and corresponds to a particular emotional concept. Some of the major 
emotions represented in the model include Happiness, Calm, Apathy, Curiosity, 
Conservatism and Suspicion. Note that the definition of ‘emotion’ in this context is 
relatively broad: one could classify ‘Conservatism’ as a political position rather than 
emotion, so ‘emotion’ in its use here refers to any broad cognitive variable that is not well 
described by the moniker ‘belief’. The variables are all identical in nature, but differ in 
the role they play within agent cognition. Note that the use of emotions within the model 
is deliberately underweighted, since parameterizing their initial state is highly subjective 
and difficult to validate at this stage. Two mechanisms within the code govern the 
modification and impact of emotions: fuzzy logic engines and stimulus-response pairs. 
Each emotion has a number of fuzzy patterns associated with it: both in modifying the 
state of that emotion in response to some combination of external environmental or 
internal agent variables (which may include other emotions), and in forcing change in 
some other internal agent variable or particular behavioral choice in response to change in 
that emotion. Figure 8 below shows the overall concept of this dual process. 
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Figure 8: mechanisms by which emotional variables are modified and modify other emotional or 
internal (BDI) variables and agent behaviors. 
 
An example of some of the rules coded into the fuzzy logic patterns is shown below (for 
the SWI agent and the ‘income stress’ variable, Figure 9). Each rule consists of two 
antecedents and one output. Linguistic variables for the antecedents are defined as: 
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VERY LOW, MID-LOW, MEDIUM, MID-HIGH, HIGH 
 
Linguistic variables for the outputs are defined as: 
 
INCREASE/DECREASE:  MINOR, MODERATE, SIGNIFICANT 
 
e.g. 
 
IF debt is MEDIUM 
AND capital is MID-LOW 
THEN MODERATE INCREASE in income stress 
 
IF debt is HIGH 
AND capital is VERY LOW 
THEN SIGNIFICANT INCREASE in income stress   
 
IF debt is VERY LOW 
AND capital is VERY LOW 
THEN SIGNIFICANT DECREASE in income stress 
 
Figure 9: fuzzy logic input patterns for income stress 
 
Income stress, and its hydrologic equivalent, ‘water stress’, are catch-all variables that 
have a larger number of fuzzy logic patterns than most other EmotionObject variables. 
The higher connectivity between these variables and the agent’s internal and external 
environment mean that both income stress and water stress are agent variables that are 
strong indicators of the agent’s overall state of mind. Generally speaking, the less income 
and capital the agent has, the higher the agent’s income stress will be. Likewise, the less 
water the agent has, the higher the agent’s water stress will be. But the complex 
interaction of a large number of variables in these fuzzy logic patterns means that change 
in the stress variables is not always clear or predictable. Figure 10 below lays out, in a 
simple dependency diagram, an example of emotional variables hard coded to have 
effects on agent behavior, namely the probability of the agent choosing to participate in 
the ground water bank. The relationships described in this diagram are for simple 
stimulus-response effects, but also represent the general effect in fuzzy logic patterns of 
each input variable on the output variable. The decision to choose certain emotional 
‘concepts’ over others is laid out in the section following Figure 10. 
 
 
 42 
 
Figure 10: influence of emotional variables on the probability of a GWI agent participating in the 
bank. ‘strong’ in ‘strong, positive’, refers to one position along a spectrum of strengths of 
influence: weak, moderate and strong. A weak influence corresponds to a minor (<0.01) change 
in the probability; a moderate influence is a <0.1 and >0.01 change in the probability; and a 
strong influence is a >0.1 and <1 change in the probability, where all changes can be positive or 
negative. The ‘positive’ in ‘strong, positive’ describes the direction of influence: a positive 
influence for water stress indicates that when water stress increases, the probability of that agent 
participating in the bank will likely increase. An inverse influence for risk aversion indicates that 
when risk aversion increases, the probability of participation will likely decrease. Note that 
‘strong’ versus ‘weak’ relationships effectively also determines the likelihood that the input 
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variable will have a significant effect on the output. ‘weak’ relationships may be lost in the 
general noise of multiple variables affecting one output variable or behavior, whereas a ‘strong’ 
relationship is likely to be observed over all others (i.e. agent behavior or internal state is more 
sensitive to these variables). But note that the large number of fuzzy patterns, and the large 
number of stimulus-response pairs, means that the full range of effects is not yet fully explored, 
and there may be unknown confounding variables and relationships poorly understood at this 
point (without comprehensive validation as yet complete). Figure 11 displays another sampling of 
input variables (some emotional, some non-emotional i.e. beliefs about the state of the world 
internally or externally), and which output decisions these are most likely to affect based on 
knowledge of the a priori structures in the code. 
 
  
Figure 11: sketch of decision flows from input variables (emotional and non-emotional) through 
to output decisions. Note that the diagram does not specify exactly what the nature of the 
influence is, merely suggesting that – given the nature of the code – that there will be some form 
of likely relationship between the listed input variables and the listed decisions. Note also that 
this diagram is not exhaustive: due to space limitations, only a selection of inputs and outputs can 
be presented.  
 
The choice of these emotional concepts versus others was drawn largely from the results 
of the interviewing work conducted in January 2007 (see Appendix for example 
questions). For example, it was clear (qualitatively) from the interviewing that there 
existed hostility (antipathy towards) surrounding the concept of the ground water bank. 
This gives us the variable ‘Hostility’, which – in general -  determines the agent’s likely 
mode of behavior towards other agents and towards the outside world in general. Some 
interviewees were clearly suspicious of the concept, particularly of the model that would 
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be used to operate the bank. This gives us the ‘Suspicion’ variable, as well as the ‘Model 
Trust’ variable. This latter variable is a critical influence on repeat participation in the 
bank; once the initial choice is made, if the agent develops a reasonable level of trust in 
the bank, the agent’s trust in the model operating the bank will also develop positively. A 
low level of model trust will reduce the likelihood of the agent participating again in the 
bank the next time around. Note that all agents begin with a similar range of emotional 
states – the Latin Hypercube Sampling approach dictates that the emotional states across 
all agent types vary from run to run, but each agent experiences the same broad range of 
emotional variation over all runs. There were clearly some interviewees and stakeholders 
who had more initiative and creativity in terms of how they were responding to over-
allocation and other hydrologic and economic crises in the eastern Snake. This gives us 
the ‘Initiative’ and ‘Apathy’ variables, which effectively control how ready the agent is to 
adopt new concepts (agents with high initiative are likely to be early adopters). Last but 
not least, interviewees clearly possessed some degree of happiness with the state of the 
system: this is a very generic term, similar in nature to the stress variables described 
earlier, but is a useful measure of the agent’s overall level of satisfaction. Agents 
generally do not directly aim to maximize happiness, although a reduced level of 
happiness is tied to increased stress. 
 The discussion here illustrates that the choice and implementation of emotional 
variables is, as yet, very simple, and clearly much remains to be desired regarding the 
sensitivity of the model to different emotions and the sophistication with which emotional 
concepts are represented. However, it was seen as essential to have some emotional 
component in the model: none of the stakeholders in the eastern Snake are economic 
automatons. All of them are complex individuals with diverse life histories and highly 
varied outlooks on the world. To pretend that emotions do not have a role in decision-
making is to overlook a very significant component of human interaction and human 
thought. As Macal and North (2005) suggest, “Cognitive scientists are developing agent-
based models of emotion, cognition and social behavior based on the notion that a 
person’s emotional state impacts their behavior as well as their social interactions… The 
goal is to create synthetic agents who embody the nuanced interplay between emotion, 
cognition and social behavior.” (Macal and North 2005, 6). However, the highly 
subjective, relatively coarse nature of the current implementation of emotions is 
acknowledged, and consequently the role of emotions is deliberately underemphasized; 
i.e., a change in a particular emotional state, even if the change is a significant one and 
the relationship between that state and a particular behavior is ‘strong’, the probability 
still remains low that the change will be enough to shift behavior, assuming everything 
else remained the same.  
 
3.1.5 ... Agent Learning 
 
A small, yet important component of the simulation is the ability of agents to ‘learn’ from 
past experience. The learning is unsophisticated and far from what we might consider 
human learning to be, however it does represent an adaptive response to changing 
environmental conditions. The principal form of ‘learning’ that the cognitively active 
agents can engage in is behavioral modification through feedback. For example, if a 
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decision one year leads to very poor yields, little water and a higher overall level of 
income and/or water stress, the agent will respond to this by shifting behaviors to 
minimize the negative impacts of its previous decisions and avoid them in future: the 
agent might seek to participate in the bank to obtain more water, choose a different crop 
(breaking out of rotation, if necessary) or go to the bank for more money. Each 
cognitively active agent is equipped with a simple memory which stores records of events 
and internal state for each month and each year of the simulation. Certain decisions – 
such as participating in the ground water bank, or choosing crops, or selecting loan 
request amounts – involve checking back in memory to see if the previous year’s 
decision, or the year before that, was particularly bad and needs to be discounted from the 
options available. The agent does not search back more than a couple of years, which is a 
cognitive limitation identified from the stakeholder interviews undertaken in the region: 
several different sources, particularly from the academic community but even within the 
farming community of the region, suggested that farmers have a very short and selective 
memory for ‘good’ versus ‘bad’ years. The overall impression was that the typical farmer 
deliberately underemphasizes the bad years in memory, and overemphasizes the good 
years, and that either memory does not last for much longer than two to three years. In 
this way, a string of good years will likely lead the farmer to stop behaving in a way that 
is preparatory or mitigating of the potential for bad years in future. The probability of a 
bad year is still increasing, however, which demonstrates how humans do not optimize 
their decision-making! Consequently, agents are equipped with the ability, for certain 
decisions, to ‘optimize’ in a fallible way across the past three years of their experience: 
choose the best option based on the performance of previous choices in terms of the 
relevant output. 
 
3.1.6 ... Treatment of Uncertainty and the Future 
 
The agents do not plan for the future. No agent has any concept of future impacts of their 
actions, although all cognitively-active agents have some concept of the past impacts of 
their actions based on their memory. Agents tend to select the best option according to 
their limited (and short-term) learning from past experience, and the innate tendencies 
imparted to their decision-making by the base code. The risk aversion, initiative and 
curiosity emotions will drive more risky decision-making, but no agent factors in future 
uncertainty or future events to decision-making. This is a major and flawed assumption, 
since it was clear from the interviewing that the stakeholders do consider the future in an 
advanced, abstract way: for example, the trout farms are constantly gambling on the 
possibility that the water quantity and quality may decrease in future beyond the tolerance 
of the trout, whenever they make major investments in personnel and/or infrastructure. 
One exception to the general model rule of no ‘forward-looking’ ability in agents is the 
ground water user-specific variable, ‘perception of future mitigation’. This is a belief 
which projects the likelihood that, at some point in the future, the SME will impose 
limitations on the amount of water that these agents can withdraw using their wells. 
Changes to this belief are, at present, very crudely controlled: a ‘mitigation-likelihood’ 
signal is communicated to all GWI agents each day by the SME, with the SME 
generating this signal based on the overall number of complaints and court actions so far 
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received that water year. The perception of future mitigation is used in a similar manner 
to the risk aversion variable: a perception of more likely future mitigation will contribute 
to a greater agent willingness to participate in the bank and so offset that future 
mitigation, and vice versa. A second exception to the general model rule is the use of 
climatic forecasts. All farming agents receive a climatic forecast, the GWIs from the 
SME and the SWIs from their respective canal companies. The SME and CCs generate 
forecasts by taking a gamma distribution of the real historical precipitation and 
temperature data for the eastern Snake region. An arid forecast will influence agent 
behavior to be more conservative in water use and choice of crop; a wet forecast will 
generally have the opposite effect. Note that agents do not make longer term plans based 
on longer term forecasts as well as a consideration of past experience.  
 In summary then, agents treat the past and the future with some simplicity: past 
experience is only used with a three year time limit, and then only for certain decisions 
where the past is particularly useful (e.g. choice of crops, choice of loan request amount, 
and so on). Many other elements of agent decision-making is purely Markovian, since the 
next step may depend almost entirely on the previous step taken. For example, when it 
comes time to choose crops, the agent will check whether the current rotation is profitable 
enough and not too risky given the climatic forecast and the agent’s memory of previous 
water availability. This is an example of a reflective decision where memory played a 
role. However, the frequent decision point that forces the agent to decide whether or not 
to launch a court action depends mostly on the state of internal stress at that point in time, 
and not a set of conditions back in time. The agents treat the future with even less 
sophistication, apart from some specific variables – such as perception of future 
mitigation, and climatic forecasts – which are used in a Markovian fashion to determine 
the right decision from a selection of options.  
 
3.1.7 ... Description of Agent Typologies 
3.1.7.1 ... Irrigators 
 
The irrigator agent typology in GWBSIM has a generic structure with modifications for 
two different subtypes of irrigator: ground water irrigator (GWI) and surface water 
irrigator (SWI). The core elements of both subtypes are the same, but the actual beliefs, 
desires and intentions/actions open to the agent are strongly determined by that agent's 
type.  
 The subtypes are based on real life distinctions: irrigators in the Eastern Snake 
tend to use ground water and/or surface water to irrigate their crops. For modeling 
purposes, these typologies are separated out into separate water uses, i.e. surface water 
users only use surface flows from the Snake River, and ground water users only use well 
water. Development of the basic economic, legal and environmental functions of each 
irrigator agent (e.g. buying fuel, launching a legal suit, spreading fertilizer) were 
implemented with general knowledge of how these actions are accomplished in the real 
world. More specific structuring and parameterization, such as the choice and relative 
weight of social and emotional variables, was conducted using interview data gathered in 
January 2007. 
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 The differences in typology are primarily manifested through different sets of 
beliefs, desires, intentions and resources. A simple example of this is in the agent's use of 
beliefs and resources. A surface water irrigator is dependent on its annual allocation from 
the SME – the WaterRight and HeadgateFlow variables – variables which are critically 
important to its decision making. The ground water irrigator, on the other hand, has a 
water right that is pre-determined and does not vary year to year. The agent pumps as 
much as it can within its annual quota. There is no annual variation in the allocation 
unless the SME issues a curtailment order that has to be met by some form of physical 
mitigation. In this way, different agents make different uses of the same types of belief 
data. Another example is in the social capital of different agents: ground water users, 
perennially being blamed in the real system for causing surface water flow loss 
downstream, are represented in the model with less social capital than their surface water 
using neighbors.  
 Both Irrigator subtypes store some of their current beliefs, desires and resources 
data in variables representing long term memory. Long term memory is represented using 
custom-built MemoryMap data structures. These can be summarized here as simply 
providing for the efficient storage and retrieval of key-indexed information, and for the 
modification of key-indexed information over time. The key can be the year of storage, 
the type of information, or in fact any primitive or non-primitive data type the agent 
wishes to use. Similarly, the stored information can be as simple or as complex as the 
agent needs. An entire year’s record of flow data can be stored just as easily as one day. 
Memory for each agent is generally updated once a year, and rarely comprehensively (an 
average or a median of numerical data is typically stored rather than an actual time series, 
both for purposes of realism and efficiency). 
 
3.1.7.2 ... System Management Entity (SME) 
 
The system management entity is an agent designed to represent a high level institution in 
the ESPA area, administering water resources allocation in the basin, and recording 
instances of conflict among agents. The internal cognition of the agent is on a much 
simpler scale than for the irrigator agents, because the SME has limited functionality and 
no need for complex reasoning capabilities, but the SME still possesses the 
thinking/doing loops described earlier. The core functions of the SME are as follows: 
 
• Records court actions by individuals or collections of agents: the model allows 
individual agents or groups of agents to file suit against another on the basis of 
perceived injury in relation to reduced water allocation. For example, if a 
surface water irrigator finds it is short of its allocation for several years in a row, 
it may decide to initiate a court action against the nearest ground water irrigator. 
This court action process involves sending a message to the SME, which records 
the plaintiff, the defendant, and the deficit claimed as injury. 
• Sets up all agents with spatial and other initialization data: the SME reads in 
data from the relevant databases and parameterizes all agents at the beginning of 
each simulation run. For example, the locations in the model animation space of 
each Aquifer cell needs to be drawn from a large table of row/column data 
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(derived originally from converting the lat/long values for the ESPAM 1.1 cells 
into the 0,0 Java-modified coordinates of the model animation canvas). The 
SME takes care of reading in these locations and making sure each Aquifer cell 
is apprised of its row/column data before being animated. The SME also handles 
parameterizations according to the LHS table (see earlier discussion). 
• Manages the ground water bank: the SME conducts administrative functions 
that keep track of leases, deposits, bank volumes and determining harm/no-harm 
for a particular proposed transaction. 
3.1.7.3 ... Market 
 
The Market agent is another simple agent designed to hold globally-accessible economic 
data for use by irrigator agents. For example, the Market agent records current crop prices 
for potatoes, wheat and corn; fuel costs for machinery operation; machinery purchase 
costs, and other economic data. These datasets are simple lookup tables that individual 
agents can access at any point. 
3.1.7.4 ... Canal Company (CC) 
 
The CC is a simple agent with no active cognitive functions. The Canal Company’s 
principal role is to distribute water from its canal system to those SWIs that are members 
of the canal and so are holders of a certain water right in that canal. For example, SWI 
#45 may hold 245 shares in CC #2. The CC determines what each share is worth (perhaps 
0.01 cubic-feet per second), and distributes the equivalent volume of water to that 
shareholder (in this case, 2.45 cfs). The model distribution process is approximately 
similar to that occurs in the real world: the canal company does not deliver a ‘parcel’ of 
water to the agent, but simply notifies that agent of the availability of that water and for 
how long it is available. The agent will then make use of that amount of flow until the 
flow in the canal changes, ends or the agent is asked to shut its lateral headgate by the 
canal company. The CC agents also take care of mediating between the River/Aquifer 
agents and the individual irrigators: return flows and diversion values from individual 
irrigators are summed and passed onto the Reach, River and Aquifer agents in order to 
couple the environmental actions of individual agents to environmental effects. 
3.1.7.5 ... Reach, river and aquifer agents 
 
These are non-cognitive, purely functional environmental agents. The Reach agents are 
the principal points of interaction for the ground water bank and for simulation of the 
river flow. Reaches 2 through 10 of the 11 reaches have upstream and downstream 
neighbors with which they interact - passing water according to flow rates and other 
characteristics of each Reach. Reach 1 receives an inflow at a rate according to USBR 
Hydromet historical data), and Reach 11 passes its flow to a sink outside the model 
realm. Each Reach cell also may receive updated flow data according to the positive or 
negative effects of a particular ground water banking activity, and certain Reach cells 
receive inflows from tributaries roughly corresponding to the real world position of actual 
tributaries. River agents are created simply for the purpose of providing an animation of 
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each river cell on the model animation space, but perform no functional role. Aquifer 
agents take care of calculating and propagating the effects of ground water pumping. 
Note that while this approach to simulating the Snake River is not the most appropriate or 
the most valid, it does represent a considerable time savings over the MODSIM-coupling 
option, and does a reasonable job of reproducing typical annual variation in Snake River 
flows  
3.1.8 ... GWBSIM ground water bank  
 
Under GWB, the aquifer is conceived of as a water bank. Agents can make deposits and 
withdrawals at will, but are constrained within a number of coded rules. These are as 
follows: 
 
Quantification of transactions: all deposits and withdrawals are quantified in terms of the 
net acre feet of depletion or recharge that each causes. For deposits (recharge), this is the 
amount of water that is recharged, discounted by a 5% 'uncertainty allowance': “this 
protects other users of the aquifer from distortions caused by imprecision” in the 
hydrological modeling (Contor pers. comm. 2007). for withdrawals (pumping), this is the 
total amount of water pumped (Contor pers. comm. 2007).  
 
No Harm Rule: no deposit or withdrawal is permitted if the local Aquifer agent finds that 
the transaction would result in damage to surface water reaches. This would occur if the 
pumped amount exceeded the original deposit multiplied by its decay function, or the 
withdrawal exceeded the threshold of influence on the aquifer and river such that reaches 
were affected. 
 
Shrinkage and cost of transactions: each agent has the option to deposit or withdraw 
water from the aquifer at the end of each time step: the withdrawal costs money at a price 
set by the SME. All deposits made by an agent are modified over time by a discount rate 
which corresponds to a shrinkage of the resource underground: as Contor points out, the 
primary shrinkage mechanism for a body of water stored in an underground aquifer is the 
migration of water into other hydrologically-connected water bodies. Consequently, 
water stored in a bank is not static, and a certain proportion is lost to the system between 
the time of withdrawal and the time of deposit.  
 
Withdrawals: ground water bank water can be withdrawn out of priority (i.e. out of the 
normal priority allocation process associated with surface and ground water rights) due to 
the fact that the water would not have been there if it were not for the GWB process, and 
so is assumed to be outside of the prior appropriations doctrine.  
 
Management of the bank: the SME manages the deposits to the bank, issuing each 
depositor with a 'certificate' for the deposit. The certificate records the amount of the 
deposit and the specified decay function for the deposit. The decay function defines how 
much the deposit is worth at some time in the future. Pumping with a prior deposit is free 
as far as the certificate (and associated decay function) states that this amount of water is 
still available in that portion of the aquifer for use by the agent. Effects of agent 
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withdrawals or deposits are calculated by the SME using gamma distributions of the 
response functions derived from the ESPAM 1.1. This data is used to determine the harm 
(or no harm) of a particular transaction. The ‘real’ response functions, unmodified, are 
used by the Aquifer agents to propagate the effects on surface water reaches of any 
pumping or deposit activity by an agent. In this way, the distinction between modeled and  
‘real’ effects that a real world bank would have to deal with is reproduced in the 
simulation environment. 
 
Participation: Only SWI and GWI agents can participate in the bank - GWIs can both 
deposit and withdraw, but SWIs can only deposit. 
 
3.2 ... AlbAgent specification 
 
3.2.1 ... Environment 
 
The AlbAgent environment is divided up into land and water components. Each farming 
agent owns a parcel of land, which is defined in a model as a separate class that itself 
encapsulates crop objects. When an agent chooses to plant a certain crop, the land parcel 
instantiates a particular crop object. Crop growth is not directly simulated, but a 
probabilistic method is used based on existing historic data and some broad assumptions 
about crop dynamics. The Land section describes both the land parcel concept and the 
simulation of crop growth. The water component of the environment is a 5135 cell 
aquifer based on a simple bathtub model (Figure X). Each cell has a volume of water 
associated with it, and a level of water in the cell defined from universal datum. The 
Water section below describes in more detail how the hydrology of the system is 
implemented. 
3.2.2 ... Land 
 
The LandParcel class, which each Farmer agent instantiates one copy of, holds terrestrial 
environmental information relevant to the Farmer’s production of crops. Figure 12, class 
diagram for the LandParcel class, provides more detail (but for ease of viewing does not 
include all fields). 
 
 
Figure 12 (right): simplified class diagram for the 
LandParcel class 
 
The CropMix field describes the relative proportions 
of different crop types on the land parcel. Each array 
index corresponds to a particular crop type, as 
defined in a common reference table. For example, a 
0.6 value in CropMix[0] would correspond to 60% of 
the Area devoted to cereal crops. The getCropArea method returns the actual area planted 
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with a particular crop. The LandParcel class also takes care of crop yield simulation: the 
volume of a particular crop generated after that crop’s growing season. This is 
accomplished via a simplified crop growth equation. 
 
Equation 1: simplified crop growth equation 
 
  
 
where  
 
y = yield (economic units) 
Ay = average yield of crop type per hectare, from arid region agriculture literature 
WIp = water application during growing season as proportion of ideal application 
Sf = shock factor - pest infestations, frosts, etc (value of 0.0 = maximum shock factor, 1.0 
= zero shock factor) 
Hc = total active hectares for that crop 
 
While being far from a credible simulation of crop growth, the equation is intended to 
reflect the strong influence of both water and external events (shock factors) on a 
farmer’s yield. Equation 2 below illustrates the crop growth equation with a simple 
example: 
 
Ay = 200 trees per hectare, 15 kg olives per tree average yield 
WIp = water applied per tree 2.10E-3 hm, ideal application per tree 2.99E-3 (Fernandez 
and Moreno 1999) 
Sf = 0.95   
Hc = 322 
 
 
 
 
 
Equation 2: crop growth equation with inputs 
 
3.2.3 ... Water 
 
The hydrogeology in the study area is conceptualized as a single-layer aquifer with no-
flow boundaries on all sides, i.e. there is no communication between the study area 
aquifer zone and any adjoining zones in the same or other local or regional scale aquifers. 
The aquifer is divided into a grid of cells (116 by 120 cells of side 1000 m) which fit 
within the study area (see Figure 13). Aquifer transmissivity is assumed to be equal in all 
directions, such that responses to withdrawal or injection in any area of the aquifer are 
propagated across the aquifer in a zone of influence of increasing magnitude. Data from 
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Sanz et al (2006) suggest that transmissivities in the UH2 Miocene aquifer unit 
underlying most of the study area range between 200 and 6000 m2/day. Transmissivities 
for all aquifer cells are equal, a mean of 3100 m2/day (Santos et al 2006). Equation 1 
below illustrates the Theis equation used to derive a drawdown at some distance r from a 
pumping well, some time t after the original pumping event. 
 
 
Figure 13 (right): diagram of study area grid at beginning of simulation time in 1997; scale 
across grid is approximately 110 km; grid lines are parallel to N-S, E-W directions 
 
Equation 3 (below): Theis equation used to compute aquifer drawdown 
  
 
 
where 
 = drawdown from original aquifer levels 
 = pumping rate 
 = transmissivity, assumed for this region as 0.017 m2/s 
 = Theis function (drawn from Kresic 2007) 
 
The Theis function is calculated based on the dimensionless parameter u: 
 
Equation 4: calculation of dimensionless parameter u 
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where 
 
 = Storage coefficient, assumed to be 0.2 (unconfined aquifers typically range between 
0.1 and 0.3) 
 = time since original pumping event 
 
W(u) is calculated from u via an exponential integral (Krecic 2007): 
 
Equation 5: Krecic’s integral to calculate Theis function 
 
 
which was used in the example detailed in Table X to generate a series of W(u) values for 
each successive time step and Moore neighborhood (Table X). 
 
t Distance from 
cell 0 
W(u) 
0 500 5.4167 
1 1000 4.7261 
2 2000 4.0087 
3 3000 3.6374 
4 4000 3.3547 
5 5000 3.1365 
6 6000 2.9591 
7 7000 2.8099 
8 8000 2.6813 
9 9000 2.6813 
10 10000 2.4679 
11 11000 2.3775 
12 12000 2.2953 
13 13000 2.2201 
14 14000 2.1508 
15 15000 2.1508 
16 16000 2.0867 
17 17000 2.0269 
18 18000 1.9711 
19 19000 1.9187 
20 20000 1.8695 
21 21000 1.8229 
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t Distance from 
cell 0 
W(u) 
22 22000 1.8229 
23 23000 1.8229 
24 24000 1.8229 
25 25000 1.8229 
 
Table 1: table showing Theis functions for cells at distance n from cell 0 
 
The immediate drawdown in the pumping cell is calculated using equation 1 and a value 
of 500 m for r (distance from the pumping location). Wells are located at the center of 
cells. 
 The effect of pumping at any one cell is calculated for all other cells on a 
temporal basis: cells in the immediate Moore neighborhood of the pumping cell have the 
effect calculated using equation 1, one time step after the original pumping event. Two 
time steps after the event, the neighborhood is expanded (see Figure 14 below) and the 
effect calculated again. This is intended to convey, in simplistic fashion, the delayed 
response of a large aquifer to a particular pumping event. Note that a single pumping 
event is, for ease of modeling, defined as a single 10 hour event that happens 
instantaneously in a particular model time step. For the example below, one time step 
after the application in each successive Moore neighborhood, the cells in any one 
neighborhood see their water level stabilize at 249.9996 m above datum, assuming a 
study grid area of 13456000 m2, a withdrawal of 5040 m3 (10 hours of pumping at 0.14 
m3) and no other pumping events in the intervening period. However, it is likely that, by 
the time a single pumping event propagates to the edge of the grid, other pumping events 
will also have occurred. To handle this, each event is distributed in effects across all cells, 
with a time stamp of future activation (e.g. for the 18th Moore neighborhood, the 18th 
time step after the original event). Each cell will likely build up a queue of pending 
effects, and these are implemented when the actual time step matches the effect time 
stamp. 
 Figure 14 below shows an example of the effects of withdrawing water at a rate of 
0.14 m3/s from a central cell during a 10 hour pumping event. Since it is assumed that the 
aquifer is unconfined and there is no interference between cones of depression, the lag 
rate (rate at which ground water levels equilibrate is assumed to be instantaneous, 1 time 
step after the application of a pumping event. This has the effect of all cell ground water 
levels decaying to a system-wide height above or below the pre-pumping water level. 
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Figure 14 (above): diagrammatic illustration of Theis equation 
 
Although for ease of modeling the system is conceptualized as closed, the aquifer does 
have external inputs. These are defined as follows: 
 
Precipitation: direct infiltration from precipitation-sourced runoff; the annual 
precipitation data for the Jucar basin is averaged across the study area, and assumptions 
made as to the rate at which water moves into the aquifer. According to Ferrer-Julia et al 
(2002), medium-scale kriging across northern Albacete returns estimates for soil 
infiltration at 20 to 100 mm/hr. Noting the karstic nature of the terrain north of Albacete, 
the upper quartile of the range is sampled for typical infiltration rates over the study area: 
80 to 100 mm/hr. Martin-Rosales et al (2006) suggest that “recharge processes [in arid 
regions of eastern and south-eastern Spain] are intimately linked to episodic events” 
(Martin-Rosales et al 2006, 1). Consequently, recharge events are simulated with an 
infrequent arrival rate derived from a Poisson distribution. 
 
Return flow: direct infiltration from irrigation activities by Farmer agents; in the absence 
of detailed datasets, and for ease of modeling, aquifer recharge rates (proportion of water 
applied that returns to the aquifer) for any one aquifer cell are drawn from a truncated 
normal distribution, mean of 0.3, standard deviation of 0.05 (based on estimates for 
climatologically and geologically-similar regions; Gates et al 2002; Doble et al 2005). 
 
River losses: infiltration through the stream bed of the Jucar and other stream and river 
systems inside the study area; given the low flows in the Jucar and other tributaries, this 
input to the aquifer is not simulated. 
 
Inter-aquifer connectivity: there is undoubtedly communication between the study area 
region of the UH2 aquifer unit, but for ease of simulation and due to data inaccessibility 
subsurface movements of water into and out of the aquifer are not simulated. 
River systems: the principal contribution to irrigation supplies in the Albacete region is 
the aquifer, and local or regional river systems are not simulated. 
 
3.2.4 ... AlbAgent agents 
 
Much as for GWBSIM, the agents are described first in conceptual and then in more 
technical terms. The specification is somewhat less detailed than for GWBSIM, however, 
since the AlbAgent model is a great deal less complex. 
 
3.2.4.1 ... Conceptual description of AlbAgent agent typologies 
 
Only two typologies are represented in the system: the Farmer agent and the CHJ agent. 
The Farmer agent is loosely based on the dominant farmer type in the Albacete region: a 
farmer growing mixes of cereals, fruits, olives and vines using groundwater-sourced 
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irrigation. A small proportion of some agents in some scenarios grow secano (non-
irrigated) crops, but there is no difference in the internal structure of those agents. The 
CHJ agent is loosely based on the Confederacion Hidrologica del Jucar, a regional-level 
body which is responsible for managing irrigation allocations, hydraulic infrastructure 
(canals and dams) and hydrologic data collection (not an exhaustive list). The agent is 
represented as a non-spatial, non-reasoning agent with certain regulatory responsibilities 
that it fulfills regardless of the internal or external states of the Farmer agents. The CHJ 
does respond to the condition of the aquifer, since in the more severe institutional change 
scenarios (see later discussion of scenarios) the CHJ will aggressively limit Farmer agent 
usage of water if the conditions in the aquifer reach a certain level of depletion.  
 As discussed above, the Farmer in AlbAgent corresponds loosely to the GWI or 
SWI agents in GWBSIM. As in Idaho, the agricultural trend in Castilla-La Mancha is 
towards larger and more industrialized farms, and so the Farmer agent is loosely oriented 
towards larger scale, profit driven agriculture. Unlike Idaho, the Albacete region has very 
little surface-sourced irrigation due to its higher aridity and the karstic geology. This 
necessitated a paring down of the Farmer typologies to just a single, ground water using 
type. The Spring Users of GWBSIM have no counterpart in the Spanish setting, and so 
were also not replicated. The municipality of Albacete, the regional government, the 
irrigation community in Alicante, and the national Spanish government are all additional 
possible agents that were not simulated. For most of these, it was a boundary decision 
which kept the overall model as simple as possible. In the case of the municipality of 
Albacete, the city’s hydrologic role was assessed and deemed insignificant except as a 
consideration for the CHJ agent. Indirectly, the city has a very powerful role. It is widely 
assumed that agriculture will not have the final vote on water use in the future - if water 
quality and quantity decrease to the extent that domestic use is being restricted or 
otherwise adversely impacted, regional experts suggest that immediate and widespread 
agricultural water use restrictions would come into play (Angelo 2007, pers. comm.). 
Acknowledging this reality, the CHJ is equipped with a trigger to implement various 
water restriction policies on the farming community once aquifer and climate conditions 
go past a certain point.     
 Before discussing both typologies in more technical detail, Figure 15 below 
specifies the overall structure of the model. 
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Figure 15: major entities in the model. The ‘Environment’ entity is a wrapper provided by the 
development platform (AnyLogic) which consists of a number of arrays corresponding to the 
number of different active agent types. For example, environment.Farmer is an array holding all 
the instantiations of the Farmer class in the model. A relation is an indirect (non-encapsulated) 
linkage between two classes. For example, each Farmer agent encapsulates a WaterNode, which 
has a reference to the aquifer cell nearest to the agent, and each Aquifer cell may have 0 or many 
references to the WaterNodes referencing that cell. Each Aquifer cell has a direct reference (one 
to one) with the GroundWaterBank, but the GroundWaterBank references many Aquifer cells. 
 
3.2.5 ... Technical description of AlbAgent agent typologies 
3.2.5.1 ... Farmer 
 
The Farmer agent is a generic typology; different ‘flavors’ of Farmer are based on the 
same basic class, with modifications of key fields. For example, farmers focusing on 
different crop types are differentiated on that basis. From the 1999 Agricultural Census, 
the core agricultural types in the Albacete locale are: 
 
Cereals 
Fruit 
Olives 
Vines 
 
The Farmer superclass structure is illustrated in Figure 16 below. 
 
 59 
 
Figure 16: class diagram for Farmer class in AlbAgent  
 
The CognitionEngine, LandParcel and WaterNode classes are described under the 
Cognition subsection below. The Type field can take on any integer value between 0 and 
3, corresponding to the principal crop type listed above. In exceptional cases, the agent 
begins with a parameterization of Type 4 (secano, or non-irrigated crops). In most 
scenarios the agent can also switch to non-irrigated crops if it so chooses. In the present 
version of AlbAgent the farmer is restricted to farming one type of crop for the duration 
of the simulation. 
 
3.2.5.2 ... Farmer cognition 
 
Farmer cognition is accomplished using a simplified BDI model (Belief-Desire-Intention; 
Rao and Georgeff 1995), very similar to that adopted in GWBSIM. Some important 
differences in technical implementation are discussed below, but the overall cycle of 
thought and action, shown in Figure 17 (reproduced from above), remains the same. 
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Figure 17: cycle of thinking and doing implemented in AlbAgent 
 
A key technical difference is that the process of converting beliefs and desires into 
intention and action has been made conceptually more precise, with additional classes 
implemented. AlbAgent Farmer agents process ‘Temporal Tag’ ‘Concept’ and ‘Intention’ 
objects into ‘Action’ objects in two continuous state chart cycles (Figure 18) that 
incorporate successively more detailed and specific filters. 
 
 
Figure 18 (right): screenshot from the agent-based modeling tool, AnyLogic, showing the 
statecharts for ‘thinking’ and ‘doing’ cycles of agent cognition 
 
In the first transition of the ‘thinking’ state chart (from state [dormant] to state 
[conceptualization]), broad temporally-specific typology Strings are generated that 
correspond to a library of scheduled general activity groups (e.g. post October 1, 
“Irrigation” is a temporal tag String that becomes current, since the water year has 
begun). This provides a very crude first level of organizing all the possible intentions that 
agent could in any one particular time step. For example, it might allow the agent to 
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immediately ignore any concepts, intentions and actions that involve harvesting, since the 
time of year is not appropriate to harvesting. While this does reduce the flexibility of the 
agent and the extent to which it can ‘wander off cognitively’, the approach considerably 
reduces the computational load presented by an agent.  
 Using these general temporal Strings, objects of class Concept are matched 
depending on whether the Concept object tags match the original String. A concept is 
essentially defined as a more specific grouping under the temporal tag (see also definition 
below). To make the description of these initial steps a little more concrete, here is an 
example set of steps: 
 
1. Agent checks model time: February 3, 1998; 
2. Agent searches a String-by-schedule library for basic temporal tags active on or 
after this particular date. In this case, we have 1 match - “Irrigation”; 
3. ArrayList<String> created, with the tag String added; 
 
State [conceptualization] of the cycle finds any Concept objects (in a second library of 
objects) with internal tags matching the temporal tag String(s). Continuing the previous 
example: 
 
4. 2 matches are found (Match1 and Match2); 
5. The agent checks the internal tags on each Concept object to determine its type. e.g. 
Match1.Tag = “Hydraulic”; Match2.Tag = “Economic”. These correspond to 
hydraulic and economic activities associated with irrigation. A hydraulic activity 
might be opening or shutting a headgate, whereas an economic activity might be 
buying more irrigation equipment or buying water. 
 
In state [planning], the agent generates an ArrayList of Intention objects that have 
internal tags matching filtered Concept objects. Note that Concept and Intention objects 
are differentiated on the following basis: Concept object = general class of activities open 
to the agent under a particular temporal tag, e.g. economic, hydraulic, social; Intention 
object = less general aggregation of activities falling under a particular Concept, e.g. 
under the hydraulic Concept and the “Irrigation” temporal tag we might find 
OpenHeadgate, ShutHeadgate, RunPump, ShutOffPump). Continuing our example:  
 
6. agent finds Intention matches with Match1.Tag: Intention objects with tags 
“OpenHeadgate”, “ShutHeadgate”, “RunPump”, “ShutOffPump”; and the same for 
Match2.Tag: Intention objects with tags “BuyWater”, “SellWater”; 
 
Still within the state [planning], the agent feeds each Intention object through the central 
planning engine within the CognitiveEngine object. The planning engine runs a set of 
condition checking methods associated with each Intention, to assess the relevancy of that 
particular intention given a number of internal and external environmental conditions 
(varying depending on the Intention). 
 This filtering of Intention objects is accomplished by the ActionFilter class, and 
proceeds through a number of separate conditions that assign positive, negative, neutral 
or zero weights. If the resultant sum of the weights exceeds an archived threshold (which 
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can be modified if necessary), then the Intention object is used to generate an Action 
object which is passed to the second state chart (‘doing’). Figure 19 below excerpts some 
code from the development platform illustrating a set of conditions for the lease intention. 
 
public Integer lease(){ 
int greenlight=0; 
if ((Double)IR.getR(rs.TrustInBank) > (Double)IR.getP(rs.TrustInBank, rs.MIN)){ 
applyWeight(2);} 
else { applyWeight(-2); } 
if (Goals.isCurrentGoal(MethodCallTrace.Trace())) { applyWeight(2); } 
if ((Double)IR.getR(rs.WaterAvailability) < 
(Double)IR.getP(rs.WaterAvailability, rs.MIN)){ applyWeight(1); } 
if ((Double)ER.getR(rs.GovtLeaseReqmnt) > 0.0) { applyWeight(1); 
if ((Double)IR.getR(rs.TrustInGovernment) < 
(Double)IR.getP(rs.TrustInGovernment, rs.MIN)) applyWeight(-1);}   
if ((Double)IR.getR(rs.Risk) < (Double)IR.getP(rs.Risk, rs.PREF)) 
applyWeight(2); 
else { applyWeight(-2); } 
Weight = checkRemainingEvents(MethodCallTrace.Trace(), Weight); 
if (!Account.canGenerateNewApplication(CurrentDate)) { applyWeight(0); }; 
if (!(Boolean)ER.getR(rs.BankingAllowed)) { applyWeight(0); } 
if (has(rs.Lease)){ applyWeight(0); } 
if (Weight>ActionThresholds.getThreshold(MethodCallTrace.Trace())) 
{ 
greenlight=1; 
} 
Weight = 0.0; 
return greenlight; 
} 
 
Figure 19: code from class ActionFilter: the lease() method is called when an Intention object 
with a matching tag is fed through the CognitiveEngine. Note that positive (applyWeight(+)) and 
negative (applyWeight(-)) weights can be applied to the overall weighting for the intention. The 
overall weight can be zeroed out if necessary (in this case, the weight is zeroed out if the agent 
has already leased, since only one lease is allowed per simulation year).  
 
To continue our example from above: 
 
7. Intention object with tag “OpenHeadgate” returns true for testActivation() 
8. Planning engine generates Action object, tag “OpenHeadgate”, adding it to the 
Actionable queue. 
 
As soon as any Action objects appear in the Doing loop, the loop is activated. The loop 
grabs the top Action object in the queue (FIFO), and activates the action method in the 
agent’s internal memory that corresponds to the Action object’s tag. This is done without 
any further condition checking. 
 This dual cycle forms the core of all agent cognitive and environmental activity. 
The intent of the multiple levels of temporal and conceptual filters is primarily to reduce 
the need for a more detailed and processor-intensive cognitive cycle, by conducting a 
near-binary search of the tree of options that the agent faces each time step. It differs 
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from GWBSIM in one particularly important area: in AlbAgent, new temporal strings, 
concepts and intentions can be added to a text file prior to runtime, without any additional 
coding. Some programmatic changes would be needed to make available the action 
associated with the intention, but the parameters and thresholds of selecting the intention 
can be set by anyone in the associated, reasonably self-explanatory text file. Figure 20 
below illustrates the broad overview of the agent cognitive cycle as it has just been 
outlined. 
 
 
Figure 20: more detailed overview of the agent cognitive cycle, including real method names 
 
3.2.6 ... AlbAgent agent communication 
 
Farmer agents can communicate with fellow agents of type Farmer in two scenarios: 
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• Information seeking: agent 1 seeks some information about the internal or external 
environment of agent 2, e.g. agent 1 wishes to know how satisfied agent 2 is with a 
particular crop price, or, agent 2 wishes to know how much money agent 2 made 
last year.  
• Cooperation request: agent 1 seeks the help of agent(s) 2...n for some task. 
 
The following rules apply to communications of type 1: 
 
• The target agent does not have to respond to a request for information from the 
source agent, and does not have to give true information in answer to the request; 
• Agents are only allowed to send one information-seeking message per model time 
step. 
 
The following rules apply to communications of type 2: 
 
• The target agents do not have to respond to requests for cooperation; 
• Any responses to cooperation requests must be made within 1 model time step of 
the request being received. 
 
3.2.7 ... AlbAgent agent memory 
 
The Farmer agent memory is implemented using the Memory and Chunk classes. The 
class diagrams for these are shown in Figure 21. 
 
 
Figure 21: Memory and Chunk class diagrams 
 
Each entry in the Years array holds an ArrayList containing a number of Chunks. Each 
Chunk has a number of tags associated with it, describing what kind of information is 
held in the Chunk’s value ‘bins’ (the DVal, IVal and SVal primitive types). For example, 
a particular Chunk might hold “Hydraulic”, “River”, “Flow” tags, corresponding to 
steadily refined levels of classification. The Chunks are accessed by agents through a 
particular year. e.g.  
 
1. Memory query: what was the river flow last year?   
2. Tags parsed from the query: “flow”, “river” 
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3. Last year = 1997 
4. Years[0] contains 3 Chunks, the second of which has both “river” and “flow” tags. 
5. The Binned field lets the querying agent know which of the bins holds the relevant 
value, in this case DVal. 
6. DVal = 34.23 is returned to the original query. 
 
Additional functionality is provided by the storeChunk() and removeChunk() methods. 
The obfuscate() method in class Chunk is designed to replicate a function of human 
cognition, the blurring of numerical values in human memory the more frequently the 
number is accessed. As the Use variable increments, the P(obfuscate()) increases. The 
method will find the stored value and modify it by some amount within 10% of the 
original value, e.g. the 34.23 flow value is changed to 32.21. The decayChunks() method 
in class Memory takes a more drastic approach to simulating the fallibility of human 
memory, by randomly removing chunks. Chunk removal is undertaken infrequently 
according to a Poisson distribution. 
 Note that, as for GWBSIM, no agent has a true conceptualization of the future - 
such as a dedicated cognitive mechanism for handling long term implications of actions. 
There are isolated, hard-coded instances of taking account of the potential future: most 
Farmer agents are made ‘aware’ that the CHJ could take some action in the future to 
reduce some or all of the water use by the Farmer agents. The extent to which an agent 
fears that outcome is encapsulated in the FearOfGovernment internal resource (see 
discussion of resources, below). In reality, the value of this resource is controlled by an 
in-built cognitive loop that increases the fear of government action as more time goes by 
and nothing has yet been done. Like all internal resources, the actual value of each 
resource will vary by agent, since the amounts by which each variable increases or 
decreases in response to an external variable is distributed in either a uniform or gaussian 
manner. Some additional potential variation is built in, since agents can and routinely do 
‘check in’ with their neighbors to see what they ‘think’ about something (i.e. query the 
state of some internal resource of a neighbor). Agents can also (and routinely do) start 
rumors of government action, which are passed around a fixed number of agents before 
disappearing. The potential for highly organized behavior that can result from such 
simple rules is one reason why this particular setting is so ripe for agent-based modeling.  
 
3.2.8 ... AlbAgent agent learning 
 
The learning component of agent cognition is confined to a simple stimulus-response 
mechanism. If particular Action objects recurrently lead to reduced welfare or satisfaction 
on the part of the agent, the base activation level of the object is reduced so that - even if 
conditions appear to be right for that action - it becomes less likely the action is taken. 
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Figure 22 (right): simplified class diagram of the Action class 
 
AlbAgent Farmer motivations: cognitive make-up 
 
A set of stress variables are used to modify the core drivers for each Farmer agent’s 
decision-making. The core (implicit) drivers for decision-making are as follows: 
 
• Achieve an income as great as or exceeding the agent’s desired income level 
• Maintain debt and debt payments below a desired level 
• Maintain perceived levels of social conflict in the locale below the agent’s unique 
preferences 
• Maintain water heights in the agent’s well according to the agent’s preference 
 
These motivations fall under economic, social and hydrologic categories. Associated with 
each broad category is a single stress variable: Social Stress, Economic Stress and 
Hydrologic Stress. The stress variables are used as external metrics of agent performance 
and state of mind, given different ground water banking scenarios. For example: reducing 
a Farmer agent’s income will likely lead to increase economic stress, and may lead to an 
increased social stress depending on the agent’s unique cognitive fingerprint. The agent 
may respond to this by complaining, or changing its economic strategy. Similarly, 
pumping water from deeper in the well this year versus last year will likely cause an 
increase in hydrologic stress, which may also motivate a complaint, or more drastically a 
switch to secano (lower water use crop). Changes in stress variables are thus indirectly 
linked to current and future actions.  
 The Farmer agent also has a number of non-stress variables, which are denoted as 
internal resources. Internal resources are cognitive variables that only that particular 
agent has access to and can modify (as opposed to external resources, such as capital, 
which have substantiation outside of the agent’s internal cognition). Examples of internal 
resources include: fear of government, happiness, confidence, initiative, satisfaction with 
ground water bank. Example of external resources include: capital, debt, crop choice and 
harvest volume. GWBSIM’s structure of cognitive variables differs in that the BDI 
separation is much more explicit. GWBSIM agents have ‘belief’, ‘desire’ and ‘resource’ 
objects aggregating collections of separate variables for the one concept (e.g. a belief 
about the capital it owns, a desire for a certain level of capital, and an actual real world 
value for capital). AlbAgent dispenses with this explicit differentiation for reasons of 
parsimony, but has reworked the concept of a resource. There is no explicit difference 
between a belief and a resource, and desire is not encapsulated as a preference for the 
state of an internal and/or external resource (each resource has a set of preference values - 
minimum, preferred and maximum). AlbAgent does not hard code any resources or 
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variables into the model: they are parameterized via text file at model setup. 
 While it may seem that the cognitive makeup of GWBSIM and AlbAgent differ in 
fundamental terms, the essential cognitive model is the same for both: Beliefs supporting 
Desires that lead to certain Intentions, which generate Actions that may update the 
agent’s Beliefs, Desires and even Intentions. The models mostly differ in the level of 
sophistication with which the BDI model is implemented. For example, GWBSIM makes 
use of fuzzy logic and several other forms of translating internal and external variables 
into an effect on decision making. AlbAgent makes use of simple weighting based on 
separate or nested IF-THEN rules. 
 
3.2.9 ... AlbAgent agent population 
 
The Farmer agent population is set at 1311, drawn from INE data on land ownership (for 
agriculturally-active parcels of land). Negative farming population trend projections from 
INE are used to decrease the population automatically by a certain population each year. 
In the world, this could be natural population decrease (due to death), emigration from 
the region, or more likely, changing professions. In the event that a Farmer agent is 
removed from the model, the farmer’s land is distributed equally to the three nearest 
agents.  
 
3.2.10 ... AlbAgent agent economy 
 
The agricultural economy is simulated at a very coarse scale, making use of both 
historical data and future projections. Hectares of land with historical crop mixes are 
assigned to each agent at model startup, and agents then proceed to farm that land 
according to the assigned crop mix for the remainder of the model runtime, unless they 
decide to change the crop mix to reduce water use. Production costs and crop prices from 
1997 to 2007 are based on historical datasets; costs and prices thereafter (2007 to 2011) 
are set using annual inflation figures. The array of production costs each agent faces is 
the same, although quantities are stochastically varied between agents to take account of 
small variations in the agent’s farming practices and operational conditions. Additionally, 
agents also pay tax and debt, with figures similarly derived from historical datasets and 
projected according to trend. Harvesting and selling crops represents the principle 
economic activity of the Farmer agent, but the agent can also make money from 
participating in the ground water bank (see the specification of the AlbAgent ground 
water bank, below). No other agro-economic functions are simulated (e.g. land or water 
purchase or sale). 
 
3.2.11 ... CHJ 
 
The CHJ is an agent with roles corresponding roughly to those of the Confederacion 
Hidrologica del Jucar. Important roles of the real world CHJ include: 
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• Administering the water allocation system 
• Gathering data associated with the hydrologic system 
• Managing the groundwater system through a network of piezometers 
• Protecting ecologically sensitive areas 
• Flood protection 
 
Only some of these roles are relevant to the simulation. For example, since the simulation 
of ecologically sensitive areas is not included in AlbAgent, the role of the CHJ in 
protecting those areas. Roles that are actually simulated include: 
 
• Administration of the water allocation system, with limitations (see discussion 
below) 
• Administration of the ground water banking system (in the GWB scenario) 
• Recording and resolution of disputes over water use 
 
Given the focus on parsimony in constructing AlbAgent, many other normal 
administrative functions of the CHJ are not implemented. For example, the CHJ does not 
track whether or not an agent uses more of its annual water right than it is entitled to. In 
addition to the simpler coding benefits this bestows, expert opinions from the region 
suggest flagrant and unpunished overuse of water in the farming community. So there 
may be real world support for the assumption that the CHJ does not administer water 
rights in any rigorous manner. This is in stark contrast to the role of the SME in 
GWBSIM, which makes a detailed accounting of water use of each canal company for 
each time step. In realistic terms, the model CHJ agent only performs the following 
administrative functions: 
 
• Monitoring the overall state of the aquifer and automatically implementing any or 
all of a number of conservation policy options if the state of the aquifer exceeds 
certain depletion thresholds 
• Receiving, processing and approving/denying applications for ground water 
banking deposits or withdrawals 
 
If agents perceive inequalities in the distribution of benefits from the ground water bank, 
or if the ground water bank is leading to unacceptable drawdowns in Farmer wells, 
conflicts may be generated. These are of three categories of increasing severity: informal 
complaints, formal complaints and protests. Informal complaints are shared among the 
immediate neighbors of the Farmer agent, and are essentially a short term means for 
communicating agent stress. Formal complaints are directed to the CHJ; the CHJ will 
record but will not act on formal complaints. Protests are directed to the CHJ, which it 
will record and may eventually act on (such as implementing a water use restriction 
policy for certain agents).  
 
3.2.12 ... CHJ cognition 
 
The CHJ has a vastly simplified cognitive structure relative to the Farmer class. No 
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cognition/action is implemented; instead, a set of event timers with different periodicities 
repeatedly check whether certain CHJ actions are appropriate at that time. In addition, 
information received from Farmer agents (unprovoked) can initiate CHJ action. The CHJ 
has no learning, active memory or emotional components. The CHJ is intended to 
represent a non-cognitive administrative entity, and so does not have any communication 
or interaction abilities beyond necessary administrative messages and receiving conflict 
notifications from Farmer agents. 
 
3.2.13 ... Specification of the AlbAgent ground water bank 
 
The AlbAgent bank is identical in concept to the GWBSIM bank (see earlier discussion), 
with the following substantive technical differences: 
 
Pricing: the bank has variable pricing depending on the scenario. In scenarios with lower 
degrees of institutional change (see scenarios discussion below), the market sets the price 
per unit of water transacted in the bank. In scenarios with higher degrees of institutional 
change, the CHJ sets the per unit price. 
 
Deposit method: GWBSIM deposits were only possible through direct injection via 
managed recharge sites. AlbAgent deposits are only possible by foregoing the use of 
some or all of an existing water right. This system is predicated on the assumption that, 
without participating in the bank, the agent would use most if not all of its water right. By 
not using some portion of that right, water exists in the aquifer that otherwise would not 
have.  
 
Deposit/lease start date: AlbAgent Farmer agents can start leasing and depositing from t 
= 0 in the simulation, if they so choose. This is not the case in GWBSIM, which calls for 
an initial delay to allow deposits to build up. 
 
Organization of ground water bank accounts: GWBSIM has a natural feature around 
which to organize the bank, i.e. hydrogeologically distinct reaches of the Snake River. 
AlbAgent has no such feature, and the aquifer is not differentiated hydrogeologically 
within the study area (which is, incidentally, much smaller in geographic area and vertical 
extent that the Eastern Snake Plain Aquifer. Consequently, an arbitrary cruciform 
division of the study area aquifer was used, such that there are four bank accounts: north-
east (1), south-east (2), south-west (3), north-west (4). The bank account that an agent 
uses consequently depends on its location. 
 
In all other respects, the rules in the ground water bank are the same for GWBSIM and 
AlbAgent.  
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4.0 ... Design Of Experiments: GWBSIM and AlbAgent  
 
The Design of Experiments phase of the work involved the specification of a) the 
scenarios to be simulated with each model, and b) the concomitant parameterization of 
each model run. A scenario is defined as a coherent and unique set of model conditions.  
Parameterization is the process of defining the state of all model variables at the 
beginning of each model run, in accordance with the specifications of each scenario. In 
practice, parameterization can be general (some or all variables set to a stochastically-
controlled median level) or specific (select variables set up with initial values according 
to some pre-defined schema. The scenario design approaches for GWBSIM and 
AlbAgent differed considerably, partly by design and partly by accident. The scenarios 
for each model were initially considered from the perspective of what kinds of change it 
would be appropriate to force on each system. In the case of GWBSIM, each simulation 
would be conducted over a historical time period (1980-2000). This meant that historical 
climatic and hydrologic data would be used, and so varying climatic as well as 
institutional conditions would be inappropriate. On the other hand, AlbAgent was part 
historic, part future in its run (1997-2014). Consequently, in AlbAgent there was more 
scope for varying climatic as well as institutional parameters, and so more than just 
institutional scenarios were formulated. Two different parameterization approaches are 
adopted, on the basis of the different scenario structure for each model.  
 In GWBSIM, two separate scenarios were simulated, one without ground water 
banking and one with ground water banking. The Without scenario (referred to as the -
GWB scenario) differs from the With (referred to as the +GWB scenario) largely on the 
options open to individual agents and the responsibilities of the SME. The GWB scenario 
is based on a detailed specification laid out by Bryce Contor, IWRRI hydrologist, in a 
March 2007 personal communication.  
 
The original specification of -GWB was as follows: 
• Simulation length: 20 year simulation length, with daily time steps 
• Agent population: 1500 SWIs, 1500 GWIs, 80 SUs, 1 PC 
• Hydrological data: time series (river flow gauge data) from USBR Hydromet, 
time period 1980-2000. 
• Economic data: dataset from University of Idaho  (1980-2000), annual 
intervals 
 
The original specification of +GWB was as follows: 
 
• Simulation length: 20 year simulation length, with daily time steps 
• Agent population: 1500 SWIs, 1500 GWIs, 80 SUs, 1 PC, 46 CC, 11451 
Aquifer,  
• Hydrological data: time series (river flow gauge data) from USBR Hydromet, 
time period 1980-2000, daily intervals. 
• Economic data: dataset from University of Idaho , time period 1980-2000, 
annual intervals. 
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• Ground water banking option available to all irrigator and non-irrigator 
agents (except SME, environment and Market agents) 
 
Adjusted specifications (see discussion in Results section) reduced the simulation time 
period to 5 years, and 10 separate runs under each scenario, but otherwise kept the rest of 
the specifications the same. 
 Since GWBSIM is used to test only two scenarios - with and without ground 
water banking - I deemed it more appropriate to explore variation in select cognitive 
variables, by applying a Latin Hypercube Simulation (LHS) approach over a population 
of runs for each scenario. The general intents in running GWBSIM with this 
parameterization approach were, primarily, exploring the broad conflict outcomes with 
and without ground water banking, and secondarily, exploring the effects of varying 
initial agent cognitive states on those same conflict outcomes. AlbAgent was a different 
model for a different system and with subtly different scenarios. Consequently a different 
parameterization approach was adopted. All cognitive variables in AlbAgent are 
established for each agent via normal distributions around median values. Therefore there 
is no scope for controlled variation. In effect, the parameterization for AlbAgent is by 
scenario: each scenario in AlbAgent has a distinct set of climatic and institutional 
variables which are modified according to the scenario’s intent. The breakdown of each 
scenario is listed in Figure 23. Multiple replications with different random number seeds 
are run for each scenario in order to explore the model’s sensitivity to the stochastic 
components of its parameterization. In the remainder of this section, I lay out the LHS 
approach adopted for GWBSIM parameterization, and the scenarios/replication approach 
adopted for AlbAgent parameterization.    
 Only two scenarios are simulated with GWBSIM. These scenarios are essentially 
identical in physical and social makeup, except that in the +GWB scenario, the ground 
water banking institution is available for use by ground water and surface water 
irrigators. The government (the SME) does not incentivize participation, and so its own 
institutional activities only vary by having to operate the bank in the +GWB scenario. 
The internal cognition of individual irrigators does vary slightly, in that ground water 
banking is made available in their decision making for the plus scenario, whereas in the 
minus scenario the agents are not aware of the possibility of ground water banking. Note 
that the agents are not necessarily equipped with any bank-specific cognitive tools; the 
agents have to adapt to the existence of the banking system with the same cognitive 
structure they have for the -GWB scenario. As discussed above, given the lack of 
significant parametric variation between scenarios, I identified a small number of mostly 
internal cognitive variables to explore via systematic re-parameterization between model 
runs. The Latin Hypercube Simulation (LHS) approach (McKay et al 1979, Iman and 
Conover 1980) is a form of sensitivity analysis, which can be defined as the variation of 
inputs generally by small, incrementally changing amounts in order to determine the 
effects of individual variables or groups of variables on model outcome (Florian 1992; 
Pebesma and Heuvelink 1999; Barton 1998; Sanchez 2005). LHS can reduce the number 
of model realizations required to gain a statistically-significant result, while ensuring that 
all regions of the parameter space are sampled equally and systematically. In effect, LHS 
is a form of stratified sampling, the division of a sample space into regular intervals and 
sampling from those intervals rather than a simple random sample from the entire sample 
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space. In this way, LHS reduces a large multi-dimensional sampling space to a more 
practical but still statistically credible set of factor levels and combinations (McKay et al 
1979, Iman and Helton 1988). The LHS approach adopted was after Florian (1992) and 
incorporates multiple stages, beginning with qualitative selection of a core set of 
variables which the modeler believes is critical to the dependent variable in question. 
This set is then randomly sampled, and the random samples are themselves randomly 
combined to form the factor set for each simulation run.  
 LHS was used in GWBSIM in the following steps: 
 
 
1. A set of factors is identified are were likely to be most critical to the outcomes 
of the key dependent variables.  
  
     
  where K = number of key input variables and X1...Xk = the key input variables. 
  
2. An initial realization number (number of parametrically distinct simulation runs, 
s) is assessed. 
 
  Simulation Runs = s 
 
3. A cumulative distribution function (CDF) using a gaussian distribution is 
constructed for each factor in the chosen factor set.  
 
  CDF =  
 
4. Each  is divided into s intervals. 
 
5. Each interval sampled at the centroid. 
 
  I =  where K = 1, 2, 3…k, msk is the rank number of the sth  
 simulation for input variable Xk, and  is the inverse CDF. 
 
6. An s x k (Figure X)  matrix is constructed by randomly sampling once from the 
interval sample (I) selection for each variable.  
 
7. The s x k is used to parameterize each of s runs. 
 
 
Figure X: Latin Hypercube Simulation setup (after Florian 1992) 
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Social capital 
0.00898
098010
145651 
0.29573
625211
8898 
0.99164
695376
9207 
0.66273
780606
8191 
0.87573
640681
0724 
0.70894
952196
906 
0.56751
604821
2759 
0.42947
128422
2054 
0.10295
414635
4417 
0.34141
588526
9794 
Conflict levels 
0.67183
591225
8192 
0.57252
508047
2868 
0.25605
218519
5512 
0.38075
240512
0628 
0.06902
331089
62655 
0.78524
797316
162 
0.92445
844205
6559 
0.46719
871889
8987 
0.19388
202081
3797 
0.84915
925964
9586 
Future mitigation 
0.30076
404430
3301 
0.29224
533102
1916 
0.75845
685524
0098 
0.68720
000389
7745 
0.00156
127628
912156 
0.96946
027773
9233 
0.49420
349393
2268 
0.51865
253553
7603 
0.81445
484023
3551 
0.12200
214365
6205 
Happiness 
4.77175
959264
185 
6.37786
172036
713 
2.41131
067191
114 
3.65669
298364
619 
9.77186
384379
514 
5.07493
406790
555 
8.92273
646026
202 
1.91800
944611
885 
0.54850
792528
2932 
7.11017
813576
894 
Initiative 
5.08989
299674
261 
1.20779
812692
222 
4.18253
168722
904 
3.93189
338898
145 
2.28138
565543
473 
6.17509
110591
593 
7.45754
748114
375 
9.28782
675254
185 
8.42453
290909
667 
0.23963
677850
3348 
Curiosity 
3.19530
566351
213 
8.56559
628867
384 
9.57112
357155
727 
2.95996
886025
694 
4.60579
831872
831 
1.54228
386881
574 
6.14324
401853
403 
5.88940
813185
678 
0.80749
924962
0314 
7.06983
826040
252 
Hostility 
9.81682
020644
883 
2.90228
429214
512 
6.30075
069781
281 
7.26237
817545
025 
8.50387
208604
272 
4.12654
461139
673 
0.36713
729431
2746 
1.80809
678978
111 
5.59064
094426
064 
3.93187
935499
591 
Suspicion 
9.72591
918936
921 
8.34634
451358
034 
6.65805
119940
942 
4.56127
113606
125 
5.88221
624645
039 
7.78979
960075
041 
1.77069
884254
655 
3.74255
145843
777 
2.49293
606789
847 
0.76252
556665
6414 
Capital 
465906.
381772
499 
785794.
098649
096 
104208
0.49270
272 
350695.
532879
345 
174321
6.00236
74 
150113
0.90044
325 
121607
3.21426
612 
161266.
005285
582 
828328.
938297
323 
196058
5.68317
653 
Debt 
30811.9
041658
727 
39500.6
973399
214 
23483.4
859526
513 
45654.9
901599
598 
11529.7
003708
491 
10579.9
185808
843 
3983.24
011393
585 
41065.9
945617
608 
29634.6
685334
982 
17449.0
860917
579 
Interest 
0.66349
211792
2113 
0.93777
542807
9543 
0.15210
918367
3794 
0.35355
785514
5751 
0.83784
565470
8006 
0.54662
704917
8032 
0.45584
591783
5176 
0.73812
271206
1434 
0.21879
810844
6227 
0.03301
980365
39189 
Income stress 
0.18087
541473
9191 
0.99498
175716
1547 
0.38564
187819
2524 
0.60302
630725
1826 
0.72008
821351
6517 
0.86025
210898
5837 
0.22187
359583
3285 
0.04854
780093
71593 
0.56322
003643
5277 
0.43868
478497
255 
Water stress 
0.14017
063331
2552 
0.33856
083552
8949 
0.20344
746986
2157 
0.87282
824121
3623 
0.78223
226307
4392 
0.01462
914502
24651 
0.56110
473051
6417 
0.60742
955709
5488 
0.94037
449550
4882 
0.41715
366342
5959 
Model trust 
0.41001
541198
4869 
0.31461
320824
1664 
0.01660
440225
74218 
0.92325
937527
91 
0.74410
206490
456 
0.20646
824115
4822 
0.52878
973684
0905 
0.19930
300877
1674 
0.68753
226256
9473 
0.84304
077210
9037 
 
Figure X: actual table of parameterization values used in both scenarios in GWBSIM. Note that 
‘Conflict levels’ refers to the variable defining the agent’s perception of the current level of 
conflict in the basin. ‘Future mitigation’ refers to the variable defining the agent’s belief in the 
likelihood of some form of mitigation being forced onto GWI agents in the future. 
 
AlbAgent enjoys a wider range of scenarios and so much richer possibilities for varying 
non-cognitive parameters. Consequently, a scenario-controlled parameterization was 
adopted in favor of an LHS approach. The parameterization was established from the 
qualitative premise that two areas of change are of particular significance for the Albacete 
region from the perspective of conflict: climate and institutions. These provided two axes 
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to map out all possible scenarios. An LHS approach would also have been appropriate 
here, since the number of possible combinations of parameters and parameter values 
leads to a combinatorial explosion. Even with an LHS approach it was clear that the 
number of model runs required to adequately explore the sample space would be well 
beyond the time and resources available. Consequently, an alternative, more 
parsimonious approach was adopted: dividing the sample space of climatic versus 
institutional change into 9 separate and qualitatively-defined scenarios. In this way the 
low, moderate and high states of change for both climate and institutions can be explored 
in combinations that test the extremes (no climatic and institutional change versus 
maximum climatic and institutional change, etc) and the median states (some climatic and 
institutional change). While this does not fully explore all the possible dynamics between 
climatic and institutional change and any links with conflict, it does allow us to put 
bounds on the major hypothesis and at the very least suggest a direction for future 
exploration. Figures 23 and 24 below describe each scenario in detail. 
 
 
Figure 23 (right): numbered scenarios, qualitatively classified on axes of increasing climatic and 
institutional change. ‘Worst case climate change’ corresponds with the upper limits of the 
IPCC’s projections for precipitation and temperature changes; ‘major government interference’ 
means that the government (CHJ agent) is allowed to intervene in the system through selective 
subsidies and direct pumping shut down orders, and will intervene with high probability; ‘no 
banking’ means that the ground water banking institution is neither available to agents nor are 
they aware of the possibility of banking. 
 
Scenario Number Extent of climatic change Extent of institutional change 
1 Low Low 
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Scenario Number Extent of climatic change Extent of institutional change 
2 Low Moderate 
3 Low High 
4 Moderate Low 
5 Moderate Moderate 
6 Moderate High 
7 High Low 
8 High Moderate 
9 High High 
 
Figure 24: tabular form of Figure 23 above, indicating the qualitative dimension of 
climatic/institutional change associated with each AlbAgent scenario. Dimensions are explained 
in more detail in Figure 25 below. 
 
 
Figure 25: detailed explanation of ‘low’, ‘moderate’ and ‘high’ change dimensions for AlbAgent 
scenarios 
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4.1 ... Methodological Limitations 
 
A number of problems emerged during the course of preliminary GWBSIM runs that 
were deemed likely to damage the quantity and quality of output data from the final set of 
runs. It was soon clear that rectifying these problems would require major reconstruction 
of the core cognitive and environmental engines of GWBSIM. Unfortunately, there was 
not enough time to complete these changes before moving onto AlbAgent development. 
Consequently, I partly modified the experimental design to account for these changes, 
which has limited the analytical scope accordingly. Some of the problems and 
methodological limitations with GWBSIM are discussed in more detail in the results, but 
are listed here as a summary: 
 
1. Corruption of environmental output databases: analysis of the relationship 
between river flows, river diversions and measures of system conflict was not 
possible. 
2. Shortened simulation time period: only 5 years out of the full 20 years were 
simulated. 
3. Limited tracking of outputs: only a few key variables, selected a priori as 
important, were recorded. This meant that the analysis is restricted to these 
variables and other possible causative relationships may go unexplored.  
 
One of the most critical limitations for GWBSIM is the lack of environmental results data 
(river flows and diversions), since water is the most central and essential resource driving 
the system. Due to the lack of this data, I do not attempt to draw any major conclusions 
relating environmental conditions and agent behavior. However, to frame that discussion 
I briefly explore here trends in the historical data used to parameterize the model. River 
flows were set up using Bureau of Reclamation HYDROMET data for 13 gauging 
stations up and down the Snake. Note that these are highly simplified inputs, since many 
other layers of input (ground water bank activity, diversions from the river and return 
flows back into the river) were not simulated. What this brief analysis will be able to 
show us is whether the 5 years of simulation achieved (out of a possible 20) were 
particularly unique hydrologically. Figure 26 shows some basic probabilities for this 
hydrologic dataset: 
 
 
Probability of a gauging station having its... 
...highest flow after 1985: 0.53 
...lowest flow after 1985: 0.46 
...highest flow before 1985: 0.46 
...lowest flow before 1985: 0.53 
 
 
Figure 26: basic probabilities for gauging station flow, 1980-2000 
 
This cursory analysis shows that most gauging stations have a significantly higher 
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probability of seeing their highest and lowest flows in any given year before 1985, 
suggesting that hydrologic variability was high for this initial few years. Per-year means 
calculated for all gauging stations (Figure 27) suggest that the first 5 years of the 
simulation were either at or above the 20 year average; the middle 10 years were at or 
below average, and the last 5 years were consistently above average. 
 
Figure 27: average flow per year across all gauging stations. The red line marks the approximate 
position of the 20 year average. 
 
Implications for analysis are as follows: 
 
• The first 5 years of the simulation most likely had much higher base 
hydrologic variability than later years. 
• The first 5 years did not contain the driest year, but did contain the wettest 
year. 
 
At this point, however, I must re-emphasize the limitations of this approach: these flows 
are the basis for later decisions by agents. These decisions are very likely to substantially 
alter the base flows in the Snake, either through participation in the ground water bank, 
diversion of water from the river into canals, evaporative loss through crop growth, or 
return flows back into the river. This pre-simulation work provides a general 
environmental ‘frame’ for the analysis, but because of the potential difference between 
the base flows in parameterization and the actual per-year flows of the simulation, are not 
used in any substantial way in drawing conclusions or suggesting causation. 
 The methodological limitations for AlbAgent did not arise from problematic code, 
but more from data scarcity. This mainly influenced climatic, hydrologic and economic 
components of the model. Data was rarely absent, but typically only available at very 
coarse scales: some economic data was only available for the whole of Spain, for 
example, and so needed to be qualitatively scaled and adjusted for the Albacete region. 
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This was particularly true for the hydrology, with very coarse aquifer recharge and 
discharge data leading to a highly simplified bathtub model of the aquifer versus a more 
desirable finite element approach. Most importantly, there were significant gaps in the 
record of conflict for the region over the past 10 years. Different expert sources suggested 
different forms as well as degrees of conflict within and between communities, and there 
were no easily accessible records of litigations, official complaints or other reasonable 
measures of conflict. Consequently, full calibration was not possible, and AlbAgent 
remains a model with exploratory rather than predictive power. This is something I must 
emphasize for both models: neither is intended as an accurate and precise representation 
of their respective systems. Each model is constructed with as much real world data as it 
was practicable to access in the time available; in most cases, however, this was not 
sufficient, and so considerable license has been taken in filling in the gaps. Consequently, 
both models are intended to explore theory and not to offer concrete predictive 
recommendations for either setting.  
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5.0 ... Results 
5.1 ... Final experimental specifications 
5.1.1 ... GWBSIM 
 
In the final results run, I conducted 50 replications (fixed seed) for each of 2 scenarios 
(100 total runs), +GWB, and -GWB. I used a Latin Hypercube parameterization to vary 
select cognitive variables between replications, and the same LHS parameterization set 
for each scenario.  
5.1.2 ... AlbAgent 
 
I conducted 100 replications with random seeds for each of 9 scenarios (900 total runs). 
Scenarios varied climatic and institutional variables according to a predefined table. The 
greater number of replications run for AlbAgent reflected in part avoidance of the 
problems encountered in GWBSIM, and in part from the simpler and more efficient code 
in AlbAgent. 
 
5.2 ... Presentation and analysis of results 
 
I explore the results in three thematic groupings: GWBSIM results, AlbAgent results, and 
a comparative analysis. Both GWBSIM and AlbAgent results are discussed in isolation, 
since the Albacete and Idaho systems are fully independent and the models are able to 
stand on their own as fully self-contained representations of the systems. The 
comparative analysis draws on select results from both models that provide a comparative 
overview relating conflict to institutional capacity in each setting. Note that standard 
deviations are not included in the graphics unless they were significant enough to warrant 
discussion in the text. 
 For each model, I explore the results under further broad headings: conflict 
dynamics, ground water bank performance and possible causative relations between 
internal agent variables and conflict levels in the system. Each section includes a short 
summary after the analysis to aid the reader. The section begins below with a brief 
refresher of the original hypothesis, which guides the initial selection of results for 
analysis. 
 
5.2.1 ... GWBSIM 
 
I stated the major hypothesis as follows: 
 
Major Hypothesis: 
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 “Any change to institutional capacity will have an effect on the dynamics of water 
conflict in an artificial social-hydrological system” 
 
Conflict frequency (number of court actions and complaints) and conflict severity 
(number of distinct agents filing court actions or generating complaints) are the most 
critical output variables in helping us to explore the major hypothesis. Court action 
frequency and severity represents a more significant expression of conflict than a 
complaint, since the court action requires more energy, initiative, expense and 
cooperation on the part of the plaintiff agents than simply generating and posting a 
complaint with the SME. The following plots show conflict frequency and severity for 
each year of each scenario. Note that in these, as in all other GWBSIM plots, data is 
aggregated to an annual level. This was in fact the only available data resolution that the 
modeling platform made available at the time of experimentation. An update to the 
platform (AnyLogic) later made available a class of statistical variables that provided 
more detailed resolution of data, which is why the AlbAgent data is provided on a per-
time-step basis. 
  
 
Figure 28: complaints and court action frequency in the +GWB scenario 
 
In Figure 28, note that a single event is either a single complaint filed with the SME, or a 
single court action launched by one agent or group of agents against another agent or 
group of agents. The first important detail to note is that no court actions were 
encountered in any runs in the +GWB experiment. A significant number of complaints 
were encountered, however. Figure 29 below adds in the data from -GWB, indicating that 
the scenario without ground water banking overall had a higher conflict frequency, 
although in 1981 the +GWB scenario exceeded the -GWB scenario in absolute conflict 
frequency.  
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Figure 29: conflict frequency in an inter-scenario comparison. 
 
Looking in more detail at -GWB, Figure 30 below displays the total complaints per year 
(averaged across all runs in the experiment). Complaints peak around 1983, and then start 
to decrease. Note that this does not necessarily indicate a trend, since the model was 
designed to run for 20 years in simulation time, not 5. 
 
Figure 30: total complaints each year of the -GWB scenario, averaged across all runs. 
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Figure 31 below shows the court action data for the -GWB scenario. Court actions also 
peak later in the simulation, in 1984, and have a low in the second year of the simulation. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 31: total court actions for each year of the -GWB scenario, averaged across all runs. 
 
Figure 32 below compares the complaints of both scenarios, showing that while overall 
the -GWB scenario had a higher complaint (and conflict frequency), the +GWB scenario 
did exceed -GWB in absolute number of complaints in one year: 1981. 
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Figure 32: complaint frequency compared between scenarios, averaged across years. 
 
There was a significant difference between the two scenarios in terms of conflict 
frequency: no court actions were encountered in +GWB at all, whereas at least 5 court 
actions a year were encountered for all years of the -GWB scenario. 
 Figure 33 shows the conflict severity for each scenario. 100% conflict severity 
corresponds to all agents of all types filing a court action and/or complaint at the same 
time. For the +GWB scenario, no court actions were generated, and so conflict severity is 
only shown using complaint data: in other words, 100% severity would equate to all 4662 
active cognitive agents complaining at the same time. Note that a single court action 
‘unit’ equates to an agent either instigating or participating in a court action. As discussed 
earlier, agents are able to cooperate over the generation of court actions, but there can 
only ever be a single agent instigating an action. 
 
 
Figure 33: conflict severity as % of maximum for the +GWB scenario. 
 
Figure 34 below shows conflict severity for -GWB, indicating that at no point was the 
scenario ever severely under conflict with regard to court actions. The maximum 
percentage of agents participating in a court action never exceeded 2.5% of the total. 
However, the presence of court actions altogether - a much more costly activity for agents 
- suggests that the overall conflict severity for -GWB was higher than +GWB. 
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Figure 34: conflict severity as % of maximum for the -GWB scenario. 
 
Figure 35 below shows a comparison between the two scenarios for conflict severity - 
calculated for complaints, since the +GWB scenario had no court actions. The graph 
indicates that while conflict severity (complaints) was similar for both scenarios initially, 
conflict severity decreased significantly thereafter for +GWB but kept rising for -GWB. 
 
 
Figure 35: comparing conflict severity between scenarios. 
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5.2.1.1 ... Results Summary 1-A: conflict in the basin 
 
In summary, then, the complaint and court action data from the two experiments shows 
that: 
 
1.  The -GWB scenario showed overall higher levels of conflict frequency and 
severity across all years of the simulation, in terms of both complaints and court 
actions. 
2.  The level of court action-related conflict severity was low for -GWB, but still 
significantly higher than for the +GWB scenario. 
3.  The +GWB scenario showed low levels of conflict frequency and severity in 
general, with no court actions encountered at all in any year.  
4.  The +GWB scenario matched the -GWB in terms of complaints for the first 
couple of years of the simulation, but thereafter showed a significant decrease in 
conflict severity and frequency. The -GWB scenario showed a steady increase in 
complaint frequency and severity over time, but a relatively stable level of court 
action frequency and severity over time. 
 
I designed the +GWB and -GWB scenarios primarily to help explore what happens to the 
degree of water conflict in an artificial society with and without a ground water banking 
system. At face value, a lower level of conflict in the artificial society for the +GWB 
scenario would imply success for the ground water bank in reducing conflict. However, it 
is important to gauge what the intensity and form of participation in the bank before 
suggesting it could have had a significant effect on any trend seen in conflict. In other 
words, I must begin to construct a case that the ground water bank was principally 
responsible for the marked differences in conflict levels that the results for GWBSIM 
have shown so far. 
 Figure 36 below shows that GWI agents were the only participants in the bank for 
both withdrawals and leases, and that these numbers were significant - on occasion 
approaching and even exceeding one deposit/lease per agent per year. 
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Figure 36: participation in the ground water bank, by agent type and year, +GWB scenario 
 
This suggestion is reinforced by Figure 37 below, where participation in the bank peaked 
at around 25% of the total GWB-active agent population. Note that only GWI and SWI 
agents were permitted by the rules of the bank to participate. This was in part practical 
(limiting the complexity of the bank and the simulation) and in part realistic, since these 
are the two irrigator types most likely to participate in any real ground water bank in the 
Eastern Snake (and indeed, most likely to have a motivation for participating: Contor, 
pers. comm. 2007).   
 
 87 
 
Figure 37: participation in the bank as a % of potential maximum, across all years of the +GWB 
scenario. 
 
Importantly, Figure 37 shows an initial steady increase in participation followed by a 
steady decrease towards the end of the simulation. 
 Figure 38 below shows that total volumes leased and deposited from the bank 
were healthy, although deposits greatly exceeded leases. Deposit volume per participating 
agent actually increased over time, if we take into account the steady decrease in 
participation observed in Figure 37 above. Total transaction volumes peaked at around 
1.5 million acre-feet in 1982. The pattern of leases over time shows an intriguing pattern 
of sharp increases towards the middle of the simulation run followed by sharp decreases 
back to nearly 0 leases by 1984.  
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Figure 38: volumes deposited into and leased from the bank. 
 
Figure 39 below shows the volume of water in the bank responding to the dominance of 
deposits over withdrawals, with the bank nearly 4 million acre-feet in credit by the end of 
the simulation. This is a substantial quantity compared with the annual flow of the Snake 
River (typically between 8 and 12 million acre-feet annually). Between 1983 and 1984, 
for example, around 800,000 acre-feet were added to the aquifer (and, eventually, to the 
river by virtue of hydraulic connectivity in the system), around 10% of the river’s annual 
flow. 
 
Figure 39: total volumes of water in the bank over time. 
 
5.2.1.2 ... Results Summary 1-B: performance of the ground water bank 
 
In summary, this brief examination of the state and performance of the ground water bank 
has shown that: 
 
1.  GWI agents dominated both leases and withdrawals from the bank. Note that 
only GWI and SWI agents were allowed to participate in the bank. 
2.  GWI deposits were a far more significant contribution to the bank than leases. 
This was reflected in the overall upward trend in the bank’s balance over time. 
3.  Deposits increased in volume over time, and the per-agent deposit volume also 
increased. Leases showed no such trend, peaking in mid-simulation but 
decreasing to near zero by the end. 
 
The above graphics have attempted to convey the evolution of each scenario over time 
using the principal metrics of conflict frequency and severity (proxies for the hypothesis-
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defined concept of conflict dynamics), as well as details regarding the transactions into 
and out of the ground water bank. It is clear that the bank was reasonably successful and 
that the banking scenario saw less conflict than the non-banking scenario. This having 
been made clear, I will now move onto exploring possible correlations between the 
various characteristics of each agent type and the overall conflict frequency and severity 
in the model. While a correlation is never absolute proof of causality, it does provide 
substantial food for thought and can help contribute to or detract from the central 
hypothesis. First, through correlations and multiple regressions, I explore the relations 
between the parameterizations of key variables conducted as part of the Latin Hypercube 
Sampling. In other words, I am posing the question: does the initial parameterization for 
the pre-selected key variables have a statistically significant effect on the year-by-year 
level of conflict in the artificial society? Second, through covariance analyses, I explore 
possible correlations between changes in agent characteristics over time, and conflict 
frequency.  
 Figure 40 below shows correlation values for all parameterizations compared with 
number of complaints (+GWB scenario, where no court actions were encountered). This 
is a plot of initial parameterization values against a major model outcome, the number of 
complaints per year, not variation in those parameterizations over simulation time. Note: 
‘Conflict levels’ denotes the agent’s perception of conflict levels in the basin; ‘Future 
mitigation’ denotes the agent’s assessment of the likelihood of future mitigation 
requirements being handed down from the SME. A mitigation requirement is essentially a 
penalty dealt out to agents who are ruled by the SME to be in breach of the prior 
appropriation doctrine (i.e. causing some damage to senior water rights upstream or 
downstream). Mitigation plans are usually settled out of court, through diverting some of 
that agent’s water right to the injured party, and other ‘mitigating’ actions. All active 
cognitive agents in the model were imbued by its parameterization with a varying level of 
suspicion as to the likelihood of these mitigation plans being forced upon them or other 
agents during the simulation or at some point in the future. 
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Figure 40: correlation coefficients for comparisons between LHS-parameterized values and the 
resultant number of complaints per year for the +GWB scenario. 
 
Some of the most evident features are: the strong positive correlation between debt and 
complaint frequency; mostly negative correlation between income stress and complaint 
frequency; and mostly negative correlation between capital and complaint frequency. The 
signs of these correlations are mixed: in most years, a higher debt is related to increased 
numbers of complaints, with reasonable significance. However, income stress is related 
to both increases and decreases in complaints. This suggests confounding variables may 
be reducing the significance of that relationship over time. The increase in capital is 
generally inversely correlated with complaint frequency, meaning (in a not unsurprising 
finding) that an increase in an individual agent’s capital is likely to result in a lower 
complaint frequency from that agent.  
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Figure 41: correlations for the -GWB scenario, comparing LHS-parameterized agent 
characteristics with result complaints and court actions in each year of the -GWB scenario. 
 
The same plot for the -GWB scenario is more complex because both complaints and 
court actions are included as dependent variables. Some notably significant relationships 
appear to be: 
 
i. Water stress and complaint frequency, very strongly and positively correlated. 
ii. Social capital and complaint frequency, strongly correlated both positively and 
negatively. 
iii. Initiative and court actions, moderately and negatively correlated. 
iv. Perception of conflict levels and court actions, moderately positively correlated. 
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v. Moderate negative correlation between suspicion and both court actions and 
complaints. 
vi. Consistent weakly negative correlation between debt and complaints/court 
actions. 
 
Other relationships are present, but these are at best weakly correlated or contradictory 
between years. Only water stress has a correlation coefficient large enough to stand out. 
 In Figures 42 and 43 below, we conduct a simple (normalized) covariance 
analysis for variation in agent characteristics over time against complaint frequency for 
GWI and SU agents, +GWB scenario. Some of the most notable features are as follows: 
 
i. Strong negative covariance between capital and complaint frequency. 
ii. Moderately strong positive covariance between social capital and complaint 
frequency. 
iii. Moderately strong negative covariance between a variety of mostly ‘negative’ 
emotional variables - hostility, suspicion and perception of future mitigation - and 
complaint frequency. ‘Negative’ in this context is a somewhat subjective label, 
but attempts to convey the assumption that ‘hostility’ is generally agreed to be an 
emotion with unproductive consequences for human society. This is an interesting 
relationship, given that one might expect such ‘negative’ emotions to lead to 
behaviors that were more aggressive and hostile - such as complaints. However, 
this does not appear to be the case. 
iv. A lack of a clear covariance between income stress, water stress and complaint 
frequency. 
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Figure 42: covariance between agent characteristics and complaint frequency over time for the 
+GWB scenario. Note that the variance has been normalized to plot on a 0.0-1.0 scale. 
 
Figure 43 below shows the same normalized covariance for the SU agent. A very 
different picture emerges: whereas most emotions for the GWI agent appear to be 
inversely related to complaint frequency, for the SU the opposite is true. Higher hostility, 
curiosity, initiative and suspicion all are apparently related to higher complaint frequency 
from the agent. Social capital and financial capital are once again strongly positively and 
negatively (respectively) related to complaint frequency, and this time income stress and 
water stress have a much stronger and positive relationship. 
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Figure 43: covariance calculated for agent characteristics and complaint frequency, for the SU 
agent in the +GWB scenario. Note that the values have been normalized to 0.0-1.0. 
 
Figure 44 below shows the same data in a slightly different format (non-normalized) due 
to the addition of court action data for the -GWB scenario, and some highly variable and 
probably erroneous data in the samples. Once again, we see that GWI and SU agents are 
the source of most trouble in the artificial society. Other notable observations include: 
 
i. Negative correlation between water stress and complaint frequency for SU. 
ii. Negative correlations between hostility, suspicion, income stress and complaint 
frequency for SU. The relationship between income stress and complaint 
frequency is somewhat suspect and may be erroneous. 
iii. Positive correlations between happiness and complaint frequency in SU: this is in 
contrast to the negative correlation between happiness and complaint frequency 
seen for the +GWB scenario in SU agents. 
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Figure 44: non-normalized covariance between agent characteristics and complaints/court 
actions, -GWB scenario. 
 
To take a more general perspective, Figure 45 below shows R-squared values for a 
multiple regression using key agent characteristics selected, against complaints and court 
actions for each scenario. Some of the notable features of this plot are as follows: 
 
i.  The strongest relationships on average are between capital and conflict 
frequency, suggesting that a significant proportion of the variability in conflict 
frequency may be due to inter-agent and inter-annual variability in capital 
reserves. 
ii.  Weak relationships tend to be seen for happiness, initiative, curiosity and 
hostility - some of the most key emotional variables for agents. 
iii.  Complaints in the +GWB scenario appear to have significant variability in 
strength of relationship across the variables, while court actions see more 
consistent relationships. 
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Figure 45: multiple regression of agent characteristics against levels of complaints and court 
actions in each scenario. 
 
5.2.1.3 ... Results Summary 1-C: Influence of agent characteristics on 
complaints and court actions 
 
In summary, then, a number of key points can be drawn from our regression and 
covariance-based survey of relationships between some key agent characteristics and 
conflict event frequency: 
 
1. Across all agents and both scenarios, the financial variables appear to have the 
strongest relationships with conflict frequency. Higher capital generally equates to 
fewer complaints and court actions, and higher debt to more complaints and court 
actions. Interestingly, higher debt appears to have more of an effect on complaint 
frequency than court action frequency. 
2. Relationships between variation in emotional parameters and conflict frequency 
are decidedly mixed: for example, some agents appear to have inverse 
relationships between happiness and conflict frequency, other agents strong 
positive relationships. In other words, correlations are present but are often 
contradictory and so do not bear up to detailed analysis. 
3. Social capital appears to be an important parameter for agents, and appears to be 
positively correlated with complaint frequency for both GWI and SU agents. 
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Having examined in some detail possible statistical relationships between agent cognitive 
parameters, available financial resources and conflict frequency, I now turn back to 
broader brush metrics. The following plots are simple comparisons of model evolution 
with and without the ground water banking option activated. Progressive changes in court 
actions, complaints and bankruptcies are shown against increasing model time, with 
comparisons between scenarios where appropriate. 
 Figure 46 below shows, for the +GWB scenario, bankruptcies for those agents 
that went bankrupt over all the years in the simulation. It is immediately clear that it is 
mostly SWI agents that went bankrupt. SU agents appear to survive the early years of the 
simulation without any bankruptcies, but then experience a late surge towards the end. 
The decrease in bankruptcy frequency for SWI agents toward the mid-part of the 
simulation is interesting, suggesting that there might be some longer periodicity in 
financial failures for SWIs not captured by the model’s short runtime. 
 
 
Figure 46: bankruptcies by agent and year in the +GWB scenario. 
 
Figure 47 below, -GWB bankruptcies by year and agent, shows a different picture. 
Whereas the +GWB scenario bankruptcies were restricted to just two agent types, with 
one agent type dominating, three agent types undergo financial failures in the -GWB 
scenario, and GWI agents follow SWI agents closely in inter-annual variation in 
bankruptcy frequency. SU agents, once again, do not appear to go bankrupt until the latter 
stages of the simulation. 
 
 98 
 
Figure 47: bankruptcies by agent and year, -GWI scenario. 
 
These inter-scenario differences are much clearer in Figure 48 below. In absolute terms, 
fewer agents go bankrupt in the +GWB scenario than do in the -GWB scenario, but there 
is some ambiguity in inter-annual variation between the two scenarios. For example, for 
1980, 1983 and 1984, SWIs in the +GWB scenario generate fewer bankruptcies than in 
the -GWB scenario, but this relationship is reversed for 1981 and 1982. Peak levels of 
bankruptcy for all agents across both scenarios and all years are firmly in the latter part of 
the simulation and for the -GWB scenario.  
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Figure 48: comparison of bankruptcies between scenarios and across agent type. 
 
Figure 49 below shows the progression over time in the numbers of court actions each 
year. This is only for the -GWB scenario, since no court actions were encountered for the 
+GWB scenario. The trend is, overall, up: there are more court actions per year in 1984 
than there are in 1980. However, the reduction in court action generation in the mid-part 
of the simulation is interesting, particularly when we remember the similar shaped curve 
for SWI bankruptcies over the same period - albeit for a different scenario. 
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Figure 49: court actions by year of the -GWB scenario simulation. 
 
Figure 50 below displays the variation in bankruptcies over time in an inter-scenario 
comparison. Nothing significantly new is on offer here, except to show definitively how 
the -GWB scenario has a steeper gradient of increase in bankruptcies over time and a 
higher overall level of bankruptcies. 
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Figure 50: change in annual bankruptcies over time, both scenarios. 
 
Finally, the following series of graphs show the source of court actions and complaints - 
the agent types which generated the most court actions and complaints each simulation 
year. 
 
 
 
Figure 51: mean complaint frequency per year, for each agent source. 
 
Figure 51 above addresses mean complaint frequency by year for both scenarios. 
Immediate observations of note include: 
 
i. The constant high generation frequency of the GWI agents in the -GWB scenario, 
contrasted with their more variable generation frequency of the +GWB scenario.  
ii. The steady increase in SU complaints over time for both the + and - scenarios, 
with the peak achieved in the +GWB scenario.  
iii. The flat curves for both SWI and PC agents in both scenarios. 
 
Figure 52 below depicts mean court action generation frequency for the only scenario that 
generated court actions,  -GWB. 
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Figure 52: mean court actions by year and agent source, -GWB scenario. 
 
Immediate observations of note include: 
 
i. Steady upward trend for both SU and GWI agents through the simulation. 
ii. Steady downward trend for SWI agents through the simulation. 
iii. Constant but very low generation rate from PC throughout the simulation.  
 
Two key indicators, water stress and income stress, represented catch-all variables 
impacted by a number of different agent decisions and changes in the agent’s external 
environment. These indicators enjoy the most frequent implementation of fuzzy logic of 
any parameters in the model. The significance of emphasizing fuzzy logic with the stress 
variables is that these variables represent the closest thing to an overall indicator metric 
for agent ‘state of mind’, i.e. the stress variables draw on the largest rulesets and are the  
most sensitive to changes in relevant internal and external conditions.   
 If an agent has a high water stress, for example, it generally indicates that a 
number of water-related conditions both internal and external to the agent are not going 
well. Note that, unfortunately, there is no universal metric for ‘going well’. Given that the 
irrigator agents are interested in increasing water levels in the canals and the power 
company agent is interested in increasing water levels in the river (to feed its run-of-the-
river dams and keep electricity generation rates up), different agents can be stressed in 
opposite directions by the very same environmental condition.  
 Given the ‘catch-all’ nature of these variables, it is important to understand, in 
addition to how these indicators may have been related (or not) to overall levels of 
conflict, how these indicators varied over time for each agent. Exploring the shape of 
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these curves might help us explain other trends in the data and overall system behavior. 
Figures 53 and 54 below shows plots for both scenarios, indicating how water stress and 
income stress vary over the 5 year model runtime (data averaged across all runs, all 
agents of the same type, within each scenario). 100% stress for a given scenario would 
correspond to all agents experiencing 100.0 values in that particular form of stress (the 
maximum level for all stress variables). Note that a negative value for stress corresponds 
to a recurrence of conditions favorable to reducing stress. Once the agent is entirely 
unstressed (i.e. percentage reaches 0), the time steps for which conditions continue to be 
actively not stressful force the stress value into negative values (i.e. if conditions go on to 
cause neither an increase or decrease in stress, then the stress value stays at 0). This is 
intended to convey the concept of conditions being generally favorable or unfavorable for 
a particular agent type; a simple 0 value for stress would not convey the same 
information. Figure 53, an inter-scenario comparison for water stress, has some notable 
features: 
  
i. Across both scenarios, water stress for SWIs increases over time. Water stress is 
generally highest for these agents in the latter part of the simulation, although the 
peak stress for SWIs in the +GWB scenario is actually seen in 1981. 
ii. Stress for GWIs is highest, for both scenarios, in the early years of the simulation. 
Stress for these agents drops to 0 or negative stress over time. 
iii. Water stress for SU and PC agents is either zero or negative throughout the 
simulation, with stress either remaining static and negative or becoming 
increasingly negative over time. 
iv. The static state of PC and SU agents for the -GWB scenario is somewhat 
puzzling, when we remember that SU agents were responsible for a significant 
proportion of complaints in both scenarios. This suggest either no clear link 
between water stress and the likelihood of the agent complaining, or some other 
confounding variable.  
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Figure 53: change in water stress over time, by agent and scenario. 
 
The same graph produced for income stress shows a similar overall appearance. Income 
stress for SWI agents in both scenarios increases over time, although it increases more 
slowly and achieves lower peaks than for water stress. For all other agents, however, 
income stress decreases into negative values, or remains static, over time. Highest values 
of stress for the SWI agents are in the -GWB scenario. For other agents there appears to 
be little difference in the stress response of the agent given different ground water 
banking options (but remember that PC and SU agents were not allowed to participate in 
the bank).  
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Figure 54: change in income stress over time, by agent and scenario. 
 
In summary, then, my exploration of court action, bankruptcy and agent stress changes 
over time has yielded the following key observations: 
5.2.1.4 ... Results Summary 1-D: conflicts and stress 
 
1. Fewer agents go bankrupt in the +GWB scenario compared with the -GWB 
scenario. 
2. Bankruptcy figures for both scenarios are dominated by the SWI agents, and the 
number of SWI bankruptcies generally increases during the simulation run. This 
is generally true of all other agents who experience bankruptcies. 
3. Court action frequency generally increases over time in the -GWB scenario 
(remember that no court actions were generated in the +GWB scenario). 
4. The SWI and PC agents generate little or no conflict in the +GWB scenario, but 
constant or declining levels of conflict in the -GWB scenario. 
5. The SU and GWI agents are responsible for the bulk of the complaint and court 
action generation in both scenarios. 
6. The -GWB scenario sees the agents in their most stressed state, for both income 
and water stress. 
7. SWI agents experience the most water and income stress out of all agents, in both 
scenarios. 
8. Both water and income stress tend to increase over time for SWI agents, but 
decrease or remain static for most other agents. 
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A final area of interest is in the exploration of environmental conditions (reach flows, 
spring flows and canal flows) relative to conflict frequency and severity. So far we have 
mostly only explored internal agent conditions (such as agent happiness) and more broad 
societal conditions (such as level of bankruptcies across an agent population). External 
environmental variables are conceptually likely to have a very strong influence on agent 
behavior and internal state: the amount of water in a canal dictates how much is available 
to each surface water irrigator agent (as long as it is the same as or less than the agent’s 
entitlement according to how many shares it owns in the canal). The amount of water 
available to each agent will partly determine what type of crop and how much acreage is 
planted. The type of crop, acreage and availability of irrigation water will be strong 
influences on the yield that year and the amount of income the agent receives. If there is a 
major drought, and little water is in the system, many agents will experience severe 
economic stress (translating into financial stress).  
 Unfortunately, while data was written to file on a regular basis for reach flows, 
reach diversions and canal volumes, in both experiments an I/O problem meant that the 
data was significantly corrupted and consequently unusable. In the analysis and 
discussion that follows, this fact must be born in mind: however good the explanation for 
a link between an internal agent variable and an external societal metric (such as 
complaint frequency), it may well be overshadowed by a strong, and unfortunately 
unknown environmental forcer. The flaw that led to the data corruption was addressed in 
work on the AlbAgent model.   
 
5.2.2 ... AlbAgent1 
 
As for the GWBSIM results, I present the results of AlbAgent experimentation with the 
intention of supporting or denying the major hypothesis - although I will not explicitly 
treat the hypotheses in this section. The results are grouped as follows: 
 
1. Time series of conflict 
2. Performance of the ground water bank 
3. Comparisons between state of the aquifer and various internal and external agent 
variables, including conflict 
4. Covariance between select internal variables of agents and external societal conflict 
5. Correlations between variations in climatic parameterization and conflict outcomes 
6. Correlations between variations in institutional parameterization and conflict 
outcomes 
 
I use the time series to show how the different scenarios performed in terms of total 
conflict in the system. It is useful to know which scenarios were the best performing 
(where ‘best’ equates to the system with the lowest levels of conflict), since this provides 
a point of departure for later discussions attempting causal linkages between 
agent/environmental variables and conflict. I report on the ground water bank’s 
performance for a similar reason: from the AlbAgent parameterization table discussed 
                                            
1 Standard deviations are not included unless they were significant enough to warrant discussion in the text 
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under the Parameterization section, we know that scenarios are either low, moderate or 
high on institutional or climatic scales. It is possible then to make some preliminary 
associations between qualitative ‘change state’ and the bank’s performance. I calculate 
correlation coefficients between a number of internal agent variables and overall societal 
conflict to look for any potential for causality. For example, internal stress may both be a 
product of wider societal conflict as well as a cause; it is not trivial to determine which 
came first, and by calculating correlation coefficients I may be able to make a better 
determination. Finally, I examine correlations between initial climatic/institutional 
parameterization and overall conflict outcomes to determine whether the ‘state of change’ 
in each scenario may be having a strong influence on the level of conflict in the system. 
 
Conflict in the system 
 
 
Figure 55: total level of conflict by scenario (number of individual conflict events over time) 
 
Figure 55 shows a number of key features of conflict dynamics (note that the Y axis is 
number of conflict events, with extra weighting for formal complaints over informal 
complaints). All scenarios have clear annual periodicity, with the conflict peak achieved 
just before the new year, and all scenarios zeroing out their conflict in the new year. Most 
scenarios show a steady increase in conflict over time, particularly those scenarios with 
less overall conflict relative to other scenarios. Importantly, the scenarios are grouped by 
frequency of conflict: scenarios 2, 3, 5, 6, 8 and 9 suffer much higher conflict frequencies 
that scenarios 1, 4 and 7. The more severely conflicted scenarios peak in conflict within 
the first 5 years of the simulation, thereafter dropping off sharply before slowly climbing 
back up. In no scenario does conflict actually decrease over time. Most importantly, the 
scenarios with the lowest levels of conflict were those that did not include ground water 
banking as an option for agents. Not shown on the graphic is the fact that the system did 
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not achieve the highest severity of conflict in any scenario, since the conflicts were 
entirely made up of formal and informal conflicts: no protests (the AlbAgent equivalent 
of GWBSIM court actions, in terms of severity) were encountered in any scenario. 
 Figure 56 compares the same total conflict data against a ‘change index’. Scenario 
data for average conflict were plotted against their degree of change index, and all entries 
with a single index were themselves averaged. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 56: comparing a normalized conflict index with the degree of change experienced by 
scenarios; note that the degree of change is from no change (0) to maximum change (4). Also 
note that conflict index is normalized from 0.0 (no conflict) to 3.0 (maximum conflict). 
 
The most interesting feature of the graphic is that despite the general indications that 
degree of change might be positively correlated with conflict, the actual comparative 
trace follows a distinctly different pattern: the highest levels of conflict are associated 
with moderate levels of change. This suggests that it is the type of change rather than the 
degree of change that is important. This is underlined by the fact that the highest degree 
of change (close to 4) experiences some of the lowest levels of conflict. 
 
 109 
 
Figure 57: comparing degree of institutional and physical change with conflict frequency.  
 
The figure above (Figure 57) breaks down the data into specific types of change, and in 
so doing conveys four important bits of information. The first is that institutional change 
sees much stronger conflict responses than physical (climatic) change. Conflict drops 
slightly as climate change increases, but the change is subtle and essentially there is little 
variation. Conflict increases dramatically as institutional change increases, but tapers off 
slightly at the highest degree of institutional change. The second point is that the peaks of 
conflict under institutional and physical change do not coincide with the same degree of 
change. We see the highest level of conflict for institutional change when that change is 
only moderate, and the highest level of conflict for physical change under the no physical 
change scenario. This brings us to the third point, that conflict exists in the system with or 
without change: the no-change scenarios for both physical and institutional dimensions 
show conflict. Finally, we see that ground water banking (only active at degrees 2 and 3 
of institutional change) was accompanied by higher conflict relative to those scenarios 
with no ground water banking. 
 
5.2.2.1 ... Results Summary 2-A: conflict in the system 
 
In summary, then, the conflict results for the system are as follows: 
 
1. All scenarios have annual periodicity in conflict. 
2. Most scenarios show an increase in conflict with time. 
3. Those scenarios with ground water banking all experienced higher conflict than 
those scenarios without ground water banking. 
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4. Scenarios with more severe conflict showed peaks in the first 25-40% of the 
simulation, whereas the scenarios with the lowest conflict peaked at the end of the 
simulation. 
5. No acute conflict was experienced by any scenario. 
6. Increases in institutional change were generally accompanied by significant 
increases in conflict frequency. Increases in physical change were not accompanied 
by significant increases or decreases in conflict frequency. 
7. Peaks of conflict occur when institutional and physical change are at different 
degrees. 
8. Conflict was experienced by the system even without any sort of change, physical 
or institutional. 
 
Bank performance 
 
Figure 58: volumes of water in meters cubed, leased from the bank over time, for each scenario 
in which ground water banking was activated. 
 
Figure 58 above shows that bank performance (in terms of leasing) was generally good 
beyond the first two years of simulation. The highest lease volumes across the scenarios 
occurred in the first five years of the simulation, with steady decreases for five years 
thereafter and then fluctuation across all scenarios resembling something akin to 
Epstein’s punctuated equilibrium (Epstein 2002). Scenario 6 experienced the highest peak 
in lease volume, but as the Figures below show, did not enjoy the highest average or 
highest overall volume. Beyond the first few weeks of each year, lease volumes - and by 
extension, participation in leasing - dropped off precipitously. Very much smaller lease 
volumes were seen during the remainder of each year, but lease volumes rarely drop to 
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zero. Considerable variance can be seen across all scenarios: Scenario 8, for example, 
sees a few peaks of activity separated by many years of below average leasing. Scenario 
9 shows the opposite, with many years of high levels of activity followed by a single 
slump year.  
 
 
Figure 59: average lease volume per week, by scenario 
 
Figure 59 above shows small, but statistically significant variation between scenarios in 
terms of lease volume (standard deviations were generally too small to be usefully 
plotted). Scenario 3, with high levels of institutional change but no physical change, 
shows the highest average lease volume. Interestingly, there appears to be a neat relation 
between degree of institutional change and average volume leased: all the moderate 
change scenarios (2, 5 and 8) show less average volumes than the extreme institutional 
change scenarios (3, 6 and 9).  
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Figure 60: total volumes leased under each scenario 
 
Figure 60 above simply reinforces the fact that Scenario 2 was the most voluminous case 
for volumes leased, as well as the bifurcation in lease volumes between moderate and 
extreme institutional change scenarios. 
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Figure 61: volumes deposited in the ground water bank, by scenario, over time 
 
The case for deposits is somewhat different. Instead of seeing higher transaction volumes 
initially, deposits show a somewhat variable but weak trend towards increasing over time 
(after initial peaks for some scenarios). This finding of generally trend-less data for 
banking transactions applies to both deposit and lease data. Scenario 9 displays the peak 
deposit volume. As for the lease data, activity at the beginning of each year is high but 
tapers off. 
 
Figure 62: average volumes deposited per week, by scenario 
 
Figure 62 above shows that Scenario 6 had the highest average deposit per week, while 
Scenarios 2 and 5 the lowest. The difference is a little less significant, but in general we 
again see that the highest degrees of institutional change tend to be accompanied by high 
volumes deposited in the aquifer, and vice versa for scenarios with moderate degrees of 
institutional change. 
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Figure 63: comparing average weekly transaction volumes 
 
Figure 63 above shows that deposits and leases, when considered together, show 
seriously unbalanced performance for the ground water bank. As we saw in GWBSIM, 
leases are again outweighed by deposits, sometimes 2:1. Interestingly, however, the 
change in peak height between scenarios shows a similar pattern for deposits as for 
leases, suggesting that leases and deposits track each other within any one scenario, i.e. 
there may be some relation (uni- or bi-directional causality) connecting volumes of lease 
transactions to deposit transactions. Scenarios 3 and 6 display the highest average activity 
of all the scenarios, leases being slightly higher and deposits slightly lower in volume for 
Scenario 3. 
 
5.2.2.2 ... Results Summary 2-B: performance of the ground water bank 
 
In summary, then, our examination of the ground water banking performance data has 
shown the following: 
 
1. The bank was clearly functional across all years of the scenarios that simulated 
ground water banking. 
2. The highest lease volumes across all scenarios were encountered in the first five 
years of the simulation, with considerable fluctuation in lease volumes thereafter. 
3. The highest lease volumes in each year were encountered at the beginning of each 
year, followed by much more minor peaks later in the year. 
4. Scenario 3 shows the highest average and total lease volumes. 
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5. Scenarios with the highest degrees of institutional change showed the highest lease 
volumes, vice versa for scenarios with only moderate degrees of institutional 
change. 
6. Neither deposits or leases show any clear increasing or decreasing trend, but there 
is a possible trend toward increasing volumes over time in the deposit data. 
7. Deposits show less variability than leases, but the same intra-annual pattern of 
variability. 
8. Scenario 6 experienced the highest average and total deposit volumes. 
9. Deposits greatly exceeded leases in average and total volumes. 
10.  Variation in lease volumes between scenarios follows the same broad pattern 
seen in inter-scenario deposit volume variation. 
 
State of the Aquifer 
 
 
Figure 64: changing aquifer levels, in meters above datum, over time and organized by scenario. 
 
Figure 64 above shows clear differences between scenarios with regard to whether or not 
the use of water during the scenario led to sustainable treatment of the aquifer. For the 
purposes of this analysis, ‘sustainable’ aquifer use is that which does not deplete the 
aquifer (reduce the level of water in the aquifer) over time. Not surprisingly, 
‘unsustainable’ aquifer use is that which causes depletion in the aquifer. Sustainable 
scenarios include 2, 3, 5 and 6. Unsustainable scenarios include 1, 4, 7, 8 and 9. All 
scenarios show the same initial decrease in levels for the first half-year of the simulation; 
thereafter the sustainable scenarios stabilize and start to increase water levels at a 
reasonably steady rate until the end of the simulation. The unsustainable scenarios show 
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slightly more fluctuation, but in general also a steady rate of decrease over time. The best 
performing scenario in terms of sustainability is Scenario 2 (with no climatic change and 
only moderate institutional change). 
Similar data, but presented in terms of snapshots of the aquifer grid after completing a 
typical run for Scenarios 1, 5 and 9, emphasize that the no institutional change scenario 
results in a worsened aquifer state, while the maximum institutional change results in an 
improved aquifer state. The results are not exactly impressive, however: few of the grid 
cells change sufficient to shift their classification. The change is most pronounced in the 
areas where depletion was already marked (red shaded cells). 
 
 
Figure 65: state of the aquifer in 2014 after completing a typical run of the a ‘no institutional 
change’ scenario (Scenario 1). Note the scale is from more depleted (red shades) to less depleted 
(blue shades) - ignore the existing scale labels. 
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Figure 66: state of the aquifer in 2014 after completing a typical run of ‘moderate institutional 
and climatic change’ (Scenario 5). Note the scale is from more depleted (red shades) to less 
depleted (blue shades) - ignore the existing scale labels. 
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Figure 67: state of the aquifer in 2014 after completing a typical run of maximum institutional 
and climatic change (Scenario 9). Note the scale is from more depleted (red shades) to less 
depleted (blue shades) - ignore the existing scale labels. 
 
Correlating GWB transaction activity with variation in aquifer levels suggests there is no 
strong relationship between aquifer water levels and the intensity of transaction activity 
through the bank (see Figure 68, below). 
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Figure 68: correlation coefficients calculated between bank transaction frequency and aquifer 
water levels. In all scenarios, there is little evidence of a strong relationship. 
 
However, we can explore the ranking of scenarios by deposit volume, to see if the higher 
deposit volume scenarios tend to be the more sustainable scenarios (Table 2, below). 
With the notable exception of Scenario 2, the top three sustainable scenarios are those 
that saw the highest deposit volumes. The relationship appears to be less clear for lease 
volumes: the top two lease volumes were experienced by sustainable scenarios, but the 
third top lease volume is in an unsustainable scenario. From these two tables it might be 
reasonable to say that deposits have a stronger influence on the aquifer water level than 
leases. 
 
Table 2: scenarios ranked by deposit volume (first = highest volume) and sustainability from the 
perspective of not experiencing a decline in aquifer level 
 
Scenario Deposit Volume Rank Sustainability 
6 1 Sustainable 
3 2 Sustainable 
5 3 Sustainable 
8 4 Unsustainable 
9 5 Unsustainable 
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Scenario Deposit Volume Rank Sustainability 
2 6 Sustainable 
 
 
Table 3: scenarios ranked by lease volume (first = highest volume) and sustainability from the 
perspective of not experiencing a decline in aquifer level 
 
Scenario Lease Volume Rank Sustainability 
3 1 Sustainable 
6 2 Sustainable 
9 3 Unsustainable 
8 4 Unsustainable 
5 5 Sustainable 
2 6 Sustainable 
 
 
A further question with regard to the state of the aquifer, is the performance of the aquifer 
over time in relation to the level of conflict in the system. There is obviously no direct 
link between a social variable such as conflict and a physical variable such as the aquifer, 
but there are possible indirect linkages (discussed later), and so exploring at a crude level 
possible correlations between conflict will help decide whether these linkages are worth 
examining further. 
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Figure 69: correlation coefficients for aquifer levels and conflict levels 
 
3 out of 9 scenarios show a reasonably strong negative correlation between aquifer level 
and conflict, such that as aquifer levels go down, conflict goes up. For other scenarios, 
the correlations are still mostly negative but generally much weaker. 
 One of the other most significant influences on aquifer state is likely to be the 
climatic conditions: specifically, amount of precipitation and temperature. Figure 70 
below explores correlations between temperature, precipitation and aquifer levels. 
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Figure 70: correlation coefficients between aquifer levels, and temperature/precipitation 
 
Scenarios 7, 8 and 9 stand out in an otherwise unremarkable dataset, for having very 
strong positive correlations between precipitation and aquifer levels, and low negative 
correlations between temperature and aquifer levels. These scenarios all include the 
highest degrees of climatic change. Scenarios 1 through 3 show mixed and 
counterintuitive relations between temperature/precipitation and aquifer levels. Scenarios 
5 and 6 show stronger but still counterintuitive relations. 
 
5.2.2.3 ... Results Summary 2-C: state of the aquifer over time 
 
In summary, then, our exploration of the aquifer level data, along with select 
comparisons, has uncovered the following results: 
 
1. Sustainable scenarios, where aquifer levels increase, include 2, 3, 5 and 6. 
Unsustainable scenarios, where aquifer levels decrease, include 1, 4, 7, 8 and 9. 
2. All scenarios show an initial sharp decrease in aquifer levels, but then diverge. 
3. Rates of decrease and increase over time are steady. 
4. No correlation is identified between frequency of bank transactions and aquifer 
levels 
5. The sustainable scenarios appear to be more strongly associated with higher deposit 
volumes, whereas the relationship for leases is less clear. 
6. Aquifer levels are generally strongly correlated with extremes of precipitation and 
temperature, and more significantly so with precipitation. The best correlations are 
found for the scenarios experiencing the most extreme levels of climatic change. 
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Conflict and agent internal state 
 
Data gathered during the simulation on agent internal state included: 
 
• Economic, hydraulic and social stress 
• Fear of government action 
• Risk aversion 
• Sociability 
• Trust in government/fear of government 
• Perception of water availability 
 
The stress variables are ‘catch-all’ variables intended to communicate a broad ‘state of 
mind’ for the agent: for example, changes in the agent’s environment that lead to the 
agent having less water may raise the hydraulic stress level of the agent. Similarly, if the 
prices the agent gets at the end of a year for its harvested crops, the agent’s economic 
stress level may rise. Note the ‘may’: there are significant stochastic components inside 
the translation of external stimulus into internal state, and each model replication within 
each scenario ran with a different random seed. There is no guarantee that an adverse 
external circumstance will increase the relevant stress variable in any one run. Over time, 
however, one would expect there to emerge a general relation of this sort. 
 The varying levels of institutional change incorporate varying levels of 
government action. Consequently, the agents’ perceptions of the government are 
important determinants of the state of other internal variables, and their reaction to 
government action. Both fear and trust in government are captured; these are set at 
moderate levels to begin with (but including some inter-agent variation set 
stochastically). Fear usually has the effect of prompting the agent to take action to 
minimize the risk of a negative consequence. Trust usually has the effect of making the 
agent more comfortable with a government institution or action. But again, in any one 
simulation run it is impossible to predict what exactly an agent will do regarding a 
government action/institution, and given its fear and trust variables. 
 The ‘social capital’ variable is largely concerned with inter-agent communication 
and cooperation. Social capital is a dimensionless quantity that is diminished whenever 
an agent communicates and/or cooperates, and increases when an agent is not 
communicating or cooperating. The agent’s social capital can potentially have a 
significant controlling influence on how much the agent communicates and cooperates 
with other agents. Unfortunately, a problem was encountered in collecting data on the 
average agent state of the social capital variable, and so I am forced to turn to a different 
measure: sociability. Sociability is similar to social capital in that it is also affected 
(albeit) weakly by communication and/or cooperation, but is only used explicitly to help 
control the spread of rumors within the agent population. Occasionally, an agent will 
spread a story about some pending governmental action, or some change in the state of 
some environmental variable (such as that year’s precipitation). The sociability of other 
agents will determine how far that rumor gets: if the rumor leaves a sociable agent only to 
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arrive at a highly unsocial agent, the rumor will be passed on to far fewer agents than if it 
had landed at a highly social agent. 
 Finally, the agents perceive the availability of water for their own use. This is not 
a direct measure of the actual availability, but is a rough guesstimate each agent 
maintains as to whether there is or is not enough water in the system for their uses. It is, 
predictably, affected by the agent’s experience over time: if the agent pumps from deeper 
this year than it did last year, its perception of water availability will go down. 
 The algorithmic relations between internal variables, and between environmental 
and internal variables, are fundamentally entirely the creation of the modeler and so - in 
theory - a simulation should reveal nothing new about a system that the modeler does not 
already know. However, the combinations of a number of different internal variables 
acting in concert over different time scales and at different times, are most definitely not 
pre-established by the modeler (at least, not intentionally). Consequently, it is well worth 
exploring the relations between internal variables and some of the model outcomes of 
interest, as well as some of the possible interdependencies within the set of internal 
variables. 
 
Fi
gure 71: changes in average total stress per Farmer agent; stress plotted as a percentage of 
maximum stress (all stress variables have minimum and maximum values of 0.0 and 1.0) 
 
Figure 71 above shows two distinct groupings of stress trace: scenarios 2, 3, 5, 6, 8 and 9 
see on average 30% higher levels of stress per agent than scenarios 1, 4 and 7. If there are 
any relations at all between the degree of change in each scenario and these results, it is 
likely to be with institutional change: scenarios 4 and 7 experience moderate and high 
physical change respectively, but all undergo low levels of institutional change, perhaps 
suggesting some sort of correlation with the absence of any institutional change in the 
system. Another important feature of the graphic to note is that stress increases over time, 
at first at a fast rate (roughly 10 percentage points per year), and then at a slower rate, for 
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both groups. There also appears to be some annual cyclicity in the pattern of stress: 
roughly once a year stress experiences a slight drop, before resuming its upwards climb. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 72: average social stress per agent with time 
 
Figure 72 for social stress shows a similar grouping: scenarios 4, 7 and 9 in the lower 
stress grouping, and the same annual pattern of variation but confined to the higher stress 
scenarios. An interesting feature of both this graphic and the previous is that within 
scenario groupings, the scenarios are exceptionally closely clustered together - within 
tenths of an index point. 
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Figure 73: average, per-agent economic stress with time 
 
Figure 73 shows a very different picture compared with social and hydraulic stress. Much 
higher variability, less of a difference between the two groupings of scenarios, and very 
strongly pronounced cyclicity on an annual basis in both groupings. Importantly, the first 
three years are characterized by dramatic variation in stress in all scenarios. Stress does 
increase throughout the simulation, on average, but actually peaks in those first three 
years. 
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Figure 74: average per-agent hydraulic stress with time 
 
Figure 74 shows the only stress traces that actually decrease in severity over time. The 
groupings remain the same, but the more severely stressed scenarios show a slow but 
steady decrease from an early peak. The same annual pattern is visible, and very 
pronounced in the more severely stressed scenarios. The dramatic increase in stress 
appears to come at the beginning of each year, followed by a slower decrease in stress 
towards the end of the year. 
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Figure 75: correlation between total stress and total conflict 
 
Figure 75 shows two general groupings: Scenarios 1, 4 and 7 standing out with strong 
correlation between stress and conflict, and the remainder with weaker correlations. This 
bimodal distribution suggests some additional control on the stress and conflict; 
unfortunately, since Scenarios 1, 4 and 7 neatly straddle the entire range of physical 
change, and all are in the zero institutional change category, attributing the strong 
correlations between stress and conflict to some element of background change is less 
easy. This is unless, as suggested earlier, it is the absence of institutional change which is 
the important factor. 
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Figure 76: average agent fear of government 
 
 
Figure 77: average agent trust in government over time 
 
Fear of government varies little between scenarios, and shows a steady decrease over 
time. Trust in government, on the other hand, shows a significant peak within the first 
two years of the simulation, a significant decrease in the next 4 or 5 years, followed by a 
less steep and more steady decrease to the end of the simulation. Both fear of government 
and trust in government are, at least in theory, likely to have effects on an agent’s 
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willingness and enthusiasm for participation in the ground water bank. Unfortunately, the 
unusually stable trend for the fear of government variable suggests some artifact of 
coding or otherwise incorrectly specified feedbacks. Note that in both cases, we see the 
same scenario groupings: scenarios 1, 4 and 7 together separated from the other 
scenarios. This grouping experiences higher trust and higher fear than the other scenarios. 
 
 
Figure 78: correlation coefficients between deposits and leases in the ground water bank 
 
If we plot correlation data between ground water bank activity and fear of 
government/trust in government (Figure 78), we see no particularly strong relationship, 
although leases and trust in government are most strongly correlated. 
 Finally, we address the relations between sociability and conflict. This is mostly 
to explore what effect this variable, which is a relatively minor cognitive variable in 
terms of the number of algorithms is implicated in and by, have on the overall level of 
conflict and stress in the system. Note that social capital is a similar variable, but data 
collection problems meant that this dataset could not be analyzed. 
 
 131 
 
 
Figure 79: average agent sociability with time 
 
The annual variation we have seen in other variables is present in Figure 79, particularly 
evident from the start of the simulation through to around 4.5 years. Overall, we see a 
general negative trend, with the rate of decrease increasing over time. Initial variation in 
average sociability is high, but the curves appear to settle down with time. Interestingly, 
we see the same grouping of scenarios here as in earlier graphics: Scenarios 1, 4 and 7 
distinctly and separately defined. These scenarios experience higher average sociability 
than the other scenarios. 
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Figure 80: correlation between sociability and total stress 
 
With one of the strongest set of correlations across all scenarios found for any correlation 
pairing so far, it appears that there is at least some relationship between sociability and 
total stress, such that as sociability increases, total stress decreases. 
 
 
Figure 81: correlation between sociability and total conflict 
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The correlation data in Figure 81 shows a slightly weaker, but nevertheless impressive set 
of relationships between sociability and total conflict, suggesting that as sociability 
increases, total conflict decreases. We also see the grouping of Scenarios 1, 4 and 7 
standing out once more. 
 
 
Figure 82: average agent perception of water availability over time, by scenario 
 
This figure is interesting for the way in which the grouping in scenarios we have seen 
throughout the analysis reappears, but in a different form: instead of being distinctively 
separate from the other scenarios, Scenarios 1, 4 and 7 follow roughly the same average 
trace, but experience much greater intra-annual fluctuations. A further important feature 
of the graphic is the difference in curve trend between banking and non-banking 
scenarios: Scenarios 1, 4 and 7 show a steady decrease over time, whereas the remaining 
scenarios show a similar decrease up until around year 10, after which most scenarios 
show evidence of a slow increase in perception of availability. Finally, note the sharp 
increase in perception of water availability in the first year, for all scenarios. This may be 
due to the issue of model equilibration: see the brief treatment of this issue at the 
beginning of the results discussion.  
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Figure 83: correlation coefficients for perception of water availability and water conflict 
 
Correlations in Figure 83 above are mostly weak, but it is interesting that little or no 
correlation exists for all scenarios except 1, 4 and 7 - the only scenarios without ground 
water banking. In other words, for scenarios without ground water banking, the lower the 
perception of water availability, the higher the level of water conflict (and vice versa). 
 Finally, I shall briefly explore relations between the key financial states of each 
agent - capital, debt - and conflict. 
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Figure 84: correlation coefficients for comparisons between capital, debt and total conflict 
 
The results are somewhat mixed. Strong negative correlations exist between levels of 
capital and conflict, mostly in Scenarios 1, 4 and 7: as capital decreases, conflict 
increases. The same is not true for debt: weaker negative correlations for Scenarios 4 and 
above, but weak positive correlations for Scenarios 3 and below. This suggests that for 
scenarios with no climate change, a reduction in debt may be associated with an increase 
in conflict particularly if no institutional change is encountered. For scenarios with some 
degree of climate change and across all degrees of institutional change, an increase in 
debt is correlated with an increase in conflict.  
 
5.2.2.4 ... Results Summary 2-D: conflict and internal agent state 
 
In summary then, our analysis of cognitive variables has turned up the following features 
of the data: 
 
1. Average stress increases over time for all scenarios. 
2. Scenarios are grouped by stress: Scenarios 1, 4 and 7 with distinctly lower stress on 
average than the other scenarios. 
3. Average stress has distinct but uneven annual cyclicity (increases and decreases). 
4. Average stress increases at a faster rate to begin with than towards the end of the 
simulation. 
5. Social stress shows the same groupings as for average stress, with a faster rate of 
increase at the beginning of the simulation. 
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6. Economic stress shows significant variation among all scenarios at the beginning of 
the simulation. 
7. Economic stress shows similar cyclicity and groupings to the other stress types. 
8. Hydraulic stress shows similar cyclicity and scenario groupings to other stress 
types. 
9. Hydraulic stress for all scenarios except 1, 4 and 7 decreases over time, with annual 
variation. 
10.  Scenarios 1, 4 and 7 show the strongest correlations between conflict and stress, 
but all scenarios show some evidence of a correlation. 
11.  Average agent fear of government and trust in government both decrease over 
time, but trust in government enjoys a brief sharp peak in the first two years of the 
simulation, followed by a fast then slower rate of decrease. 
12.  There is little evidence that fear of government trust in government have any sort 
of correlation with ground water banking activity. 
13.  There is strong correlation evidence that as sociability increases, social stress 
decreases. 
14.  There is reasonably strong correlation evidence that as sociability increases, 
conflict decreases, particularly so for Scenarios 1, 4 and 7. 
15.  For Scenarios 1, 4 and 7, agent perception of water availability decreases steadily 
throughout the simulation. The other scenarios show a decrease until year 10, and 
then a slow increase. 
16.  Intra-annual variability in perception of water availability is much higher for 
Scenarios 1, 4 and 7 than for the other scenarios. 
17.  All scenarios experience a dramatic increase in perception of water availability 
within the first year of the simulation. 
18.  Water conflict appears to be sensitive to agent perception of water availability 
only in Scenarios 1, 4 and 7. 
19.  Capital is strongly negatively correlated with societal conflict, particularly in 
Scenarios 1, 4 and 7. Debt is more weakly positively correlated with societal 
conflict across all scenarios 
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5.3 ... Discussion 
 
As for the Results, in this section I will address the results of GWBSIM and AlbAgent 
simulation runs separately, and then comparatively. The fourth and final section of the 
discussion will be discussing data relevant to the sub hypothesis - the concept of the 
universal hydrologic agent. The intent of the discussion is to make and justify a series of 
statements as to whether the hypotheses can be supported, denied, or remain 
indeterminate. Note that, in the following discussions, I will indulge in some degree of 
agent anthropomorphism: agents will ‘know’, ‘react’, ‘feel’ and ‘act’. In reality, despite 
the more than 50,000 lines of code in GWBSIM, the agents get nowhere near knowing, 
reacting, feeling and acting in any sense approximating the real world. However, agents 
do ‘know’ due to hard coded variables, received messages, and stored memory; agents 
also ‘react’ through hard coded and dynamic feedbacks; agents ‘feel’ changes through 
direct observation of the system and messages from fellow agents; finally, agents ‘act’ by 
activating pre-specified methods for action. Where I slip into the convenient vocabulary 
of personification, it is not intended to attribute or otherwise apply any deeper 
intelligence to the agents than is already provided by existing cognitive mechanisms 
specified in the model..   
 
5.3.1 ... A note on achieving steady state 
 
A number of the datasets reviewed so far have shown interesting behavior along the 
following lines: anomalously fast rates of increase/decrease, or anomalously high/low 
levels of variability from 0% to <30% of simulation time. Soon thereafter, the datasets 
settle into more consistent trends or cycles. At times in the following discussion, 
explanations may be offered for this ‘settling down’ period, but there remains the general 
possibility that the models are in fact just proceeding to an equilibrium state (or set of 
behaviors). Lerman (2000) conducts mathematical analyses of coalition-forming agents, 
showing that different initial parameterizations led to marked changes in the amount of 
time her system would take to reach a steady state. In effect, the time taken represents the 
gap between the actual initial values of the parameters, and what values the normal 
operation of the model will end up setting the parameters at. The two are rarely close 
together, particularly for complex models where the modeler may have little or no idea of 
the final sets of interactions affecting any given parameter. The further apart the two 
values, the longer the model will take to achieve that equilibrium state - or the steeper the 
rate of change from initial values to equilibrium values. It is possible that the trends seen 
in several datasets may have some explanation along these lines. However, it does not 
preclude other explanations: while the model is achieving steady state, all its normal 
mechanisms are operating, and so variation within that progression period may well be 
attributable to some other causal relation. 
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5.3.2 ... GWBSIM discussion 
5.3.2.1 ... Summary 1-A 
 
1. The -GWB scenario showed overall higher levels of conflict frequency and 
severity across all years of the simulation, in terms of both complaints and court 
actions. 
2.  The level of court action-related conflict severity was low for -GWB, but still 
significantly higher than for the +GWB scenario. 
3.  The +GWB scenario showed low levels of conflict frequency and severity in 
general, with no court actions encountered at all in any year. 
4.  The +GWB scenario matched the -GWB in terms of complaints for the first 
couple of years of the simulation, but thereafter showed a significant decrease in 
conflict severity and frequency. The -GWB scenario showed a steady increase in 
complaint frequency and severity over time, but a relatively stable level of court 
action frequency and severity over time. 
 
The major hypothesis suggested that the major institutional perturbation of a ground 
water bank, in an institutionally ‘frozen’ system, would cause a reduction in conflict 
frequency and severity. These results appear to provide strong support for this hypothesis. 
Both scenarios were run over the same periods, with the same parameterizations from the 
same Latin Hypercube sample. The only significant macro-structural variation in the two 
artificial societies was the introduction of the ground water bank, and so it is reasonable 
to say that the ground water bank as an institution had a strong negative effect on the 
frequency of conflict and the severity of conflict in the artificial society. The ground 
water bank scenario still experienced conflict, in the form of complaints. Complaint 
generation, however, is a much less severe expression of agent problems than court 
actions. Court actions require capital expenditure, handicaps on agent action, negative 
changes in emotions, and often extensive cooperation with other agents (i.e. repeated 
exchange of messages related to the court action event). Consequently, a high complaint 
generation frequency on its own is no match for even a low frequency of court action 
generation or court action-related conflict severity. 
 The fourth finding in Summary 1-A suggests some important points: first, the 
initial increase but then steady reduction in complaints for +GWB over time could be 
linked to the non-availability of ground water banking for the first year of the simulation. 
Under the ground water bank’s rules, no withdrawal is allowed on credit, i.e. water has to 
be present in a reach of the bank from which a withdrawal is requested for that 
withdrawal has to be approved. Moreover, enough water has to be in the bank for that 
withdrawal not to cause the reach balance to go negative. Consequently, an additional 
rule was added to the bank that restricted transactions to deposits-only during the first 
year of the bank’s operation. Given the earlier statement linking ground water banking to 
reduced conflict frequency and severity, it is also reasonable to suggest that a 
handicapped version of the bank (i.e. no lease option) would have less of a negative effect 
on court action and complaint generation. This provides further evidence of the utility of 
a ground water bank in expanding institutional capacity and lessening the frequency and 
severity of resultant conflict. 
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 For the -GWB scenario, complaints per year increased steadily over time, while 
court actions did not. This trend may simply reflect a lack of negative feedback: 
complaints cost little and achieve little, but do serve to vent some of the agent’s stress 
(stress levels are allowed to decrease slightly when a complaint is generated by that 
agent). There is little incentive over time to not keep complaining if things are not going 
well; as later graphs showed, agent stress continued to rise across all SWI agents in the -
GWB scenario. Consequently, over time, more and more agents will have experienced 
conditions conducive to generating a complaint. The stability of the court action 
frequency over time is a little more puzzling: why did these remain stable while more 
agents became more stressed over time? A possible answer is in the type of agent most 
stressed in both scenarios: SWI. These agents have less resource certainty than GWIs 
(they are more subject to fickle variations in climate than ground water agents) and fewer 
resources to begin with (SWIs begin with less capital than GWIs). Figure 85 below shows 
the average per-agent court action frequency for the -GWB scenario: 
 
 
 
Figure 85: per-agent court actions by year, -GWB scenario. 
 
We see that court action frequency for these vulnerable SWI agents decreased over time - 
but as we know, their stress did not. The most likely explanation is that they simply ran 
out of money and/or social capital: court actions require expenditure on the part of each 
participating agent, and so they may simply not have had enough financial resources to 
justify another court action. These actions also require expenditure of ‘social capital’, a 
resource designed to limit the amount of communication and cooperation agents can 
engage in (and reflect real world logistical and physical limits on the same), and so social 
capital may also have run out. However, the plot shows SU and GWI agents taking up the 
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slack, filing court actions as the SWI agents reduce their generation frequency. This goes 
some way to explaining the relatively stable level of court actions over time: an initial 
high level as SWI agents responded to adverse conditions, then remaining stable as the 
contribution from SWI agents decreased and the contribution of other agents increased. 
 
5.3.2.2 ... Summary 1-B 
 
1. GWI agents dominated both leases and withdrawals from the bank. Note that only 
GWI and SWI agents were allowed to participate in the bank. 
2. GWI deposits were a far more significant contribution to the bank than leases. 
This was reflected in the overall upward trend in the bank’s balance over time. 
3. Deposits increased in volume over time, and the per-agent deposit volume also 
increased. Leases showed no such trend, peaking in mid-simulation but 
decreasing to near zero by the end.  
 
The dominance of GWIs in ground water bank transactions is most likely related to the 
fact that SWI agents could not physically undertake leases (being without the pumping 
infrastructure to abstract the water from the aquifer). This was the simplest 
conceptualization of the ground water bank: in a more elaborate vision, SWIs could lease 
water by buying credits from the bank and then giving them to local GWIs, in return for 
those pump-equipped agents abstracting water from the aquifer and adding it to the local 
canal. Since SWIs could not lease, they did not have the same motivations for 
participation. GWIs could deposit in the knowledge that the more deposits they made in 
good years, the more they would have to call on through leases in bad years. SWIs could 
only hope for some monetary gain by depositing excess or otherwise unwanted water, 
and no hydrologic gain in drought years. In the absence of the environmental data, it is 
not known whether simple below-average conditions led to little excess water for SWIs to 
contribute to the bank.  
 The significantly higher volume of deposit volumes versus lease volumes has a 
number of possible explanations. Initial disparity can be explained by the simple fact that 
leases were not permitted for the first year. Later disparity is more ambiguous in origin: if 
GWIs have excess water under their water right every year, they are likely to continue 
contributing to the bank every year, and possibly more as years go by. All bank-
participating agents had an internal measure of ‘model trust’. This variable corresponded 
to the level of trust the agent had in the SME-run model by which the bank was 
administered (i.e. the gamma response functions; see earlier discussion). Simple positive 
feedbacks would increase model trust if the agent participated in the bank and received 
no resultant harm (and vice versa). Higher trust in the bank’s administration increases the 
likelihood that the agent will participate in the next run, so creating a feedback loop 
ensuring repeat participation for some agents. Note that runaway feedback loops are 
unlikely, partly because these were rigorously controlled for during design, and partly 
because all cognitive variables have some stochastic variability introduced each time step 
that should lessen the likelihood of runaway feedbacks developing.  
 Deposits are a relatively safe, guaranteed source of income if the agent has excess 
water. If the agent is making a deposit at some opportunity cost for another use (e.g. to 
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grow crops), in the belief that returns will be higher off the deposit than the alternative 
use, the risk is higher. GWIs are more likely, with their more secure water supply, to 
make deposits with excess water. SWIs are far less likely (as was shown) to take that risk, 
since they have a more fickle supply and are likely to develop a higher risk aversion due 
to more variable water supply and a lower capital base. Consequently, while GWIs will 
keep making deposits, and their model trust will steadily increase as a result, SWIs are 
more likely to remain below the ‘trust bar’ for participation - both deposits and leases. 
Moreover, GWIs may not need leases unless they are under mitigation orders from the 
SME, and these are rare (both in the model and real life). The combined result is that 
safe, beneficial deposits will be made in increasing volume, while leases remain an 
uncertain quantity and not necessarily undertaken unless macro-scale forces dictate 
(through mitigation plans). It would take further work and tailored experimental runs to 
deduce what the real sensitivity of agents is to risk and whether this really affects 
deposit/leasing behavior.  
 However, Figure 86 below shows that GWI model trust decreased subtly over 
time, while SWI trust remained static. 
 
 
Figure 86: changing trust of ground water bank-participating agents in the bank, over time. 
 
Model trust is clearly not a strong determinant of bank participation, since it decreased or 
was static over time despite considerable variation in agent deposits/leases. A simple 
explanation for the lack of strong increase in model trust is the lack of strong payback on 
the deposit. While each GWI gets a certain trust boost if participating is successful and 
does not cause harm, the boost is greatest if the agent receives a payback. Since leases 
were so much less in volume than deposits, only a certain proportion of GWI agents who 
deposited would ever have received a payback (payment for deposit occurs on a 1:1 basis 
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for the same volume of leases). Without all agents receiving good returns on their 
investment in the bank, model trust would remain static or decline.  
 Given this result, we must modify our explanation for increased deposits over 
time, and the deposit/withdrawal disparity. Instead of model trust having a significant 
feedback role in promoting future participation, it is most likely, and simplest, to suggest 
that GWI agents deposited so much more because the risk was low enough to make it 
worth the effort despite the resultant lack of payback. Deposit of excess water in the bank 
represented an almost risk-free action for GWI agents (a deposit is simply an act of 
foregone pumping and so requires no actual physical action on the part of the GWI 
agent), and so deposits would continue year-on-year despite most of them not gaining 
financially from the transactions. 
 This discussion helps us explore why exactly the ground water bank appears to 
have such a beneficial effect on conflict frequency and severity. It does not appear to 
affect SWIs much, since these do not participate in great numbers in the bank. 
Consequently, we see higher levels of stress from SWIs in both + and - scenarios. We see 
reduced stress in GWIs partly because they are gaining financially from participation 
(which has positive feedbacks to stress levels, as shown in the financial data analyses), 
but also because they are gaining emotionally: bank participation was linked in the 
emotional engines to reductions in stress and reductions in perceptions of future 
mitigation. In other words, a GWI would deposit and thereafter believe the SME was less 
likely to impose restrictions on future water use given the deposit action. The reduced 
GWI stress appears likely to contribute most or all of the reduced conflict severity in the 
+GWB scenario. This is most relevant to court actions; GWIs are better off than SWIs, 
and so more able to launch court actions in the first place. If these agents are less stressed 
through a ground water bank, then we might expect fewer court actions.  
 One question remains to be addressed: why the reduction in court actions from SU 
and PC agents for the +GWB scenario? Neither participates in the bank, and so neither 
should stand to directly gain from its operation. One possible answer lies in the probable 
environmental effects: deposits in the bank lead to increased flows in the downstream 
springs, which spring users depend on, and in the river itself, which the power company 
depends on. With higher flows due to ground water deposits, overall PC and SU 
propensity to launch court actions is theoretically likely to be lower. Without the 
environmental data, the truth in this suggestion is unknown. Another possible answer lies 
in the power of inter-agent communication. Agents periodically trade belief ‘values’ with 
each other (e.g. one agent’s trust in the ground water bank is at 4.5, and it communicates 
that value to another agent, which may increase or decrease its own level of trust 
accordingly); which beliefs are traded is randomly chosen by the source agent. Agent 
perception of conflict will have been one such belief traded, and so it may be possible 
that reduced reductions in GWI stress from bank participation could have been spread 
among a wider agent population and caused knock-on stress reduction effects. This 
mechanism was not fully tested prior to being implemented in GWBSIM, and so little is 
known about the dynamics of message propagation in the agent population.  
 
5.3.2.3 ... Summary 1-C 
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1. Across all agents and both scenarios, the financial variables appear to have the 
strongest relationships with conflict frequency. Higher capital equates to fewer 
complaints and court actions, and higher debt to more complaints and court 
actions. Higher debt appears to have more of an effect on complaint frequency 
than court action frequency. 
2. Relationships between variation in emotional parameters and conflict frequency 
are decidedly mixed: for example, some agents appear to have inverse 
relationships between happiness and conflict frequency, other agents strong 
positive relationships. 
3. Social capital is an important parameter for agents, being positively correlated 
with complaint frequency for both GWI and SU agents. 
 
It is not unexpected that financial variables have the strongest correlation with conflict 
frequency. Finances are at the heart of what makes an agent tick: most agents want to 
make money to pay off debts (no agent is debt-free in the model) and stay in business. 
Experiencing financial hardship is one of the strongest influences on emotions coded into 
the model: it is one of the few variables compared frequently with the desired state for 
that variable. Note the cognitive mechanism in operation here: the original intent was to 
have the agent periodically check all cognitive variables (where appropriate) for 
correspondence to desired levels, and change other cognitive variables on the basis of the 
check. For example, the agent may have desired a value of happiness at 6.0, and finding 
that current happiness level is 4.0, which could have resulted in an increase in stress 
levels. However, by the time the runs had to be completed, this mechanism had not been 
implemented for all cognitive variables. 
 For example, if an irrigator agent’s debt payment one year is a certain percentage 
higher than the desired level, the agent’s income stress, risk aversion and hostility may 
rise by a moderate amount. It is entirely reasonable, then, to see agents responding to 
higher capital and lower debt with lower propensity to generate conflict. This is probably 
one of the main channels of influence of the ground water bank: providing a 
supplemental source of income that is relatively secure, it will act to reduce agent stress 
via increasing an agent’s capital reserves and helping to reduce debt. 
 It is also not unexpected that variation in emotional parameters and conflict 
frequency are difficult to link together in any conclusive manner. The agents have a 
complex range of emotions affected in a complex range of ways. Emotions are impacted 
by fuzzy logic modules (particularly happiness), as well as by simple stimulus learning 
cycles - negative response in particular environmental variables will lead to negative 
changes in certain emotions. However, in model development care was taken to ensure 
that no single environmental or internal variable would have a dominating change on 
emotions. All fuzzy logic modules and feedback cycles have at most moderate (+/- 1.0 
emotional units) effects on emotions. The result is a mixed bag: variable strengths and 
directions of relationship between certain internal and external conditions. There may be 
broader scale relationships not being identified with such a small sample set, but this 
remains for further work. 
 The strong relationship between social capital and complaint frequency is directly 
linked to a condition in the complaint generation algorithm for all agents: this requires a 
certain level of social capital before a complaint (or indeed, a court action) can be 
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launched. This was intended to reproduce in a more simple manner the real world concept 
of a conflict causing some social disturbance: agent stress increases when they perceive a 
higher level of conflict in the basin as a whole, and the agent instigating a conflict 
experiences some decline in social capital. Compare this to the real world statement - 
“he’s always complaining”, which is generally taken to be a negative condition. Survey 
data gathered in January 2007 revealed a dominant view among stakeholders that 
particular individuals and organizations had a certain propensity to generate conflict 
regardless of the actual seriousness of the conditions in the basin. To convey the reduced 
respect that these stakeholders appeared to have, the ‘social capital tax’ was introduced in 
the model to require some initial level of social capital before an agent was able to 
generate a complaint or instigate a court action, and cause a decrement in social capital 
when a conflict was launched. Figure 87 below shows some interesting trends in a 
comparison between social capital and court action frequency over time (-GWB 
scenario). SU, with the highest court action generation frequency of any agent, increasing 
over time, shows the highest ‘social capital payments’ - social capital decreases steady 
over time. The picture is the same for GWI: steady increase in conflict generation equates 
with a steady decrease in social capital. The picture is more mixed for PC and SWI, but 
these agents were in general less of a source of conflict and so this is not unexpected. 
 
 
 
Figure 87: agent sources of court actions, plotted with variation in social capital. Note: ‘sc’ is an 
abbreviation of ‘social capital’, and ‘ca’ of ‘court action’. 
 
5.3.2.4 ... Summary 1-D 
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1. Fewer agents go bankrupt in the +GWB scenario compared with the -GWB 
scenario. 
2.  Bankruptcy figures for both scenarios are dominated by the SWI agents, and the 
number of SWI bankruptcies generally increases during the simulation run. This 
is generally true of all other agents who experience bankruptcies. 
3.  Court action frequency generally increases over time in the -GWB scenario 
(remember that no court actions were generated in the +GWB scenario). 
4.  The SWI and PC agents generate little or no conflict in the +GWB scenario, but 
constant or declining levels of conflict in the -GWB scenario. 
5.  The SU and GWI agents are responsible for the bulk of the complaint and court 
action generation in both scenarios. 
6.  The -GWB scenario sees the agents in their most stressed state, for both income 
and water stress. 
7.  SWI agents experience the most water and income stress out of all agents, in both 
scenarios. 
8.  Both water and income stress tend to increase over time for SWI agents, but 
decrease or remain static for most other agents. 
 
The final summary provides support for some of my earlier propositions. In keeping with 
the overall strong evidence that the -GWB scenario results in more stress and more 
conflict for the agents, bankruptcies are higher for the -GWB scenario. This is not 
unexpected, and nor is the dominance of the bankruptcy figures by the SWI agent type. 
SWIs, as briefly discussed earlier, are perhaps the most economically vulnerable of all the 
agents. Whereas GWIs have wells that insulate them from the vagaries of climatic 
variation, SUs have a reasonably steady income stream from their industrial activities 
(and only slow response in the springs to reductions in overall system flow), and the PC 
has an enormous capital base to fall back on relative to other agents. SWIs start with little 
capital and a lot of debt, and then have to survive fluctuations in market prices, increasing 
costs and highly uncertain climatic influences on river flow. The increase in per-year 
bankruptcies over the course of the simulation run is not as easily explained, however: 
possibly, the income stress of agents is spreading by the simple communication 
mechanisms available to agents, resulting in a higher likelihood of declaring bankruptcy 
over time as more and more agents go under. Similar increases in per-year frequency of 
court actions are also most likely linked to increases in overall system stress (across all 
agents) with time. This suggests an important phenomena in the artificial society: inertia 
in the build-up and impacts of agent stress (both water and income-related). Once stress 
starts to build up, it may be self-propagating. As more agents become stressed for 
legitimate reasons (adverse changes in internal or external conditions), other agents 
perceive this stress and become stressed themselves. The validity of this mechanism is 
not entirely proven, since in the real system it is not known if there is a similar ‘runaway 
bankruptcy/stress/conflict’ trend. However, systems do go through tipping points that 
shift the entire system from one equilibrium to another (some might argue the bull/bear 
market cycle is just such an example); the fact that the runs completed were shortened 
from the intended model length leaves open the possibility that the ‘inertial conditions’ 
might in fact be one side of more cyclical patterns. The later analysis of AlbAgent will 
show that such conditions can and do exist. 
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 The lack of contribution of SWI and PC agents to court actions in the +GWB 
scenario was explored earlier, and possible explanations suggested. The lack of 
participation of SWIs in generating complaints is more interesting, and not entirely 
explicable. Low PC generation is expected: there is only one agent, and there is only so 
much conflict generation one agent can manage in one year. The low complaint 
generation of SWIs may be tied up in the overall vulnerability of the agent type: less 
capital, both social and financial, to expend on engaging in conflict. The steady increase 
in SWI stress over time versus the static or decreasing stress levels for all other agents is 
a puzzling relationship that has no ready answer. Conflict is generally related to stress 
levels, yet GWI and SU agents generally have much lower stress yet still generate 
conflict at a steady rate. The reasons behind this are not clear from the current dataset, 
and remain to be explored in future work. 
 The finding that the -GWB scenario results in the most stressed agent conditions 
once again supports the overall finding that the ground water bank appears to have a 
strong effect on the conflict levels in the model. As discussed above however, there may 
be some unwanted critical mass effects developing due to the ability of all agents to 
respond to the stress of their peers. 
 
5.3.3 ... AlbAgent Discussion 
 
5.3.3.1 ... Summary 2-A 
 
1. All scenarios have annual periodicity in conflict. 
2. Most scenarios show an increase in conflict with time. 
3. Those scenarios with ground water banking all experienced higher conflict than 
those scenarios without ground water banking. 
4. Scenarios with more severe conflict showed peaks in the first 25-40% of the 
simulation, whereas the scenarios with the lowest conflict peaked at the end of the 
simulation. 
5. No acute conflict was experienced by any scenario. 
6. Increases in institutional change were generally accompanied by significant 
increases in conflict frequency. Increases in physical change were not accompanied 
by significant increases or decreases in conflict frequency. 
7. Peaks of conflict occur when institutional and physical change are at different 
degrees. 
8. Conflict was experienced by the system even without any sort of change, physical 
or institutional. 
 
The annual periodicity in conflict is reasonably straightforward to explain: an artifact of 
the design of the government agent, CHJ, and its responsibilities mean that at the end of 
each year the ongoing conflict register maintained by the CHJ is automatically reset to 
zero. This is a reasonable institutional assumption, since the ‘reset’ only applies to 
conflicts that are not protests - even the most diligent government departments eventually 
have to clear their desks of non-critical complaints. None of the conflicts encountered in 
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any of the runs were formal protests, which would have activated dispute resolution 
activity in the CHJ and prevented the register being reset to zero.  
 The steady increase in conflict with time is happening regardless of what the 
government does or what the state of the climate is. This is reinforced by the fact that the 
status quo, the no-change scenario (Scenario 1) also experienced reasonably high levels 
of formal and informal conflict. This suggests that the system is strongly predisposed to 
conflict, and that conflict is not being resolved over time. 
 The significantly higher levels of conflict for the ground water banking scenarios 
relative to the non-banking scenarios is difficult to immediately explain. There was 
certainly no direct, coded link between participation in the bank and personal propensity 
to launch conflict. What this relationship is most likely due to is some secondary factor: 
higher hydraulic stress might induce an agent to think about participating in the bank to 
make more water available, and higher levels of stress might also induce the agent to 
complain informally or formally. It is unlikely that participating in the bank itself would 
lead to higher conflict, unless conflict was the result of higher social stress induced by 
agent inability to participate (application denied, for example). A glimmer of support for 
this argument comes from point 4 in the summary, where the banking scenarios showed 
their highest stress levels early on, when little water was in the bank and the rejection rate 
would have been high. Unfortunately, data on rejection rates were not collected so this 
line of reasoning cannot be pursued much farther. 
 An important and interesting result is that there appears to be a stronger relation 
between institutional change and conflict than physical change. Superficially, this is 
difficult to understand, since it is climate that has some of the strongest controls on water 
availability, which is in turn a strong determinant of agent stress and propensity to 
complain. However, it is more explicable when we consider the large number of 
algorithms that implicated institutional components - selecting bank participation, 
participating in the bank, reacting to the results of participation, reacting to government 
interference, and so on. In other words, while climate was an important factor, the agents 
were far more sensitive to institutional change and action. This is less a function of the 
society being modeled and more a function of the distribution and density of change in 
the model: the most frequent change was institutional. What is clear from the data is that 
the confluence of both physical and institutional change did not necessarily lead to the 
greatest level of conflict, which in some ways is a heartening result. 
 
5.3.3.2 ... Summary 2-B 
 
1. The bank was clearly functional across all years of the scenarios that simulated 
ground water banking. 
2. The highest lease volumes across all scenarios were encountered in the first five 
years of the simulation, with considerable fluctuation in lease volumes thereafter. 
3. The highest lease volumes in each year were encountered at the beginning of each 
year, followed by much more minor peaks later in the year. 
4. Scenario 3 shows the highest average and total lease volumes. 
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5. Scenarios with the highest degrees of institutional change showed the highest lease 
volumes, vice versa for scenarios with only moderate degrees of institutional 
change. 
6. Neither deposits or leases show any clear increasing or decreasing trend, but there 
is a possible trend toward increasing volumes over time in the deposit data. 
7. Deposits show less variability than leases, but the same intra-annual pattern of 
variability. 
8. Scenario 6 experienced the highest average and total deposit volumes. 
9. Deposits greatly exceeded leases in average and total volumes. 
10.  Variation in lease volumes between scenarios follows the same broad pattern 
seen in inter-scenario deposit volume variation. 
 
The initial peak in bank participation, early on in the simulation run, was preceded right 
at the beginning of the simulation (first year) by the lowest peaks encountered in either 
leasing or depositing. This chimes with what one might expect: as agent trust in the bank 
increases, and risk aversion decreases following successful participation, lease and 
deposit actions would increase in frequency and volume. Little specific trend can be 
identified overall, which suggests that year to year variations in participation may depend 
on a number of factors, including but not limited to climate. The annual pattern of initial 
peak followed by much smaller peaks tapering off in the remainder of each year, is 
reasonable given the institutional set up of the bank: agents were only allowed to 
participate once a year, and the opportunity for participation became available each year 
after October 1. It is to be expected, given natural stochastic variation in agent cognition, 
that the majority of agents that wanted to participate, would participate as soon as the 
opportunity was available (note that the timing of participation was not a factor in agent 
decision making) and the remainder who didn’t want to participate right at that point in 
time would eventually apply for a lease or deposit. 
 One of the most interesting results is the stronger relation between institutional 
change and higher lease/deposit volumes, relative to their relations with physical change. 
This is not to be unexpected: scenarios with higher degrees of institutional change 
experienced far more government interference in agent decision making, interference 
which can directly influence the volumes of leases and deposits (by forcing more agents 
to participate). Remember, however, that even if such interference led to increased 
volumes moving into and out of the bank, it came at cost: the social conflict generated for 
these scenarios was high. 
 The position of Scenario 6 as having the highest average and total deposit 
volumes is unusual. Since deposits were mostly by foregoing pumping, one would expect 
that under a scenario of extreme climate change and extreme government interference, 
that agents would deposit the most (i.e. forego the most pumping) - in other words, we 
would expect Scenario 9 having the highest average and total deposit volumes. It is more 
understandable that Scenario 3 have the highest average and total lease volumes, since 
Scenario 3 experiences no climate change and so more water was available in the system. 
At root, this may be due to a complex interplay of stress (and other cognitive variables) 
with the degrees of government interference and climatic change, a relationship not 
immediately evident.  
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 It is not surprising that deposits greatly exceeded leases in volume and frequency. 
Deposits are far ‘easier’ to make, since no pumping is required (by definition: most 
deposits involved foregoing a pumping right), and the chance is good that the depositor 
will get some recompense for its non-pumping. Leasing, on the other hand, involves cost 
both to actually purchase the water and also to pump it. As pre-specified in the code, 
deposits yield more positive feedbacks than leases. So it is to be expected that deposits 
will outweigh leases in volume and frequency. However, deposits are no good if nothing 
is being leased. Leases (purchases) are required to actually pay the depositors. So we can 
see that despite the presence of more positive feedbacks for depositing, this did not lead 
to a run on deposits followed by a crash (because of no leasing and therefore no payback 
on deposits). Point 10 shows that there is some relation between the two activities, so it is 
clear that leasing and depositing cannot each continue in a vacuum from the other. There 
may be some cognitive tweaking needed to adjust the balance between deposits and 
leases, or this may in fact reflect an inherent imbalance (and potential problem) with 
ground water banks that do not mandate more balanced deposit/lease ratios.   
 
5.3.3.3 ... Summary 2-C 
 
1. Sustainable scenarios, where aquifer levels increase, include 2, 3, 5 and 6. 
Unsustainable scenarios, where aquifer levels decrease, include 1, 4, 7, 8 and 9. 
2. All scenarios show an initial sharp decrease in aquifer levels, but then diverge. 
3. Rates of decrease and increase over time are steady. 
4. No correlation is identified between frequency of bank transactions and aquifer 
levels 
5. The sustainable scenarios appear to be more strongly associated with higher deposit 
volumes, whereas the relationship for leases is less clear. 
6. Aquifer levels are generally strongly correlated with extremes of precipitation and 
temperature, and more significantly so with precipitation. The best correlations are 
found for the scenarios experiencing the most extreme levels of climatic change. 
 
Given the theoretical impact of climate change on aquifer levels, it is no surprise that the 
most unsustainable scenarios were those experiencing the most extreme climate change. 
Similarly, the fact that the zero institutional change scenarios (1, 4 and 7) were also in the 
unsustainable bracket is easy to explain: the status quo was pre-specified to be 
unsustainable (as it is in the real system), because farmers are consistently extracting 
water from the aquifer at rates exceeding recharge. Given this reality, and given that the 
moderate and extreme institutional change scenarios were generally associated with more 
sustainable aquifer outcomes, there seems a reasonable case to be made for the positive 
effect of ground water banking on the state of the aquifer over time. The shape of the 
traces for aquifer level are also supportive of this: all traces show initial (<1 year) slumps 
steeper than the remainder of each scenario. These initially fast rates of change 
downwards recover much quicker in those scenarios that had higher levels of institutional 
interference, suggesting that the ground water bank began to have an effect on average 
aquifer levels after a time lag of 1-2 years. This is exactly the kind of lag expected: when 
I speak of ‘average aquifer levels’, I mean exactly that - the average meters above datum 
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across all aquifer cells. However, the actual volume in any one cell will most likely differ 
slightly from its neighbors, and probably differ greatly from those cells on the opposite 
side of the grid. This is because, as outlined earlier, anthropogenic effects on the aquifer 
propagate from a point concentrically out across the aquifer. A pumping event in one 
corner of the aquifer will eventually affect all cells, but only after many time steps have 
elapsed. With these inbuilt lags, mounds and troughs of ground water can build up. 
Consequently, it will take a prolonged positive recharge effect of the banking system to 
cause across-aquifer increases sufficient to raise the aquifer average. The substantive 
effect banking had is clear: deposits exceeded leases in volume, and so the bank took 
offline a great deal of pumping which would have otherwise occurred, improving the 
recharge/discharge balance in favor of recharge. 
 The lack of correlation between transaction frequency and aquifer level suggest 
that volumes of individual transactions are highly variable, and that the controlling factor 
is therefore less how many agents are participating, but how much water those 
participants are depositing or leasing. However, since no histogram data was gathered for 
the range of lease/deposit volumes, this cannot be confirmed. 
 The strengths of correlations between climatic variables and aquifer levels are no 
surprise. Precipitation is the largest contributor to the aquifer in the system, and 
temperature has effects on everything from direct evaporation rates to agent usage of 
water. Recall, however, that the greatest correlations between aquifer level and change 
are for institutional and not climatic change. It appears that both types of change have an 
effect, but these are not always equal.  
 
5.3.3.4 ... Summary 2-D 
 
1. Average stress increases over time for all scenarios. 
2. Scenarios are grouped by stress: Scenarios 1, 4 and 7 with lower stress on average 
than the other scenarios. 
3. Average stress has distinct but uneven annual cyclicity (increases and decreases). 
4. Average stress increases at a faster rate to begin with than towards the end of the 
simulation. 
5. Social stress shows the same groupings as for average stress, with a faster rate of 
increase at the beginning of the simulation. 
6. Economic stress shows significant variation among all scenarios at the beginning of 
the simulation. 
7. Economic stress shows similar cyclicity and groupings to the other stress types, but 
a different overall trace. 
8. Hydraulic stress shows similar cyclicity and scenario groupings to other stress 
types. 
9. Hydraulic stress for all scenarios except 1, 4 and 7 decreases over time, with annual 
variation. 
10.  Scenarios 1, 4 and 7 show the strongest correlations between conflict and stress, 
but all scenarios show some evidence of a correlation. 
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11.  Average agent fear of government and trust in government both decrease over 
time, but trust in government enjoys a brief sharp peak in the first two years of the 
simulation, followed by a fast then slower rate of decrease. 
12.  There is little evidence that fear of government trust in government have any sort 
of correlation with ground water banking activity. 
13.  There is strong correlation evidence that as sociability increases, social stress 
decreases. 
14.  There is reasonably strong correlation evidence that as sociability increases, 
conflict decreases, particularly so for Scenarios 1, 4 and 7. 
15.  For Scenarios 1, 4 and 7, agent perception of water availability decreases steadily 
throughout the simulation. The other scenarios show a decrease until year 10, and 
then a slow increase. 
16.  Intra-annual variability in perception of water availability is much higher for 
Scenarios 1, 4 and 7 than for the other scenarios. 
17.  All scenarios experience a dramatic increase in perception of water availability 
within the first year of the simulation. 
18.  Water conflict appears to be sensitive to agent perception of water availability 
only in Scenarios 1, 4 and 7. 
19.  Capital is strongly negatively correlated with societal conflict, particularly in 
Scenarios 1, 4 and 7. Debt is more weakly positively correlated with societal 
conflict across all scenarios 
 
One particularly clear trend can be drawn from the analysis of the stress data: the less the 
institutional change, the less the amount of stress the agents are under. Increased 
interference by the government, and increased requirements to participate in the bank, 
will lead to greater individual stress. However, in the moderate institutional change 
scenarios, no government interference exists apart from making available the option of 
participating in the bank. The CHJ agent does not mandate participation at that level of 
change. Yet the very presence of the bank appears to cause an increase in stress levels. 
This may be because of the pervasive effects of hydraulic stress: participating in the bank 
can raise or reduce hydraulic stress levels depending on the transaction type, volume and 
whether or not it is approved. It seems the simple act of adding a banking institution to 
the system increases stress because it increases the transaction costs to agents, and the 
potential for risk to adversely affect their water situation. 
 Economic stress among all stress variables shows the most inter- and intra-annual 
variability. This is probably due to linkages between economic stress and dynamics 
beyond those of the hydrologic system. The model was parameterized with historical and 
projected economic data, and so captures the contribution of both exogenous economic 
conditions. This introduces new elements of variation and uncertainty, and the economic 
stress variables in agents appear to be reflecting this. 
 It is important to note how hydraulic stress decreases over time for all scenarios 
except those without ground water banking. It is difficult to make unequivocal linkages 
between dimensions of such a complex system, but this does suggest that the ground 
water banking - some indirect or direct effect of the institution - is working to reduce 
hydraulic stress. The general relationship described in Point 10 is not surprising: higher 
stress is the primary precursor to conflict. More interesting is the lack of correlation 
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between agent perception of government and volume of participation in the ground water 
bank. This may be because the agents are not fundamentally equipped to defect on mass 
from government requirements. A small percentage will not change an agent’s behavior 
even if ordered to do so by the CHJ agent, but most will. For most agents their opinion of 
the government is largely irrelevant to their participation in the bank - particularly if they 
are forced to participate. 
 It is clear why sociability is negatively correlated with stress: one of the few direct 
feedbacks encoded for sociability is a response to stress. The higher the level of social 
stress that the agent feels, the higher the probability that the agent’s inclination towards 
communication and interaction will decrease. The apparent correlation between 
sociability and conflict is less obvious, but is probably a by-product of the positive 
correlation between stress and conflict. As described earlier, sociability is a principal 
control on the distance a rumor will propagate in the agent population. As for GWBSIM, 
which value the rumor contains (from the full range of internal resources of the agent) is 
randomly selected. Therefore, it is theoretically possible that a rumor of higher stress 
levels (which is certainly technically possible) propagated exceptionally well and caused 
overall stress levels to rise; this would correlate with reduced sociability as receiving and 
passing on a rumor incurred a cost for each agent. The mechanism is somewhat tortuous, 
however, so I would prefer the explanation that a higher stress reduced sociability by 
exploiting a pre-specified feedback.  
 A final nail in the coffin for the non-banking scenarios is the steady reduction in 
agent perception of water availability relative to the banking scenarios. While all 
scenarios are dominated by decrease, banking scenarios show some sign of a recovery 
after year 10. This may represent the delayed feedback of recovering aquifer levels in the 
banking scenarios: as agents find that water levels are creeping higher in their wells, they 
will respond favorably by reducing stress and increasing their perception of water 
availability The non-banking scenarios also experience more significant intra-annual 
variation, and stronger correlations between perception of water availability and conflict. 
This higher sensitivity to water availability in the non-banking scenarios could be 
indicative of a broader feature of these scenarios: in the absence of an institutional 
mechanism to deal with water scarcity, and the potential additional income this can 
generate, agents become more dependent on their perception of water availability for 
their stress levels and so have a higher propensity to generate conflict. Non-banking 
scenarios are consequently less robust to changes in the physical system (more affected 
by climate change), whereas the banking scenarios appear to be more dominated by stress 
and conflict due to the institution of ground water banking itself. 
 The brief exploration of the financial data suggests strong but inverse relations 
between capital and conflict. This contrasts with the much more uncertain relations 
between debt and conflict, where correlations are by turn positive and negative. It is not 
surprising that conflict and capital are reasonably strongly connected: agent cognition is 
set up to be very sensitive to changes in agent capital, since making money and making 
more money is the primary goal of the Farmer agent. Debt is less strongly pre-specified, 
and so the lack of correlation is expected. 
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5.4 ... Comparative Analysis, GWBSIM and AlbAgent 
  
A direct comparison between GWBSIM and AlbAgent data is not strictly possible. 
GWBSIM and AlbAgent are models of different systems that run on different time steps 
(GWBSIM: daily; AlbAgent: weekly), different time periods (GWBSIM: 5 years 
beginning in 1980; AlbAgent: 14 years beginning in 1997), different agent typologies 
(GWBSIM: 5 agent types; AlbAgent: 2 agent types) and significantly different 
hydrogeological models (GWBSIM: response functions; AlbAgent: bathtub model). 
Indeed, model differences (and different success in collecting data) mean that there are, in 
fact, only limited grounds on which the two datasets can be compared: data comparison 
would not be appropriate. With this in mind, I will conduct a limited comparative and 
generally qualitative analysis of the two models, highlighting the areas where the two 
datasets were most similar and, conversely, most different, and any general conclusions 
to be drawn from these similarities/differences. A brief discussion follows each 
highlighted difference and/or similarity. 
  
Difference 1: conflict and ground water banking 
 
GWBSIM and AlbAgent generated very different outcomes from the perspective of 
conflict. In GWBSIM, the banking scenario generated significantly less conflict than its 
non-banking scenario. For AlbAgent, social conflict was significantly higher for the 
banking scenarios than the non-banking scenarios. But in both cases, there is strong 
evidence that the ground water bank led to changes in conflict dynamics. 
 
This is a major and critical difference, providing strong support for the major hypothesis: 
a dynamic linking the banking system with conflict clearly exists in both models, even if 
the sign of the dynamic is different in each case. It is not certain why the difference 
exists. One possibility is in the nature of the pre-specified response of each model’s 
agents to government action. The GWBSIM model attempts to capture the more laissez-
faire government model in the western United States, by not allowing for much 
government interference beyond setting the price per unit water. The AlbAgent model, on 
the other hand, attempts to capture the much more interfering and didactic tendency of a 
European government in regional water operations. This has meant significant cognitive 
differences for agents between the models. Agents in both GWBSIM and AlbAgent have 
environmental, economic and social sensitivities that affect the state of their internal 
stress variables. But AlbAgent agents have many more opportunities to resent 
government involvement, and experience higher stress levels on a social front due to that 
involvement, because the government agent is by its very design inclined to step in more 
often. It is telling that hydraulic stress in AlbAgent goes down for the banking scenarios, 
while the social stress goes up - the problem is not the bank itself, but additional 
interference that the extra institutional capacity represents. 
 
Difference 2: severity of conflict 
 
GWBSIM experienced the highest level of conflict possible in the simulation  - court 
action - while AlbAgent did not experience a single conflict of comparative severity. 
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Without conducting extensive comparative runs to explore the sensitivity of outcomes to 
agent conflict action thresholds, it is difficult to say conclusively whether or not this 
difference is due to finer points of cognitive design within each agent, or whether it is in 
fact due to some fundamental difference in the response of the model to ground water 
banking. 
 
Difference 3: bank performance 
 
GWBSIM showed a much more consistent rate of increase in deposit volumes over time 
than AlbAgent, which was largely devoid of any particular trend either for deposits or for 
leases. Furthermore, GWBSIM’s deposits increased steadily over time, whereas 
AlbAgent’s deposits peaked early then showed variation with little clear trend. 
 
This is most likely rooted in the different population structures for each model. GWBSIM 
had several different basic irrigator types, whereas AlbAgent had just one. Among the 
GWBSIM irrigator types was an economically strong, infrastructurally-equipped agent 
that had water to spare and little risk even if no payment was forthcoming for deposits. 
This irrigator type dominated the statistics for bank performance, since this irrigator was 
reasonably insensitive to vagaries in economy and the environment. The Farmer agent in 
AlbAgent, on the other hand, was the only agent type interacting with the bank, and much 
more sensitive to economic, social and environmental change when selecting the volume 
of a lease/deposit proposal. Possible affecting this is the design of agent cognition in 
GWBSIM: deciding to participate and then choosing an appropriate lease/deposit volume 
was conducted as a separate action once a year, including a consideration of a broad 
variety of factors not restricted to hydrologic concerns. In AlbAgent’s simpler cognition, 
the same process was included within the irrigate() algorithm (potentially called every 
time step, depending on the agent’s crop type). For AlbAgent agents, deciding to 
participate in the bank is strongly tied to immediate hydrologic conditions, which are 
themselves highly variable. Consequently, AlbAgent agent decisions are less robust to 
hydrologic variation at decision time, leading to more of a punctuated equilibrium than 
the steady trend exhibited by GWBSIM. 
 
Difference 4: intra-annual variation 
 
AlbAgent results displayed much more dramatic intra-annual variation, across most 
measured variables, than seen in GWBSIM. 
 
There are two major sources of potential annual variation in AlbAgent: the annual crop 
planting/irrigating/harvesting cycle, and processing of conflicts by the government agent 
(CHJ). The annual crop cycle could potentially influence conflict, since the process of 
choosing, planting, irrigating and harvesting a crop requires that the agent make a number 
of decisions that assess its perception of water availability, and involve communication 
with other agents - which could lead to changes in internal state that promote conflict 
generation. Remember that in both GWBSIM and AlbAgent, conflict-potential 
assessment is undertaken every time step, so there is no annual variation attributable to 
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the simple fact of assessing whether complaining is a good course of action. Most of the 
crop cycle decisions that will influence stress and other conflict-critical variables in 
AlbAgent are taken at the beginning of the year, so this could help explain the peak in 
stress variables at this time. Note also that, since some of the agent crops (e.g. olives, 
vines and fruits) may run on less than a 52 week harvesting cycle, this could help result in 
some of the smaller peaks of stress and other cognitive activity seen during the year. The 
second possibility is that the action of the CHJ agent to reset its record of conflict each 
year is introducing some significant and unnatural annual periodicity to the system: all 
agents have some awareness of the global level of conflict, and this awareness they 
receive from the CHJ agent. Their awareness of conflict in the society at large is tied to 
their own stress levels and in turn the likelihood that they will complain and add to the 
global level of conflict. It is further possible that this cyclical change in awareness of 
conflict is having unknown knock-on effects to other cognitive variables: for example, 
the range of cognitive variables that includes water availability, since these show a 
particularly strong tendency to annual variation. 
 A problem with the first explanation is that GWBSIM has a similar annual cycle 
in crop selection, planting, irrigating and harvesting. In fact, this cycle has a much 
stronger annual basis, since there are no crops that have a less than or greater than 52 
week cycle. It may be that the resolution of data analysis is simply not good enough to 
show up more detailed annual variations (most datasets gathered from GWBSIM runs 
were averaged across months or years), or it may be the case the fact that AlbAgent’s 
annual reset of conflict does not exist in GWBSIM.    
 
Similarity 1: deposit/lease balance 
 
In both GWBSIM and AlbAgent, participation in the ground water bank was dominated 
by deposit transactions. The volume of deposits in both models was up to double that of 
the volume of leases made. 
 
The basic theory behind this form of bank performance in both models is similar: 
deposits are less risky and carry greater potential payoffs than leases, and so provide far 
more positive feedbacks to early adopter agents who then spread the word and re-deposit 
themselves the following year. The problem in encouraging leasing was discussed at 
length in the GWBSIM data analysis, where it was found that a combination of low risk, 
higher payoff and the restriction of leasing until the second year of banking led to a 
permanent and sometimes worsening imbalance between leases and deposits. However, 
since the same year 1 moratorium on leasing was not present in AlbAgent, it appears that 
even if deposits and leases are permitted from the very beginning, the system is still 
predisposed to weight deposits more than leases. It is debatable whether a real banking 
system in either setting would have a more rapid feedback: one would expect the lack of 
payback on deposits to lead, within a year or so, to rapid reductions in deposits as 
individuals realized the imbalance. However, this does not factor in the importance of 
cognition: in GWBSIM, trust in the bank and happiness with the transaction costs were 
important cognitive variables probably influencing the number of agents who came back 
for more. Nor does it factor in the fact that depositing agents in GWBSIM were stronger 
economically and hydrologically, and so could afford a few years of loss particularly if 
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participation made them feel better about the imminent risk of an ESA listing. In 
AlbAgent, similar ‘fear’ variables were in action: all agents had some variable relating to 
‘fear of shutdown’, or other fear of government action that might reduce the amount of 
water available to them. Consequently, behaviors should have been oriented towards 
reducing the level of fear, and participation in the bank had a feedback that would reduce 
the agent’s perception of its shutdown risk. This would give positive feedback for future 
participation even if other feedbacks (e.g. rate of return on investment) were negative. 
Leasing does not have the same confluence of cognitive feedback and favorable agent 
typologies: leasing is accomplished on an as-needed basis, and does not represent any 
sort of investment either in hydrologic terms (so that more water is available later) or in 
social terms (so that the government doesn’t shut you down). It also costs more, and so 
requires a stronger commitment and higher cognitive thresholds to conduct. While it is 
interesting and instructive that both models display qualitatively similar behavior for 
lease/deposit balances, it is not clear why the imbalance was typically in a ratio of 2:1. 
This is something to address in future work. 
 
Similarity 2: role of economic conditions 
 
In both GWBSIM and AlbAgent, higher levels of capital equated to lower levels of 
conflict. In both models, debt had more of a mixed role, sometimes positively and 
sometimes negatively correlated with conflict. 
 
Money, in effect, makes the agent models go round. Many agent activities are at least 
partially undertaken to make money, and more of it if possible: the crop cycle, selling 
land or water, participating in the bank, etc, all have potential economic benefits that the 
agent is hardwired to pursue. In this sense, the strong connection between capital and 
conflict in both models is entirely predictable: the drive to maintain and increase capital 
is hard coded for all agent typologies barring the government actors, in the form of 
positive feedbacks for actions that benefit capital, and negative feedbacks for actions that 
cost capital. In this way, a reduction in capital does not in and of itself lead an agent to go 
to court (or protest, in the case of AlbAgent), but will raise its stress levels and affect 
other cognitive variables in predictable ways that will raise the probability of the agent 
eventually complaining or going to court. Debt is not hard coded to influence agent 
behavior in the same way, so it is also understandable that debt is less clearly associated 
with conflict. It does have some effect on stress in both models, but in not as many places 
or with as significant magnitude compared with capital. The importance of capital in 
relation to conflict raises the specter of calibration of models with such complex and 
detailed social components. For both GWBSIM and AlbAgent, the connection between 
capital and conflict is indirect and not deliberate, but the dynamics between capital and 
stress are very direct and very deliberate. The strength of the feedback, which is generally 
parameterized by the modeler although it may fluctuate during the model and be modified 
stochastically at runtime, is something that has to be derived from some sort of social 
investigation either with primary or secondary source material. In the case of GWBSIM, 
this material was extensive interviewing with local stakeholders and expert testimony as 
to agent motivators. In AlbAgent’s case, this material was mostly just expert testimony 
and literature review. Was the assumption of close connections between capital and stress 
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in GWBSIM also valid for AlbAgent? We should acknowledge at this point that, despite 
the complexity of these systems models and the high potential for emergent behavior due 
to unforeseen and unspecified interactions between model components, it is still very 
likely that the hand of the modeler will show in the results. 
 
Similarity 3: baseline conflict 
 
Results from both models show that the baseline conditions - no institutional and 
environmental change added - experienced often not inconsiderable levels of conflict. 
 
Superficially, this is evidence to support the argument that both models are adequately 
calibrated and validated. Both real world systems are afflicted with conflict at the present 
time, albeit to varying degrees, and so the reproduction of the existence of conflict by the 
baseline scenarios in both models is heartening. It raises the probability that the 
fundamental setup of each model is a reasonably true approximation of reality: both 
eastern Idaho and eastern Spain suffer conflict and water scarcity due to over-allocation 
and worsening climatic outlook. The models do a reasonable job of reproducing those 
conditions - agents competing for a finite resource, climate worsening over time, and 
conflict being generated as a result. Remember that there is no hard coded, direct 
relationship between the struggles of agents and conflict. Nowhere in either model’s 
specification is any direct algorithmic relation listed that would directly connect the 
amount of water an agent has with the amount of conflict it generates. The models both 
make indirect connections by making the assumption that agents are predisposed to 
become stressed when they have less water, and a higher level of stress (plus other 
contributory factors) will raise the probability of the agent going to court or otherwise 
generating conflict. But to the credit of both models, the conflict generated in the baseline 
scenarios is generated purely as a result of the basic interactions of agents, which is partly 
controlled by the initial parameterization of each model. To paraphrase Epstein and 
Axtell (1996), conflict in both GWBSIM and AlbAgent is grown and not made.    
 It is also possible to interpret this similarity as evidence that complicates the 
assertions made so far regarding the major hypothesis. Discussions so far have addressed 
the evidence that more institutional change wreaks some sort of change on the severity 
and/or frequency of conflict in an artificial society. The fact that in both models the 
baseline scenario is highly conflicted suggests that I can only support the major 
hypothesis as far as it applies to systems that are already experiencing conflict. Neither 
model helps us much with the case of a system that is already in a conflicted state. Since 
the focus of the thesis is on such systems, this might seem a moot point. But consider the 
implications for a water manager: not only is she likely to be interested in seeing the 
effects of an expansion in institutional capacity on the current level of conflict, but she 
will also be curious as to the effects of the expansion on any dimension of a system that is 
not already conflicted. While this analysis does not materially change anything from the 
perspective of the thesis, it does add some sideboards to the real world relevance of any 
conclusions drawn. 
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5.5 ... Discussing results from the perspective of the Sub Hypothesis 
 
Hitherto, the sub hypothesis has been barely discussed. As a reminder, this asserted that 
“institutional and environmental differences between modeling settings do not necessarily 
mean that a fundamentally new socio-hydrologic agent must be built for each”. What 
light do the results for both models shed on this hypothesis? Note that for the purposes of 
testing this hypothesis I set out in AlbAgent to build the same - or similar - cognitive 
engine used in GWBSIM, using the very same code wherever possible. 
 By the principle of falsifiability, one can never conclusively prove a hypothesis, 
merely reduce the probability that it is wrong. On the other hand, we can conclusively 
prove a hypothesis wrong: I begin this discussion by determining whether, despite setting 
out to construct similar agent cognitive engines in each model, I in fact created AlbAgent 
cognitive engines fundamentally different from their counterparts in GWBSIM.  
 The comparative analysis just completed shows considerable difference and 
considerable similarity between the results from each model. Many of these differences at 
least partly stemmed from fundamental differences in content and structure between the 
representation of irrigators in each system. Consequently, the discussion identified 
several areas of significant difference that relate to the cognitive models used in each. For 
example: 
 
• The greater complexity of the GWBSIM cognitive model, in terms of larger 
numbers of cognitive variables, and more sophisticated processing of IF-THEN 
rulesets 
• Variation in location and severity of feedbacks from the results of actions/thoughts 
onto cognitive variables such as stress and social capital. 
• Less significant role for emotional variables in AlbAgent (fewer of them and fewer 
feedbacks from and to agent action). 
 
While I can assert that the basic concepts of all agents in both models are derived from 
the Belief-Desire-Intention cognitive architecture, some fundamental structural 
differences do exist: 
 
• AlbAgent makes use of far more pre-processing of intentions prior to selecting an 
action. The ‘temporal tag’, ‘concept’ and ‘intention’ filters allow the average 
AlbAgent agent to conduct a much faster binary search of the action space than the 
equivalent agent in GWBSIM. All of GWBSIM’s agents have to check for the 
activation condition in all possible actions every step of the model run. This 
imposes a performance overhead, but also means that some actions which would be 
weeded out earlier though AlbAgent’s hierarchical selection process will slip 
through the net in GWBSIM (due to stochastic components in its decision making) 
and so will change the behavior of GWBSIM agents. 
• GWBSIM makes use of fuzzy logic to process large numbers of IF-THEN rulesets 
into action. AlbAgent makes use of a weighting process, where particular outcomes 
are weighted according to an assessment of influencing conditions. The 
contribution of positive and negative influences for a particular outcome are 
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weighted such that it requires a majority of positive or negative influences before 
one action or the other is taken. The process of selection is a great deal more 
stochastic at the action-selection level in AlbAgent (but note that it has already 
narrowed the field considerably more than GWBSIM by that point), and a good 
deal less sophisticated: far fewer condition-action pairs are evaluated.  
• The different structures for processing intentions into actions via condition 
evaluation mean that there is a significant performance benefit for AlbAgent and a 
significant performance cost for GWBSIM. This, in turn, means that other 
components of agent cognition - such as memory and learning - can receive more 
processor and memory attention in AlbAgent than they do in GWBSIM. One of the 
reasons the GWBSIM runs ended up being 5 years rather than 20 is that the time 
needed to complete the full runs (over 5 hours) and the memory required to keep 
the Java heap from overflowing (around 2 GB) was prohibitive from a logistics 
standpoint. The smaller, leaner cognitive model of AlbAgent does mean that 
actions are taken via the evaluation of a much smaller number of conditions, and so 
there will likely be significant differences in the adaptability and the richness of 
agent behavior. But it does also mean that more runs can be completed and more 
analysis conducted on more data. 
• The nature of the memory structures in AlbAgent and GWBSIM are different. In 
GWBSIM, memory is a simple store-and-retrieve arrangement, with little temporal 
sensitivity (a corollary would be a single read/write action per memory type - every 
time something is written to memory, it erases the previous memory of that same 
type). In AlbAgent, memory has better indexing, so that a specific year in the past 
can be selected, and new memories added without overwriting old memories. The 
difference reflects what was mentioned earlier, in that more resources (both 
processing and memory) could be devoted to memory in AlbAgent than were 
available for the same in GWBSIM. In fact, the AlbAgent memory structure was 
attempted in GWBSIM, but led to a major memory leak and so had to be discarded. 
 
Do these differences fundamental, or are they merely tweaking the technical details of the 
same conceptual model? I would argue the latter. Agents for both models process a set of 
beliefs into a set of intentions (or plans), and then select from the viable intentions at any 
one time a particular preferred intention, before processing that intention into an action, 
and finally taking the action. Results of the agent’s own and other agents’ actions feed 
back into beliefs and so affect future actions. Stripped down to their basic structure, 
cognitive models in both GWBSIM and AlbAgent are similar enough that no new theory 
had to be implemented in code. In fact, AlbAgent is more of a Version 2.0 to GWBSIM’s 
1.0: the development of GWBSIM preceded AlbAgent by several months, and so 
experience from the development of GWBSIM informed the development of AlbAgent. 
The design process for AlbAgent took the basic concept settled upon in GWBSIM, and 
attempted to implement the same basic concepts but with more efficient and effective 
coding. The question really, then, is what is really meant in the sub hypothesis by 
“fundamentally new”. Does the same concept but a new technical implementation count 
as a fundamentally new agent?    
 To answer this, we must consider whether the differences in model behavior 
induced by the technical differences listed above were significant enough warrant 
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characterization as “fundamentally new”. The following list is discussed considering 
AlbAgent relative to GWBSIM. 
 
• Less cognitive complexity: this generated simpler, less adaptive behavior, but 
nothing new. 
• Fewer, more dispersed feedback points: AlbAgent feedbacks were fewer and 
farther between. This led to less sensitivity of AlbAgent agents to changes in their 
external environment. The one area where this perhaps had the most effect was in 
the acuteness of conflict experienced by each model: maximum level in GWBSIM, 
and only the moderate (‘formal complaint’) level in AlbAgent. With more and 
denser feedback points from agent action/observation to agent emotion and thought 
processes, it is likely that agents would have been more sensitive to external 
stressors. However, while this would potentially change the maximum level of 
conflict experienced, it does not create any fundamentally new behavior. 
• Less emphasis on emotional variables in AlbAgent: relative to GWBSIM, AlbAgent 
used far fewer emotional variables (where ‘emotional’ covers internal resources 
that were not related to tangible external resources, e.g. happiness, stress). This was 
more a result of limited development time than intentional reductions. It is true that 
adding or removing anything (including variables) from a facsimile of another 
model will render that model no longer a facsimile but a unique creation - and with 
unique model outcomes as a result. It was clear from the analysis of GWBSIM 
results that its emotional variables had no significant influence on the outcome of 
the model. This is probably partly the result of a deliberate engineering decision: 
uncertain about the validity of embedding such subjective (and sometimes 
controversial) components into agent cognition, and mindful of the problems in 
calibrating such components, I deliberately underweighted the influence of change 
in emotional variables on any other variables or actions. So if these variables are 
added or removed, they are less likely than most other variables to cause any 
significant change in agent behavior. In other words, by removing emotional 
variables from the array available to agents in AlbAgent, it is unlikely that I made 
any great change to the model outcome. Consequently, I hazard that this does not 
provide strong evidence that the models differ significantly.   
• More pre-processing of intentions prior to action selection: this reduced the 
processing and memory footprint of the model, but did not fundamentally change 
agent behavior. One minor change would have been in the degree of stochasticity in 
action selection, since GWBSIM agents incorporated a wider search of the potential 
action space than AlbAgent agents, allowing for greater opportunities for chance 
selection of actions inappropriate if we assumed purely rational decision making. In 
other words, AlbAgent agents probably behaved in a marginally more predictive 
way. But note, this is a purely qualitative assessment without strict quantitative 
basis. 
• Use of a weighting process versus fuzzy logic for selecting between IF-THEN rules: 
this certainly reduces the richness of responses for an AlbAgent agent, but does not 
change the fundamental way the agent behaves. An AlbAgent agent assess current 
conditions, and takes action if the conditions meet a certain combination of stored 
rules. This is exactly the same behavioral approach taken by GWBSIM agents, only 
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these agents have a larger ruleset to choose from, more powerful algorithms to sort 
through the ruleset, and more sensitivity to variation in precursor conditions. 
• Increased emphasis on memory versus active cognition: AlbAgent possesses 
greater ability to store and retrieve data than GWBSIM. This does have the 
potential to significantly change behavior, but does not make any real change to the 
way the agent makes decisions. Consider an example: a typical decision point in 
both models is the choice an irrigator faces between irrigating or not irrigating. In 
GWBSIM, the irrigator might factor in what the current temperatures are associated 
with (in annual terms). Does a 45 degree high at this point in the year mean that a 
drought has followed in the past? GWBSIM agents’ primitive memory could only 
consider the last piece of data stored covering 45 degree days and what 
subsequently followed. If the last year happened to be a non-drought year, even 
though all the preceding years were serious drought, the agent would underestimate 
the drought probability. In AlbAgent, on the other hand, each agent would have a 
better recall of the drought years and so perhaps be more inclined to adopt a more 
conservative irrigation strategy. In either case, the fundamental strategy has not 
changed - using memory of past conditions to influence current decision making - 
even though the actual decision is different. In passing, I note a point made by Van 
Lehn (1991), who suggested that one cannot ascribe a different cognitive 
architecture to an entity on the basis of a limited snapshot of its behavior. 
 
From these arguments, I propose that the cognitive agents used in GWBSIM and 
AlbAgent, despite significant differences in technical implementation (the code for each 
would look very different if compared), are not different in terms of fundamental 
cognitive architecture. 
 I am advancing that the same conceptual approach to agent cognition in two or 
more different models, even if their technical implementation differs widely, will result in 
reasonably similar fundamental behavior between agents - where fundamental behavior is 
that behavior which is independent of parameterization, i.e. how an agent makes 
decisions and not what decision the agent actually takes in any given situation. The sub 
hypothesis posits that it is not necessary to build a completely new socio-hydrologic 
agent for each setting; with my concept of ‘difference’ in mind, we can re-word the sub 
hypothesis: it is not necessary to adopt a completely new cognitive architecture for agents 
between different socio-hydrologic settings. ‘Cognitive architecture’ in this instance 
refers to the basic principles around which the decision making algorithms of an agent are 
organized. I can now ask the question, given the results generated by GWBSIM and 
AlbAgent runs: should I have adopted a completely different cognitive model for 
AlbAgent agents versus GWBSIM agents? In other words, was the cognitive model 
adopted for AlbAgent in any way deficient relative to GWBSIM? If the model was 
indeed deficient, then the sub hypothesis would not be supported, because of the 
implication that AlbAgent’s different setting required a fundamentally different cognitive 
architecture.  
 I will begin with attempting a brief analysis of the fundamental institutional 
differences between the two settings. As discussed earlier, this was the area of most 
significant likely difference between the two settings, since on climatic and 
hydrogeologic grounds they are remarkably similar. By delineating the basic institutional 
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differences, I can establish whether there were grounds for fundamentally altering agent 
cognitive architectures to address these differences. If so, then there is a stronger case to 
be made that the cognitive architecture adopted for both models was deficient because it 
did not address these differences. I will use Ostrom’s Institutional Analysis and 
Development framework, since it is actor-focused and a well respected tool for describing 
institutions and institutional systems. According to Koontz (2003), Ostrom’s framework 
suggests that actions by individuals related to institutions is influenced by the following 
factors: “(1) attributes of the physical world, (2) attributes of the community within 
which actors are embedded, (3) rules that create incentives and constraints for certain 
actions, and (4) interactions with other individuals” (Koontz 2003, 3). I will use these as 
basic descriptors of institutional setting for the purposes of comparison.  
 Having found that attributes of the physical worlds in both systems are 
sufficiently similar for the purposes of coarse modeling as to be discounted in this 
discussion, what about community attributes? The Idaho irrigation community, despite 
the fact it is riven by significant legal conflict, is remarkably cohesive and uniform. This 
is much in common with other western United States irrigation communities, which may 
dispute ownership and use of water, but generally are similar in economic characteristics, 
social make-up and political leanings. The Albacete irrigation community seems to share 
the same level of uniformity and cohesiveness, even though it is a good deal smaller in 
population (Angelo, pers. comm., 2007). The rule bases that create incentives and 
constrain actors is the first real area of apparent of difference: in particular, nothing like 
the Water Framework Directive exists in Idaho. Actors in the eastern Snake appear to be 
far less restricted by potential government action, and have far greater freedom to use 
their water as they see fit. However, the difference may only be one of magnitude: the 
WFD embeds elements similar to components of several major pieces of Federal 
legislation currently impacting the eastern Snake - the Endangered Species Act in 
particular. But the WFD remains a paper document with variable levels of commitment 
from European governments. A similar dynamic could be argued for Federal legislation 
implemented at the state level. There may, in fact, be more similarities between the 
institutional rulebase facing irrigators in Idaho and those in eastern Spain than first 
apparent: both communities face censure by a regional authority; both communities 
regulate their economic activities at least partly in tune with patterns of national and 
supranational agricultural subsidies; both communities are driven to use technology to 
source irrigation water for the purposes of growing cash crops; and importantly, both 
communities are incentivized to defend their water rights though recourse to political 
and/or legal action. So in terms of point 3 in Koontz’s interpretation of the IAD 
framework, Idaho and eastern Spain may share more similarities than differences, with 
the exception of one important area: the history of irrigator relations with authority. 
While it is the case that both Albacete and Idaho have enjoyed and even expected 
nationally subsidized irrigation infrastructure, the willingness of the Idahoan irrigation 
communities to accept government interference not in their own economic interest - and 
the range of tools with which they can fight that interference - is greater and wider 
(respectively) than is the case in Albacete.   
 From this cursory analysis, the greatest area of institutional difference between 
the two settings appears to be in the resources the institutional setting makes available for 
agents to fight governmental interference, and the extent to which agents within the 
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system resist interference not in their economic interest. The important question, then, is 
whether or not the cognitive architecture used in GWBSIM is able to adjust to each 
setting without fundamentally changing. The adjustment to take account of this difference 
is, in reality, a simple one: slight change in parameters, a larger range of actions available 
to the government action, and reduced density of feedbacks between government action 
and stress/conflict. No major change in the fundamental decision making processes of the 
AlbAgent agent is required.  
 Given that it is reasonably clear that institutional differences between the settings 
are not sufficient to warrant an entirely new cognitive architecture, what about the 
technical performance of the architecture in each model? I define ‘technical performance’ 
as problems encountered in data quality/model performance/agent behavior/system 
behavior and so on, but clearly localizable to some element of the cognitive architecture. 
The simple answer is that the cognitive architecture adopted was deficient in both 
models, but no problems with technical performance are localizable to the application of 
the cognitive architecture to AlbAgent versus GWBSIM. Areas of mutual deficiency 
included: 
 
• The agents in both model were not as adaptive and responsive as intended in the 
original specifications. This is primarily because the BDI framework does not 
provide for more adaptivity in agent behavior than the modeler chooses to 
hardwire. This is unlike the ACT or SOAR frameworks, for example, which can 
marshal new information and generate new action at runtime (Anderson 2003).  
• The representation of agent knowledge using the ‘belief’ and ‘desire’ concepts, 
while a simple and accessible approach, quickly becomes complex as the number of 
beliefs and desires spirals. This was particularly true in the case of GWBSIM, and 
was one of the reasons the AlbAgent implementation was leaner from the start. 
• The BDI framework does not provide any sort of guidance as to how to mesh agent 
learning and memory with its basic framework of knowledge. Since learning and 
memory were explicit and important parts of agent typologies in both AlbAgent and 
GWBSIM, this was problematic. 
 
Aside from mutual deficiencies, there were a few areas of different technical 
performance. But as the following discussion shows, none can be traced to specific 
problems with the application of the GWBSIM/BDI model of cognition in the AlbAgent 
context: 
 
• The technical implementation of AlbAgent fell short of providing the richness of 
agent behavior seen in GWBSIM, even if the conceptual models were very similar. 
For example, the irrigate action in GWBSIM is composed of a number of 
subroutines, each of which is defined separately. This allows for more dynamic and 
detailed behavior. In AlbAgent, the irrigate method is completely self-contained 
and does not call any other subroutines. This was a deliberate design change from 
GWBSIM in order to achieve a leaner codebase, but it did have some implications 
both for the complexity of agent behavior and ease of debugging.  
• Some of the data generated in AlbAgent showed evidence of artificial variability 
due to the oversimplified implementation of the BDI cognitive model in AlbAgent. 
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The intra-annual cyclicity seen in most cognitive variables may well be an artifact 
of poor integration between institutional and cognitive algorithms. For example, the 
annual ‘reset’ of conflict records by the CHJ may be having an influence on agent 
cognition well beyond the likely magnitude of any such effect in the real system.  
 
The bulk of these implementation issues stem from the leaner implementation of the 
GWBSIM cognitive model, which I would argue is not a fundamental problem with the 
conceptual framework of agent cognition since it could be addressed by another cycle of 
development (and would probably fall under a validation task for a longer project). 
Disregarding these issues, then, there is little evidence that the GWBSIM cognitive 
architecture, when applied to the Albacete setting, experienced fundamental problems. 
Without doing more exhaustive testing of the same models with different cognitive 
engines for each agent typology, it is impossible to say conclusively whether a different 
cognitive model would have been better tailored to the Albacete setting. But for the 
purposes of comparison, I propose that the two cognitive architectures not only did not 
substantively differ, but that the different settings did not require different cognitive 
models - from both institutional and technical perspectives. 
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6.0 ... Conclusions 
 
Here I address the two research questions posed at the beginning of the thesis 
(reproduced below for reference). If evidence has emerged that disproves either the Major 
Hypothesis or the Sub Hypothesis, I will discuss this in detail; otherwise I will construct 
brief arguments summarizing the earlier discussions, in favor of the two hypotheses. 
 
6.1 ... Research Question 1 
 
Question 1: Theories exist which suggest that higher institutional capacity correlates 
with reduced conflict frequency and severity; can agent-based socio-hydrological models 
of two institutionally rich, conflicted water resources management settings contribute to 
this theory, and if so, what kind of theoretical relations do they suggest? 
 
6.1.1 … Conclusions on existence of a theoretical relation 
 
The results present a contradiction. The more complex GWBSIM showed that ground 
water banking had a significant effect on the level of conflict in its artificial society. 
Comparing the -GWB and +GWB scenario on all significant metrics shows that in the -
GWB scenario agents were more stressed and more likely to launch conflict than under 
the +GWB scenario. Conflict was both more frequent and more severe under the -GWB 
scenario. Conversely, AlbAgent showed that higher levels of institutional change, which 
included ground water banking and other government interference in the running of the 
hydrologic system, were strongly correlated with increases in per agent stress and overall 
levels of conflict in the system. What does this mean for the major hypothesis? The major 
hypothesis suggested that, due to tight coupling between institutions and the physical 
system, that any change in the institutional framework would lead to a change in the level 
of conflict - via the physical system. While the data from GWBSIM and AlbAgent are 
somewhat contradictory, the discussion in the Results has shown that there are plausible 
causative relations between institutional change to conflict outcome. Epistemologically, 
while there are uncertainties in the data and in the simulation structure, the model is still, 
at base, a logical model. Consequently, the modeler has complete control over simulation 
predicates, and unlike other approaches to analyzing complex social systems, agent-based 
models can communicate strong evidence of causative relations (given initial 
assumptions). Given the analysis and this epistemological reality, I can confirm the 
hypothesis:  
 
Institutional change does lead to a concomitant change in level of societal conflict, for 
two simulated artificial societies. In one case, the change is negative, and in the other the 
change is positive. But there is most definitely change and the causal link to the 
expansion in institutional capacity is clear in both cases. 
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Note that in the following discussion, I occasionally use terminology that implies a 
human-like intelligence to agents: words like ‘ability’, ‘belief’, ‘see’ and so on. These 
terms are only meant to be descriptive in the sense of the coded cognitive abilities of each 
agent. They do not imply real creative intelligence on the part of any agent. For example, 
when a GWI agent ‘sees’ the ground water bank as presenting an economic benefit, this 
is only because the exploitation of economic opportunity is a specific behavioral 
characteristic the agent can adopt from a range of hard-wired options. It does not imply 
any sort of reflective consideration in the way a human might undertake. 
  
6.1.2 … Conclusions on the nature of the confirmed theoretical relation 
 
In the case of GWBSIM, it is not exactly clear how the ground water bank is having the 
effect of reducing conflict. The banking system did affect individual variables in a 
predictable way: for example, it reduced agent stress via a variety of cognitive benefits. 
However, poor correlations between change in any single variable and the overall conflict 
outcome suggests that: 
 
The most likely explanation for the reduction of conflict in GWBSIM is a combination of 
factors interacting in an emergent fashion.  
 
This combination included the financial boost that participation in the bank provided, the 
positive feedback to key agent emotions caused by successful transactions with the bank, 
and certain artifacts of the design of the institution itself: GWIs are more likely to 
participate in depositing because they more often have excess water and are less likely to 
need to lease water. SWIs are less likely to deposit because they more rarely have excess 
water, and have a higher risk aversion due to their more vulnerable economic situation. 
Participation in the bank is thus, by virtue of physical reality and institutional 
mechanisms, weighted in favor of GWIs and deposits; the data for bank performance 
strongly supports this conclusion. This system is showing emergent properties (Epstein 
2002) because a confluence of factors is acting on the per-agent scale in unexpected 
ways, resulting in unexpected (could not be predicted a priori) macroscale system 
behavior. 
 Similarly, in the case of AlbAgent, it is not fully clear why increasing institutional 
capacity is leading to higher levels of conflict. This is despite the fact that the level of 
participation in the ground water bank is - relatively speaking - as good in AlbAgent as it 
is in GWBSIM. Once again, it appears that: 
 
An emergent mix of factors are acting through local agent feedbacks to generate more 
conflict when we might expect less.  
 
Higher stress leads to greater propensity to complain but greater motivations to 
participate in the bank, and a different institutional environment in AlbAgent relative to 
GWBSIM means that the institution of ground water banking does not have the same 
role. This last point is critically important to helping us unravel why, for Idaho, ground 
water banking reduces conflict and why, for Spain, it increases conflict: in the Idaho 
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setting, agents largely participate in the bank primarily because they see a financial 
opportunity, have excess water to spare, and calculate that the risk to income is not great 
enough to prevent participation. Fear of future government action is a part of agent 
motivations in GWBSIM, but these agents experience and emphasize this variable 
nowhere near as strongly as agents in AlbAgent. In the Spanish setting, agents live in fear 
of government action at some point in the future; participation in the bank does little to 
reduce that stress. It may in fact increase stress, which may ultimately lead to more 
conflict. In the AlbAgent scenarios with more extreme systemic change, agents not only 
fear intervention but frequently experience it: the government is able to issue ‘shut down’ 
directives and force new subsidy programs upon the Farmer population. The key dynamic 
is variation in what motivates agents to participate in the bank. It appears that increases in 
institutional capacity that do not address the social stressors in the system, will not be 
very effective in reducing system conflict. I can summarize this discussion by 
emphasizing the different roles the ground water bank plays in each systems: 
 
• In GWBSIM, the bank acts as an economic and social pressure value, allowing 
some agents to both make money and allay fears of government action. 
• In AlbAgent, the bank acts primarily as an environmental mechanism, improving 
water availability but causing friction among the community because participation 
is not necessarily voluntary. 
 
To summarize the discussion so far, we can characterize the nature of the theoretical 
relations between institutional capacity and water conflict as the following: 
 
Institutional capacity and water conflict are likely to be related for a given artificial 
society, but the exact nature of the relations (positive, negative or neutral) will depend on 
the emergent results of the mix of predicate cognitive and economic factors included in 
the model. 
 
A component of the major hypothesis suggested that institutional capacity might alter 
system conflict because it would make more water available to those who needed it, 
mainly by reducing system inefficiencies. Both models provide evidence that contradicts 
this suggestion. In AlbAgent, ground water banking appears to be wildly successful in 
improving the state of the aquifer, and so makes more water available. But it does so at 
the expense of social harmony, greatly increasing the social stress on agents in the system 
and doing little for their economic stress. Due to data collection problems, GWBSIM’s 
environmental data is not available, so it is not possible to say exactly what impact the 
bank had on the hydrologic system (both surface and subsurface). But with significant 
deposit volumes (a cumulative total of around 4 million acre-feet by the end of the 
simulation), both river and spring flows are likely to have been positively affected. Even 
given this likely positive hydrologic benefit of ground water banking, it emerges that one 
of the strongest drivers to participate in the bank for GWBSIM agents was what the bank 
represented to the agent type which participated the most. For the GWI agents, with their 
strong economic position, were able to see the bank as an additional potential economic 
opportunity. The existence of the opportunity had favorable effects on the agent’s level of 
stress and knock-on effects on the level of conflict in the system. In some ways, this is 
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not far from one particular view of the problems in the real system. Some stakeholders 
maintain that it is not hydrologic or climatological problems which plague the Snake, but 
economic competition between different groups of irrigators and water uses. According 
to their views, it serves the lower valley well to accuse the upper valley of using too 
much water, since putting the upper valley out of business through some unilateral state 
action would mean more economic hegemony for the lower valley. Of course, such 
sophisticated dynamics are not a part of GWBSIM, but in a crude way the model appears 
to do a good job of replicating them. 
 Putting the question in terms that a water manager might appreciate, given the 
intended corollaries between artificial and real societies: is expanding institutional 
capacity likely to result in reduced conflict? The answer is yes, but only sometimes, and 
not always for the reasons one might suspect. In GWBSIM, banking succeeded in 
reducing conflict because it provided potential for economic benefit, providing additional 
uses for excess water, and - to a smaller extent - improving absolute availability of water 
in the system. In AlbAgent, banking succeeded in improving the overall environmental 
sustainability of the system by reducing over-allocation and making more water available 
(in absolute terms) to recharge the aquifer. This is an important point which should not be 
underemphasized. However, one might say that this kind of benefit would not be realized 
in the real world, because environmental benefits are usually put after resolving social 
problems. Such was the level of conflict in AlbAgent that one cannot but think that 
ground water banking would not last long even with such positive environmental 
benefits. But note: while ground water banking in AlbAgent did not succeed in reducing 
conflict, this was not because it did not make more water available. It failed because the 
root of the problem was the level of cumulative stress the agents were under, social, 
economic and hydrologic. The bank addressed hydrologic stress at the expense of social 
stress; the institutional solution represented by the bank did increase institutional capacity 
to handle the basic problem of water scarcity, but not the institutional capacity to handle 
conflict and certainly not the capacity to address negative attitudes to government 
interference. A more successful scenario might have been a ground water banking system 
accompanied by economic incentives (instead of threats) to guarantee a base level of 
participation, and a changed institutional environment reducing the likelihood of future 
government action. In some ways, GWBSIM and AlbAgent represent ends of the 
spectrum with regard to how much the government should step in and influence the 
operation of the bank. GWBSIM’s SME was limited to a very hands-off approach, 
charged with carrying out simple bank administration. AlbAgent’s CHJ, in the most 
extreme change scenarios, had the power to issue shutdown orders and participation 
directives, as well as set the price per unit of water in the bank.  
 To summarize the lessons for a water manager: 
 
• The likely effect on conflict of expanding institutional capacity depends on the 
nature of the scarcity in the system. If the scarcity is fundamentally hydrologic – 
there is, on average, less water available for the whole system than is being 
demanded – expanding institutional capacity will have its strongest effects when 
the capacity somehow makes the pie bigger (i.e. adds more water, physically, to 
the system). If the scarcity is fundamentally institutional – there is enough water 
to go round, but it is distributed badly through inefficient allocation systems – 
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then expanding institutional capacity may have a much stronger effect on conflict. 
Where the nature of the scarcity is both hydrologic and institutional, institutional 
capacity is likely to have moderate effects on reducing conflict, but will not 
resolve conflict.  
• A critical variable that may help determine the effectiveness of a banking system 
(and any form of institutional capacity expansion) is the degree of government 
involvement in the expanded system. The appropriate degree of involvement will 
vary between different contexts, but the median position – using the economic 
clout of the state to incentivize participation, and perhaps taking a harder stance 
when necessary to re-balance bank participation – is likely to be most effective in 
most cases. 
• Another critical variable helping to determine the effectiveness of a banking 
system in reducing conflict is the type and level of a priori social stress the actors 
in the system are experiencing. We could operationalize “social stress” concretely 
as pre-existing levels of legal and political conflict, or less concretely as levels of 
animosity or social tension between social groups. In either case, it would serve a 
water manager well to be aware of the range and degree of tensions (legal, 
political and social) in the system: if the institutional capacity increase does not 
directly or indirectly address these tensions, it may stand a poor chance of 
reducing conflict. 
 
6.1.3 … Additional conclusions on the limitations of a banking system 
 
 Even in the case of the successful bank in GWBSIM, the extra institutional 
capacity did not reduce stress and conflict to zero, suggesting that the banking concept 
has some limitations in how effective it can be in addressing fundamental (and macro-
scale) issues - the variable economic vulnerability of different agents, the effect of 
hydrologic variation on the stress in the system, and so on. The fact that the bank was 
most beneficial to those agents who could take economic advantage of the institution, or 
those agents who benefited indirectly through its hydrologic effects, suggests that in the 
longer term it might not be so effective at addressing chronic symptoms of over-
allocation. One could argue that in the real Snake, conflict is emerging through strongly 
economic drivers: economic interests are being harmed (or perceive themselves as being 
harmed) by the lack of sufficient water to go around, and so court actions to get other 
agents to reduce their water use are the most useful tool to address this harm. This ground 
water bank does not reduce demand: it might even increase demand over time as agents 
perceive more availability and increase production. This is not demonstrated by the 
model, but is a possible forecast for a banking future.  
 
6.1.4 … Conclusions on contributions to the Basins-At-Risk theory 
 
 Aside from addressing the specific hypothesis, what do I have to add to the 
Basins-At-Risk theory, which correlates increased institutional capacity with reduced 
water conflict? First, it is clear that the theory is not watertight. There exist potential 
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systems where simply adding institutional capacity will not, on its own, address water 
conflict. For example, where the institution requires a degree of equity in participation 
(i.e. all stakeholders get an equal chance to participate in the institution and collect 
benefits from it), pre-existing economic and political conditions may mitigate against that 
equity. For this reason, it may be necessary in some instances to increase the strength and 
frequency of government intervention. Conversely, expanding institutional capacity 
without addressing how the new capacity is received by stakeholders can ultimately result 
in failure to address conflict, even if the institution has considerable environmental and/or 
economic benefits. The balance between economic carrot and government stick can be 
critical to avoid either stifling the institution’s effectiveness, or letting it run wild without 
guidance and control. In summary, we can add the following caveat to the overall body of 
theory: 
 
Addendum 1: Pre-existing political and economic conditions may lead to inequities and 
inefficiencies and result in failure of increased institutional capacity to mitigate water 
conflict. 
 
The simulations also showed the importance of individual perspectives on a proposed 
institution. While ‘emotional’ variables are rarely a part of any engineering or policy 
assessment, nevertheless they do play a certain role in the reception of an institution by a 
stakeholder community, and its continued success or failure. GWBSIM and AlbAgent 
incorporated detailed emotional characteristics, parameterized on very limited empirical 
grounds. The choice of which emotional variables to include, however, was based on the 
in-depth interviews conducted in Idaho, and discussions with regional experts in Spain. 
So, while the validity of the exact emotional states of agents in both GWBSIM and 
AlbAgent is somewhat suspect and not appropriate to use in a predictive manner, the 
models are useful for illustrating the potential power of emotional and other internal 
cognitive variables on the overall success of an institution. We can add to the theory the 
following: 
 
Addendum 2: The success of an institution in mitigating conflict may be partly dependent 
on individual perspectives of the stakeholder population, particularly cognitive 
dimensions such as emotions and degrees of inter-stakeholder 
communication/cooperation.  
 
The modeling results suggest the possibility that increasing institutional capacity can in 
fact increase the environmental sustainability of a system without necessarily reducing 
conflict in that system, and vice versa. From AlbAgent’s results it is clear that the 
banking system contributed a large volume of water to aquifer recharge that would 
otherwise not have been present. However, this did not address social conflict, and in a 
real system such conflict might lead to the failure of the institution and its removal and/or 
replacement. In the case of GWBSIM, the institution succeeded in reducing conflict but 
probably did not make a substantial contribution to the environmental sustainability of 
irrigated agriculture. While longer term outcomes for GWBSIM were not simulated, it 
could be hypothesized that without substantial environmental benefits, in time the 
institution would have failed. In other words, institutional capacity needs to be effective 
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at addressing the multiple potential roots of conflict. This is an argument for holistic 
solutions that address environmental, economic and political problems. Given that one 
institution is unlikely to be able to achieve this on its own, this suggests that a suite of 
new institutions may be necessary in a given setting to address the multi-faceted nature of 
water conflict. Few systems have simple problems, and so I would go so far as to suggest 
that this a requirement when thinking about institutional solutions to water conflict. 
Consequently, we can add the following to the theory: 
 
Addendum 3: Adding institutional capacity may not reduce conflict, and may in fact 
increase conflict, if it does not address the multiple potential roots of conflict in society 
and environment. 
 
From my discussion of model results, I can suggest some modifications to the theories of 
change for both settings which I advanced in the major hypothesis. Previously I 
suggested that the eastern Idaho setting was institutionally frozen, whereas the eastern 
Spain setting had two institutional systems coexisting - local and regional/national scale - 
with variable levels of ‘freezing’ between the systems. The implication of an 
institutionally-frozen setting is that change is generally more dramatic, because 
continuous, gentler change is not possible in the face of institutional inertia. Both models 
implicitly tested this by simulating both non-change and change scenarios; the results 
show that a period of institutional equilibration may be encountered after the introduction 
of change. Examining changes in both internal cognitive, external environmental and 
even external social variables suggests that zero change scenarios have lower 
‘equilibration’ peaks than the change scenarios. I briefly discussed earlier the inherent 
equilibration period resulting from the nature of simulation modeling and the mismatch 
between parameterization and the stable system state, but even including this assumption, 
the change scenarios experience a much steeper re-adjustment across most system 
variables. The implication for BAR theory is as follows: introducing new institutional 
capacity will likely result in a significant re-equilibration of the social and economic 
system. The severity of this adjustment will have implications for the later success or 
failure of the institution, since the system will take a time period to return to normal 
proportional to the initial peaks or troughs in system variables. These results are also an 
argument for extended testing of new institutions, upwards of a decade for particularly 
large and complex changes. Expecting dramatic results for systems that implicate 
environmental systems (which are usually slow to respond to physical change instituted 
by human action) may lead to disappointment and weakening of the institution. We can 
add the following to the theory: 
 
Addendum 4: Institutional capacity will perturb the system to which it is added. The later 
success or failure of the institution in mitigating conflict may depend on the size of this 
initial perturbation. 
  
Finally, the simulations have underlined the importance of transaction costs and 
administrative dynamics to the fate of new institutional capacity. Most new institutions, 
whether as complex as a standalone aquifer banking system, or simply new regulations 
for regulating some component of water use, will add some amount to the transaction 
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costs facing stakeholders, and change the temporal organization of actor behavior. 
Getting the administrative structure of the institution right is critical to making these 
added costs as small as possible, and avoiding new damaging feedbacks as a result of the 
new timetable. GWBSIM’s banking system encountered damaging imbalances between 
deposits and leases partly because of the enforced delay in allowing leases after the bank 
was instituted. AlbAgent’s banking system introduced interesting and not entirely useful 
cycles of activity in the wider model by restricting participation to one transaction a year 
and not staggering applications across each year. The cycle of application, approval, and 
notification in both models undoubtedly added cognitive overhead to each agent, and kept 
the government agent extremely busy. One could imagine a much more streamlined 
approach, perhaps testing an ‘honor’ system where transactions would be free of 
administration within certain volume limits. We can add the following to our theory: 
 
Addendum 5: The administrative costs and time dynamics of a new institution can have 
both positive and negative effects on agent behavior that may impact the effectiveness of 
the institution in reducing conflict. Institutional design from the perspective of 
minimizing transaction costs for stakeholders, and adjusting the new institution to 
existing economic and political action cycles, may have important implications for 
overall institutional success. 
  
6.2 ... Research Question 2 
 
Question 2: What do the significant institutional differences between the western US and 
eastern Spain mean for an attempt to build a more generic agent architecture (cognition 
and action mechanisms) that could be used to simulate socio-hydrologic systems across 
political, geographic and cultural borders? 
 
With these two models I have attempted to show that it is possible to transfer the same 
concepts of agent cognitive architecture between very different institutional and cultural 
settings, and still obtain reasonably credible and workable results. However, confirming 
this hypothesis required some creative interpretation of ‘generic’ and ‘universal’, limiting 
these terms to the conceptual model being adopted and not the detail of the technical 
implementation. My experience in developing the different agent typologies for each 
model suggests that developing a truly universal socio-hydrologic agent, where the 
complete technical implementation of the agent (cognition and action) is transferred 
wholesale from one model to another, is not possible. This is particularly true for the 
action mechanisms that agents must be equipped with. The original intent with the 
GWBSIM to AlbAgent transition was to port the existing set of actions in GWBSIM 
straight into AlbAgent. However, desired improvements in efficiency and effectiveness 
of the agent architecture, parameterization changes appropriate to locale which 
necessitated background architectural changes, and completely new components required 
for the new setting, meant that agents in GWBSIM and agents in AlbAgent have 
significantly different actions in terms of both technical implementation and technical 
description. At this point I suggest the following addenda to the hypothesis: 
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1. A universal socio-hydrologic agent is entirely possible, but only from the 
perspective of the framework of the agent’s cognitive architecture. I define 
‘cognitive architecture’ in this instance as the theory that underlies the way the 
agents in the model make decisions. The BDI approach adopted in these models 
appears to work well, and provide great flexibility for changing real world 
settings: the beliefs, tangible resources, desires and even intentions may all 
change, but the basic structure is unaffected.  
 
2. A universal socio-hydrologic agent is not possible if that definition requires a 
complete technical implementation that can be implemented ‘as-is’ in new 
models, perhaps as a portable code library. Most settings, even restricting 
ourselves to the United States, are sufficiently different in terms of actors, 
environments, institutions and range of possible actions by actors in their 
environment, that the technical differences in parameterization will require 
unavoidable new coding in significant amounts on top of any standard library. If 
the basic skeleton of a socio-hydrologic agent is sought rather than a complete 
implementation, universal portability and utility might be more achievable. The 
series of figures in Appendix B lays out my personal vision for what the ideal 
socio-hydrologic agent skeleton would include. The vision is organized along 
hierarchical lines, with expansions for detail at each sub-component of the overall 
cognitive control in each agent. Communication between agents is also addressed. 
This set of diagrams is offered as a potential blueprint for a generic hydrologic 
agent framework that does not specify the technical implementation. By making 
this kind of framework available to new modeling teams, it might be possible to 
reduce the normally laborious task of identifying the appropriate cognitive 
architecture most relevant to a socio-hydrologic modeling exercise. The work 
completed for this thesis does not completely shut the door on a universal socio-
hydrologic agent in both conceptual and technical implementation, but the design 
and implementation of this agent would have to include an enormous library of 
plug-and-play components. This is the kind of project suited to a community 
effort, with successive implementations of socio-hydrologic agents leading to 
successive improvements in the range of functionality supported by the agent 
code, and the robustness of its implementation.  
 
3. The modeling results suggest that the challenge in developing portable socio-
hydrologic agents may not extend to institutional mechanisms. Evidence of this is 
that the ground water bank in GWBSIM was essentially directly ported to the 
AlbAgent setting with only minor technical changes. It was, instead, at the level 
of the Farmer agent in AlbAgent that major institutionally-related changes had to 
be made to cognition and action. Farmer agents in the Spanish setting had far less 
political and economic independence relative to the equivalent agents in Idaho, 
for example. Farmer response to government action, and anticipation of the same, 
also varied considerably between the two settings. Consequently, differences in 
the way agents perceived institutions, rather than the structure of the institutions 
themselves, were the principal motivations for changing agent architectures 
between the two models. 
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7.0 ... Suggestions for Further Work 
 
My experience in designing, developing and running two large and complex agent-based 
simulation models suggests to me several key and under-served research areas pertinent 
to advancing the theory and practice of agent-based modeling, specifically agent-based 
modeling of socio-hydrologic systems. I discuss these areas below. My focus on a 
hypothesis relating institutional capacity and water conflict has also made clear some 
major deficiencies with existing theory and potential avenues for future work using 
simulation modeling. These avenues are also discussed below. 
 
7.1 ... Agent-based modeling of socio-hydrologic systems 
 
The first important point is that the cognitive architectures of socio-hydrologic agents do 
bear some distinctive traits relative to other applications of agent-based models and the 
agent concept. For example, socio-hydrologic agents have close and dynamic relations 
with their physical environment, and so the engineering of these relations requires special 
care relative to other applications of agent modeling. Furthermore, there may be unique 
dimensions of the social system that socio-hydrologic agents need to be able to handle 
(such as water conflict and institutional mechanisms), for which specific agent logic will 
be needed and which precedent in other fields of application will not shed much light on. 
However, the very concept of socio-hydrologic agent remains unknown in the literature, 
and little explored by most researchers. I have attempted to show in this thesis that some 
degree of universality in cognitive architecture is possible, i.e. that different water 
resources management settings can use agents with the same basic decision making 
framework. However, I have also shown that agent-based models in different settings 
may require significantly different technical implementations depending on the social and 
environmental qualities of the setting. This suggests that there is potentially fruitful work 
in exploring to what extent the need to tailor technical implementations could be avoided 
by improving the efficiency and adaptability of agent algorithms. The goal of such work 
should not just be to make available more robust and portable agent libraries, but to build 
theory related to just what defines a socio-hydrologic agent. I have offered a start on this 
endeavor with the framework diagrams included in the appendix, part B. My strong 
feeling is that such work should proceed collaboratively and through open source tools 
(e.g. code repositories and development foundations), since the experience of any one 
modeler is overshadowed by the collective intelligence of the agent-based modeling 
community. 
  
7.2 ... Institutional capacity and water conflict 
 
The simulations and results I have described in this thesis have hopefully shown that 
there are indeed strong dynamics relating institutional capacity and water conflict, and 
that the BAR theory (increasing institutional capacity will reduce water conflict) is sound 
in so far as it implies institutional capacity and conflict are connected. However, the 
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results from the two models have also shown that the BAR hypothesis may not always 
hold true, and that some modifications to the theory may be necessary. There is 
considerable further work to be done ascertaining exactly what predisposes a system to 
experience a certain institutional/conflictual dynamic. Simulation models have an 
important role to play in this effort, since it is only through complex simulation modeling 
can we ever hope to have the kind of social laboratory needed to test alternative theories 
relating institutions and conflict. Future work could include: more exhaustive testing of 
existing models to see whether it is variation in agent internal cognition or the external 
environment that is most responsible for generating and prolonging conflict; 
implementation and testing of alternate institutions to see what role form (as opposed to 
size) of institutional capacity plays in conflict dynamics; and whether it is possible to 
develop probabilistic descriptors allowing decision makers to access the risk of increasing  
conflict in a system when implementing a new institution or adding extra institutional 
capacity. 
 
7.3 ... Ground water banking 
 
The ground water banking institution was the central focus of both models. The basic 
specification of the institution referenced work by Bryce Contor, hydrologist from 
IWRRI in Idaho Falls, ID. This specification was made in light of the existing limitations 
in the legal and political scene surrounding water in Idaho, and consequently assumed 
that the system would only be open to the least radical version of ground water banking 
possible. This conservative version of banking is by no means the only one, and there is a 
great deal of further work that could be done to explore, through simulation modeling, the 
implications of changing a variety of institutional variables. These include: the means by 
which the price per unit water is set (which could have implications for the balance and 
efficiency of the bank); the means by which agents are encouraged to lease and/or deposit 
(which could address some of the potential transaction imbalance issues this thesis 
identified); the diversity and scale of bank participation (should all agents participate, or 
perhaps only selected typologies?); whether the physical means by which leases and 
deposits are actuated matters to the overall operation of the bank; and whether social and 
environmental differences between settings (even within one country) affect the design of 
a ground water bank. Once again, agent-based simulation modeling can be a powerful 
tool in answering these questions, since it allows rigorous and transparent testing of 
theories that would otherwise rely on studies of real systems that either do not yet exist or 
for which suitable performance data do not exist.
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Appendix 
Part A  
Semi-structured interviewing guide – eastern Idaho,  January/February 
2007 
 
Not for circulation 
 
Introduction: 
 
 The purpose of the interviewing: to develop a description of how the 
many individuals and agencies make decisions about management and 
the use of surface and groundwater in the Eastern Snake; to understand 
the many perspectives on how the river and water delivery systems 
work; to explore general opinions on the potential for ground water 
banking. 
 The nature and intent of the modeling: build an integrated social-
biophysical model of the water resource systems in the Eastern Snake 
River Plain, providing a credible and realistic tool for simulating the 
social, economic and environmental response of the region to different 
ground water banking scenarios. 
 
Theme 1: 
 
The Big Picture: explores the most salient issues locally and regionally for the 
stakeholder. 
  
1.1. From a general perspective, what are the biggest problems or issues related 
to water use and management in the Eastern Snake, at the present time? 
 
1.2. What are the core economic factors affecting these issues? 
 
1.3. Are there any major problems or issues related to water use or management 
in the Idaho Falls area that are not seen on a more regional scale? 
 
1.4. Do you see any intersection between economic and natural factors? 
 
1.5. How closely is the economic future of the urban areas in the Snake tied to 
the agro-economy?  
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Theme 2: 
 
Decision-making: the typical decisions facing a stakeholder during each year 
 
2.1. What are the producer decisions each year that are most influenced by 
economic factors, and what are those factors? 
  
2.2. Do any of these decisions have ripple effects in the wider producer 
community, or are any decisions particularly contentious for any reason? 
 
2.3. Are there any producer decisions particularly susceptible to intervening 
economic factors that might act to render them ineffective after theyʼve been 
made (and an action taken)? 
 
2.4. Where are the principal areas of uncertainty in the economic factors that 
influence producer decision-making? 
 
2.5. How do you see farmers handling this uncertainty? 
 
2.6. What level of control do farmers have over their economic conditions? 
 
2.7. What is the typical level of understanding of producers as to the micro- and 
macro-scale conditions within which they operate? 
 
Theme 3:  
 
Others: the influence of the decisions and actions of other individuals and 
institutions 
 
3.1. From this list of stakeholders, please describe for each stakeholder what you 
see as their economic role in the Eastern Snake, if they have one. 
 
3.2. Please pick out the stakeholders whose opinions and views tend to have the 
strongest economic influence over other stakeholders. 
 
3.3. Which of these stakeholder tend to conflict economically the most, and why? 
 
3.4. Which of these stakeholders tend to collaborate the most, and why? 
 
3.5. Is it possible to identify a trend toward economic conflict or collaboration 
among stakeholders at the present time? 
 
3.6. Are there economic factors, processes or activities in different areas of the 
plain that interfere with each other – not necessarily in direct conflict, but 
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perhaps in competition or somehow linked so as to influence each other 
strongly? 
 
Theme 4: 
 
Interests: the principal stake that the individual or organization has in the 
management of the Snakeʼs water 
 
4.1. Are producers largely satisfied – from an economic perspective – with the 
current arrangements for managing water?  
 
4.2. If there are areas of dissatisfaction, what do you think the typical producer 
would like to change to orient the economic system more toward their 
interests? 
 
4.3. Are there legal or institutional links to the economic system that we havenʼt 
talked about so far? 
 
4.4. Is there scope for changes to the legal or institutional system that would 
improve economic conditions for producers? 
 
Theme 5: 
 
Future vision: where water use and management is headed 
 
5.1. What do you see as the future of water use and management in the Eastern 
Snake? 
 
5.2. What do you think will be the major economic factors and trends in the 
future? 
 
5.3. What would you like the future to be? 
 
Theme 6: 
 
Ground water banking: economics and options for banking 
 
6.1. From an economic perspective, do you have any opinion on how useful 
ground water banking might be in the Eastern Snake? 
 
6.2. Ground water banking would likely have impacts on the local and regional 
economic system if implemented. Are there any particular factors, 
processes or issues that youʼd like to see explored using simulation 
scenarios?
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Part B  
Generic hydrologic agent: proposed framework for adaptation to and 
implementation in specific simulation contexts 
 
Note on diagrams 
 
The sequence begins with an overview of the cognitive architecture of the ideal 
hydrologic agent. The most senior component is the cognitive engine, which provides the 
functional code that knits together all the various sub-components. This may take the 
form of a higher level state chart, controlling transitions from one deliberative process to 
another; or it may take the form of a more dynamic continuous loop, accessing sub-
components as needed. The Belief-Desire-Intention model of cognition is recommended 
over ACT-SOAR, or other more complex cognitive models, for its relative efficiency and 
ease of implementation. The seven sub-components are not necessarily organized in an 
optimal fashion, and an implementation might find that there are overlaps between sub-
components that require some merging of categories. They are merely offered as a 
suggested map of cognitive elements that should, ideally, be part of an agent’s cognitive 
architecture. Each sub-component is outlined in detail in the relevant diagram: 
capabilities of each sub-component and a brief justification for the capabilities are 
offered. 
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